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ABSTRACT 
At present, the Ukrainian population in Ukraine, and Ukrainian émigrés abroad are using two 
different orthographical systems.  The issue, which of the two codes of Ukrainian can be 
considered legitmate standard Ukrainian, is the subject of many emotionally charged debates in 
Ukraine and within the Ukrainian community in the West.  This research focused on the events, 
processes, and politics that had led to the emergence of the two orthographic codes of Ukrainian, 
as well as on the social engineering efforts that had accompanied each stage of language 
planning.  Books and publications on the history of Ukraine, language planning and government 
policies in Ukraine, Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union have been examined alongside with 
the theory of types of social engineering to reveal how government policies reflected on 
selection, codification, elaboration and securing acceptance stages of language planning.  
Outcome of the study of political impact on standard Ukrainian may be of interest to scholars 
researching language planning in the context of bilingual societies and political power.  It may be 
used to explain to students of Ukrainian how the differences between the orthographies used in 
the West and in Ukraine came into existence.  Awareness and understanding of the historical 
roots and political context of the development of the existing standards of Ukrainian may assist 
individuals involved in and effected by this polarizing issue to find shared concepts, and begin 
appreciating the existing diversity of the language. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a multilingual society, languages inevitably influence and transform each other. The 
dynamics of change become more complex if one of the languages holds a dominant status. 
Ethnic identity is generally communicated through language; in societies where one culture 
occupies a dominant position, minority groups that speak languages other than the dominant one 
are perceived as distinct and separate and, therefore, as a threat to the dominant culture. 
Substratum languages are affected both by their affiliation with the dominant language and by 
the socio-economic relationship of speech communities.   If the social and cultural hierarchies 
remain unresolved, the substratum languages tend to ideologize into the national identity symbol 
of a subjugated group and, ultimately, become a political tool and battlefield for liberation 
movements.   
The social institutions of a dominant culture take various measures to assimilate 
substratum groups.  Through various official acts they may forbid the use of oppressed 
languages.  For example, in France, the 1539 Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts prohibited “the 
use of local dialects in all legal ordinances [which] was a key move in the imposition of the 
French language” in the city of Villers-Cotterêts (qtd. in Joseph 46, Joseph 61, Schiffman 83-
84).  In Tasmania, practically every speaker of the local language was killed (Holmes 56).   In 
Ukraine, after the Bolshevik military troops occupied Kyiv in 1918, general Muraviov passed an 
order to shoot everyone who spoke a “nationalistic language” (Ukrainian), in the streets of Kyiv 
(qtd. in Lytvyn 228, Solchanyk 64-65).  People in power have theoretically limitless tools at their 
disposal that allow them to preserve their control over conquered nations, and they do not 
hesitate to use them if their domination is threatened. A dominant social group can assimilate the 
oppressed linguistic community by using the standard variety of the substratum language if the 
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superstratum and substratum languages belong to the same linguistic group and therefore have 
similarities in their vocabulary, phonetics, and grammatical structures. They are able to erode 
and, ultimately, destroy the substratum language by making it similar to the superstratum 
language. 
At all stages of its history, Ukrainian language development reflects the complex history 
of the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian people.  Russia’s efforts to retain Ukraine as a 
territory within its borders were partially driven by the apprehension of losing Ukraine as a 
province because this meant the origin of the Russian language and national identity would have 
to be found outside the country1  2 (Ryabchuk 262-263).   Moreover, the idea of Ukraine’s 
independence from Russia presented a greater threat to the Russian empire than the separation of 
any other group; this is because nations not related to Russia as closely as Ukraine ethnically, 
culturally, or religiously, could perceive Ukraine’s sovereignty as a strong liberation call.  
Therefore, the authorities of tsarist Russia, and later the Soviet government, engaged all possible 
oppressive political mechanisms to prevent any conditions that would allow a liberation 
movement in Ukraine.  One of the tools used by both Imperialists and Soviets to destroy Ukraine 
as a separate nation was the development of a standard variety of the Ukrainian language; during 
Soviet times, this facilitated the assimilation of Ukrainian people into the notion of the russified 
New Soviet Man.  The intensive Ukrainian language development from 1919 to 1938 reflects the 
Soviet national policies geared at non-Russian ethnic groups—this was the empire’s self-serving 
                                                      
1 Kyiv, founded in the mid fifth century, is the capital of Ukraine and was also the capital of the Eastern 
European Slavic State, Kyivan Rus’ (IX-XIII centuries) between 878, when Oleg (Helgi), Varangian (Viking) Prince 
of Novgorod seized Kyiv and made it the chief Varangian base, and 1240, when Kyiv was destroyed during the 
Mongol invasion led by Batu Khan.  1240 is considered as the end of Kyivan Rus’.  Kyivan Rus’ became the 
foundation of the Ukrainian, Russian, and Bilorussian national identities.  There are heated scholarly, political, and 
historical debates about which modern countries can legitimately claim the legacy of Kyivan Rus’ as their 
inheritance (Lieven 13-16, Wilson 17).   
2 Moscow, the capital of Russia, was founded five centuries later than Kyiv, by Yurii Dolgorukii during his 
rule between 1149-1157 (Wilson 13).  
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endeavor.  These national policies permeated all four avenues of language planning:  (1) 
selection of a dialect for the standard variety; (2) codification (corpus planning), which is the 
development and standardization of language rules; (3) elaboration, the extension of language 
functions into new areas; and (4) securing acceptance of the new standard variety by means of 
language status planning (Holmes 102).  An analysis of the planning processes undertaken by the 
Russian and later Soviet governments with respect to Ukrainian will demonstrate the devastating 
impact of Russia’s political position on the Ukrainian language.  Soviet government language 
policies were aimed at engineering sociolinguistic conditions that would eradicate the Ukrainian 
language and, therefore, help retain Ukraine within the geographical borders and political 
domain of Russia.  Since “language planning is undertaken by those who are in a position of 
power” (qtd. in Williams 221) and “the distinctive traits of standard languages reflect a cultural 
intervention against the normal development of language” (qtd. in Joseph 19), an examination of 
the history and details of language reform in Ukraine undertaken in 1919-1938 will reveal the 
true mandates of the Soviet government.   
The history and socio-economic processes of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union 
are complex and conflict-ridden as a result of the challenges and fears of colonial powers 
struggling to preserve their conquests.  Both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union stretched over 
vast territories inhabited by various ethno-linguistic and religious groups; their respective 
governments resorted to ruthless oppression of the indigenous populations and engaged vicious 
colonization policies.   Both regimes have been characterized by scholars as authoritarian and 
totalitarian.  Authoritarian systems are keen on halting the freedom of speech and public 
gatherings, prohibiting the formation of independent political groups and enforcing the 
censorship of information (Kojder 216). Totalitarian regimes exercise controls over all aspects of 
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a country’s social life and expect citizens to blindly embrace state ideology.  The state often 
engineers the consent of citizens by imposing and controlling conditions that would trigger such 
consent (Alexander, Schmidt 2-3).  For example, a continuity of oppressive policies between 
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union can be observed by examining Joseph Stalin’s history and 
his time in power. During the times of Imperial Russia, before the Bolshevik revolution and 
creation of the Soviet Union, Stalin was put in prison and personally experienced Imperial 
Russia’s harsh oppression of criminals and revolutionaries.  Stalin, in turn, resorted to terror and 
mass killings during his reign. Therefore, it appears that he merely used the techniques he 
experienced himself—it is possible he may have drawn on his personal experience to support his 
tyranny and censorship.  Tsars and emperors, such as Ivan the Terrible, Catherine the Great, 
Peter the Great, and other Russian monarchs introduced punitive measures and silenced freedom 
of expression (xi-xvi Bliss Eaton).  Tsar Ivan Grozny was glorified during the years of Stalin; 
Grozny’s system of oprichnina was given a positive image in order to justify the killings and 
terror inflicted by Soviet power (Perrie 112-113).  Scholars observed similarities in promoting of 
vigilance against internal and external enemies, reign of terror, mass killings and rhetoric of 
loyalty in the times of Ivan Grozny and Stalin (Nezhyvyj 184, Perrie 123-124). 
According to  modern  Western, Ukrainian and Russian scholars, historians, and political 
science experts, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian country.     Official Soviet literature and mass 
media, as well as the discourses of a few modern pro-Russian neo-communist groups, however, 
paint a different picture.  From the onset of Bolshevik power in 1917 to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, all stages of Soviet history embody affirmative actions, deportations, 
imprisonment, and massacres.  The Soviet regime controlled education, literature, art, and press 
in order to manufacture “social consent through mass indoctrination” (qtd. in Rees Stalinism... 
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46).   Colonial and totalitarian powers often resort to social engineering to achieve their goals 
and to camouflage their intentions.   One can observe a lengthy series of large-scale projects 
requiring an abundance of committed human resources for their successful outcome.   The 
endeavors of the Soviet state are instances of social engineering called to induce collective action 
and ensure its success. 
There are four types of social engineering: sociotechnics proper, self-made social 
engineering, quackish social engineering, and “dark” social engineering (Podgórecki 26-29).  
Sociotechnics proper is an efficient social action that is based on an accepted system of values, 
supported by a body of scientifically verified theses used to formulate recommendations, develop 
methods to achieve goals, and evaluate results (Podgórecki 26, 54-55).   Self-made social 
engineering relies on verified professional knowledge but consists of a number of bureaucratic 
directives with no scientific measures to evaluate efficiency (Podgórecki 26-28, 55).  Quackish 
social engineering is boastfully pretentious in its recommendations since it appeals to one’s 
emotions and involves ideologies (Podgórecki 27).  Dark social engineering takes place when the 
authorities engage in activities that are harmful for people. (Podgórecki 27, 52).  This is the form 
of social engineering seen in Soviet Ukraine, given the high number of human casualties. 
However, Ukrainian language planning undertaken between 1919 and 1938 does reveal features 
of all four types of social engineering defined above.   
The Soviet regime established in Ukraine after the country’s short-lived periods of 
independence in 1917-1919 resulted in the most massive social experiment of the 20th century 
(Lytvyn 219-239).   Building the Soviet state was an attempt to build a new utopian country.  The 
Bolshevik government aimed to destroy the pre-revolution administrative, political, judicial, and 
social structures and establish a new type of community that would operate according to the 
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preconceived ideas and visions of Bolshevism.  However, as the Soviet society progressed 
through the various stages of its development, from time to time, new circumstances of a 
political and economic nature and new personalities in power introduced changes to the policies 
and amended the social projects and plans to reflect new visions.   People were the objects of 
efforts to design a new society, which was supposed to be comprised of a new type of individual, 
namely the New Soviet Man. On the other hand, people were treated as the subjects, the 
designers, and the implementers of the social engineering endeavors.  The government realized 
that, on its own, the removal of old social structures would not secure the acceptance of a new 
way of life.  The public’s values and traditions had to be eradicated and replaced with a new set 
of morals and beliefs.  In the process of social engineering, “human beings serve as raw 
material” (qtd. in Alexander, Schmidt 1); similarly, language was the material employed by 
advocates of social change with the purpose of molding the public’s standpoints according to the 
requirements of an artificially constructed Soviet society.  Language not only absorbed and 
reflected the social change, it was subjected to modifications and transformations—as a result, it 
was deceptively sculpted to produce the image needed by the Soviet power.        
The Bolsheviks had a superior social system in mind; however, when utopia, power, and 
the masses are combined, the result sways to adverse and harmful outcomes, since “dark 
sociotechnics flourishes, as a rule, in autocratic and totalitarian states”  (qtd. in Podgórecki 55). 
The Soviet authorities did not invent anti-Ukrainian language policies.  Rather, they adopted the 
mission of destroying any features of Ukraine as a separate and independent culture and nation 
from Tsarist Russia.  However, Soviet policies towards Ukraine, including language policies, 
were part of a larger undertaking of engineering a new social order—a socialist society—and 
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creating the New Soviet Man to populate the Soviet state (Csaba 114).  Language development 
was designed to contribute to this mission. 
Soviet propaganda, censorship, and policies of intimidation were all aimed at destroying 
traditional values and beliefs and replacing them with the Communist ideology.  The Soviet 
authorities were aware of the challenges associated with the acceptance of Soviet social order by 
the population.  After abolishing korenizatsiya, which was a policy originally instituted to gain 
local support, the Soviet government turned to brutal methods of subjugation in Ukraine.  
Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasants were perceived by the Soviet state as members of alien 
social classes; they were, therefore, subjected to imprisonment, exiles, and executions.  The mass 
starvation engineered by the Soviet government in rural Ukraine in 1932-1933 reinforced Soviet 
power through the eradication of the Ukrainian rural population and the subsequent relocation of 
Russians and other ethnic groups to Ukraine.  Accordingly, a special government agency, the 
All-Union Migration Committee, was created to manage the migration of ethnic groups within 
the country (Nezhyvyj 183-184). Migrants from other parts of the Soviet Union brought Russian 
into Ukraine as their first language, or lingua franca.   The ethnic and linguistic composition of 
Ukraine changed as a result of famine, deportations, and killings.  The attitude of Ukrainian 
society was also altered: as a result of their fear, people accepted and followed any policies 
imposed by the government, including language policies. 
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CHAPTER 1   UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE 
Ukraine lost its independence in the seventeenth century as a result of concluding 
intergovernmental treaties3 with Russia, which stipulated Russian military presence in Ukraine 
with the purpose of joint military actions against outside enemies.  Until today, Russia and 
Ukraine dispute the interpretation of the Treaties and the union of 1654 and whether they were 
voluntary, coerced, or a deceitful act by Russia (Lieven 17-23, Kappeler 61-69).  In the Soviet 
Union, the voluntary reunion version was the only account allowed.  The event was widely 
celebrated during the 300th (1954) and 325th (1979) anniversaries of the union of 1654.   Though 
the Treaties clearly specified that Ukraine would preserve its political and national autonomy, at 
the time of signing, there was some opposition to the Treaties in Ukraine (Svarnyk 121).  The 
Russian government did not honor these provisions of the Treaties and began interfering in the 
internal affairs of the country (Kohut 68-69, Svarnyk 124, Wilson 74).  All privileges and 
structures that existed in Ukraine prior to the union with Russia gradually disappeared and 
Moscow became the sole administrator of the territory.  This made the Ukrainian elite vulnerable 
to assimilation.  Ironically, both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet regime used Ukrainian culture to 
create a new imperial identity (Wilson 74).   
In the years prior to Shevchenko4 ’s depiction of Ukraine’s liberation in his poems 
“Kobzar” (1840) and “Haidamaky” (1841), the creative work of Ukrainian intellectuals, though 
possessing some ethnic tones, overall fit the streamline of Russian imperialism and contributed 
to the development of Russian culture and the building of the Russian empire. (Kohut 75, 
Magosci 361-2).   Though Ukrainian-born cultural activists worked on themes interesting for 
                                                      
3 Treaty of Pereiaslav; March Treaties (Lieven 17, Svarnyk 121) (the “Treaties”). 
4 Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), a Ukrainian poet and artist, was born to a family of serfs.  Shevchenko is 
considered to be the founding author of Ukrainian literature and the inspiration for the formation of Ukrainian 
national identity and for national liberation movements (Hrytsak 182-186). 
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Russian intellectual life in their works, they were able to supplement their creations with unique 
features originating from their Ukrainian backgrounds.  Such features enriched the emerging 
imperial culture, which absorbed and appropriated Ukraine’s historical past as well as its cultural 
characteristics.  The congregation of lands under the umbrella of the Russian empire brought 
together a diverse group of people, languages, and religions and, against this backdrop, Russia 
reaffirmed its distinct Russian ethnicity and identity.  The term “Russia” was equivalent to the 
term “state,” rather than a land or an ethnic group, every new addition influenced Russian 
identity in its own way (Bushkovitch 153).  In order to survive, the Empire not only needed to 
suppress the identities of the ethnic groups under its control, but also to provide them with a 
myth to fill the void of their destroyed identities.  In this respect, Ukraine was an essential 
element of the process: “many Russians of rank considered Ukraine as the source of Russia’s 
greatness” (qtd. in Borys 52).  This is because rather than emerging from a dynasty, unlike other 
European nations, Russia’s identity developed as a result of Ukraine bringing pan-Slavic feature, 
the common history experienced by people of the ancient Eastern Slavic continuum (Sysyn 141).   
Since the growth of the Russian culture was enhanced with distinctly different features 
originating from Ukraine, the boundaries defining Russian imperial identity expanded to 
incorporate a pan-Slavic element and laid the foundation for a wider platform of Russian 
nationalism.      
Indisputably, Taras Shevchenko made the most prominent impact on the formation of the 
Ukrainian national idea, language, and culture.  Shevchenko was a visionary who influenced 
generations of Ukrainian political and cultural activists and induced the national rebirth of 
Ukraine.  The Ukrainian working class reveres Shevchenko for his selfless fight for social justice 
in the search for a national identity.   The talented artist and poet was freed from serfdom at the 
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age of twenty-four as a result of his fortunate encounter with a Ukrainian artist, Ivan Soshenko, 
in St. Petersburg, where Shevchenko moved with his master.  Alongside a group of St. 
Petersburg artists, Soshenko raised funds to pay for Shevchenko’s freedom from serfdom.   This 
independence gave Shevchenko the opportunity to enroll in the Academy of Art in St. Petersburg 
and he soon became closely associated with several politically progressive circles in St. 
Petersburg (Hrytsak 183, Shabliovsky 85).  Shevchenko wrote in Ukrainian and this choice was 
not well accepted by some representatives of Russian literary circles due to the existing belief 
that Russian was the sole language of educated people from Malorussia.  Ukrainian was regarded 
merely as the language for “Malorussian peasantry and could not have been used for high 
literature” (qtd. in Hrytsak 186).  Nevertheless, Shevchenko elevated the status of the Ukrainian 
language to that of art and demonstrated its sufficiency to serve as a medium for multifaceted 
notions.  Shevchenko’s importance in the cultural and social statuses of standard Ukrainian 
centers on his creation of “a paradigm for vernacular-based literary Ukrainian” (qtd. in Bilaniuk 
112).  The language of Shevchenko’s works is rich and natural.  He brilliantly communicates 
complex concepts in an effortless manner, making his narrations easy to comprehend — for this 
ability, he is regarded a genius.    
While Shevchenko has been credited as genial in the area of poetic word and has been 
recognized as a talented realist painter by his contemporaries and subsequent generations, he has 
become an icon primarily for his work in rebuilding the idea of Ukraine as a nation. He 
passionately and bitterly expressed his pain in witnessing the suffering of the oppressed and 
tormented people of Ukraine.  His poetry woke dormant national feelings and gave vision for the 
future of Ukraine by constructing Ukraine as a nation, a conceptual alternative to a government 
sanctioned Malorussia  (Wilson 90).  Shevchenko had colossal power to do so by means of his 
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literary talent.  Under the Imperial and Soviet regimes, both cultural and political ideologies 
attributed enormous significance and motivating force to Ukrainian language and literature.  
Language, especially in poetic form, serves to unite people momentarily. One example is the 
moment when a country’s anthem is played (Anderson 181).  Shevchenko created numerous 
poems and passages that became symbolic attributes that unite Ukrainians and give them the 
feeling of belonging to the same community.  However, Shevchenko was also censored and 
bowdlerized by various groups to channel his power in an attempt to engineer the public’s views 
according to the social mandate of the group seeking to censor the text.  Soviet authorities 
censored Shevchenko’s works and published them for their revolutionary content (Wilson 35).  
An example of such bowdlerization in the West is an omission in print and in singing a line of 
Shevchenko’s poem, ‘Testament’:  “until then I do not know God” to ensure the poet appears 
faithful to Christianity (Woycenko 11-12). Nevertheless, Shevchenko constructed Ukraine as an 
idea for his contemporaries and future generations—this idea has guided cohorts of Ukrainian 
nation builders.   
In St. Petersburg, Shevchenko became a member of an underground anti-government 
organization, the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius (the “Brotherhood”)5, founded in 
1846 by a number of Ukrainian intellectuals (Borys 68, Kappeler 226).  The program of the 
organization synthesized three philosophical standpoints: 1) Panteleimon Kulish6 emphasized the 
importance of activities oriented at national issues; 2) Mykola Kostomarov 7   promoted 
panhuman and Christian ideas, and 3) Shevchenko’s primary contribution to the agenda was the 
                                                      
5 Cyril and Methodius, Orthodox priests that worked to promote Christianity in Kyivan Rus’ and developed 
a Slavic alphabet (Petegyrych 66).  The selection of the name for the organization indicates the Christian tendencies 
of its activities.    
6 Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897) – Ukrainian writer, translator, critic, historian, and ethnographer 
(Shabliovsky 236). 
7 Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885) – Ukrainian writer, translator, historian, publicist, folklorist, and 
professor at the universities of Kyiv and St. Petersburg (Shabliovsky 235).  
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search for a solution to social problems, the abolition of serfdom, and the education of the 
working class (Hrytsak 185).  In 1847 the police raided the organization and its members were 
prosecuted.  Shevchenko’s punishment was especially severe; he was sentenced to serve as a 
soldier in the army for an indefinite term under strict supervision, and he was prohibited from 
writing or drawing (Shabliovsky 85).    
The Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius responded to the conflict between the 
Russian Empire and intellectuals of Ukrainian origin by developing a model of the Russian 
federation—a different model of the Russian state, where ethnic groups would have self-
governing institutions.  As a result the role of Ukraine, ethnicity, and the social conditions of 
Ukrainian lands came to the fore.   The organization put forward a philosophical and political 
model of a federation functioning on principles of democratic freedoms to include self-governing 
Slavic republics, in which Ukraine would have an equal position with the other members (Borys 
68).  Any attempt by members of the Brotherhood to suggest a distinctly separate Ukrainian 
identity was perceived by the Russian society as national treason.  Prominent Russian cultural, 
intellectual, and liberal activists condemned the activity of the Brotherhood, comparing it to 
“political madness” (qtd. in Hrytsak 186).  Even Vissarion Belinsky, a recognized Russian 
intellectual, a prominent literary critic, a liberal, and a dissenter of the Russian autocracy 
denounced Kulish and Shevchenko in a rude manner (Luckyj 166, Ohiyenko Istoriya…174).  
This resentfulness was a reflection of Russian imperial ideology. It was partially instigated by 
the fact that Russian national identity was not completely developed, and therefore was not able 
to subtly, without resorting to insults, counterweigh the ideas presented by the Brotherhood: 
weakness leads to defensiveness and makes people aggressive.  At the beginning of the 19th 
century, Russia was “a state without a national identity” (qtd. in Hrytsak 186). The gathering of 
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lands and people made Russia a multinational state before the Russian national identity had been 
fully formed.       
The activity and the fate of the Brotherhood opened a new chapter in relations between 
Russia and Ukraine.   Shevchenko pioneered the development of a new fundamental concept: 
“the coexistence of the Ukrainian individual with the empire,” where a new Ukrainian myth and 
the imperial myth of St. Petersburg come together (qtd. in Zabuzhko 44-45).   From a social 
engineering perspective, Shevchenko’s own experience and the fate of other Brotherhood 
members demonstrated the empire’s rules of coexistence: persecution would be used as both a 
punishment for transgressions against the empire and as a means to instill fear with the hopes of 
securing the acceptance of imperial ideology.  However, when a quackish social engineering 
agenda uses fear as its tactic, there is potential for backlash and an outcome that is diametrically 
opposite to the goals of the social engineers: in the eyes of Ukraine, severe punishment rendered 
members of the Brotherhood martyrs, who, as a result, became motivators for generations to 
fight for a common cause—Ukrainian statehood before and after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.     
Since political and cultural imperialism fears the liberation of conquered nations, it forces 
the imposition of its language in order to assert its cultural dominance and to assimilate the 
substrate nations.  Prior to 1917, the Russian government tried to attain these goals through its 
language policy regarding Ukraine.  One can trace the attempts of the tsarist government to 
eradicate the Ukrainian language back to 1720, when a tsar decree instructed the Moscow 
Collegiums, an institution of the state, to be vigilant about literature in Ukrainian because “there 
should not be the slightest difference [from Russian]” (qtd. in Shabliovsky 50).   Stripping 
Ukrainian of its peculiarities was a way to de-nationalize the language and its speakers.  In 1863, 
the Minister of Interior, Valuyev, passed an order, which stated that “there has never been, there 
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is not and there cannot be an independent Little Russian language” (Hrytsak 196, qtd. in 
Kappeler 256).  This order prohibited the printing of both teaching and religious materials in 
Ukrainian.  Since such materials, as a rule, were printed for the working people, the objective of 
this order was to prevent the spreading of Ukrainian language materials among the lower classes 
(Hrytsak 196).  The government relied on the public’s fear of punishment to ensure that 
Ukrainian literature would not enter the educational and ecclesiastical streams.  Therefore, the 
Valuyev order, along with numerous subsequent bans could be categorized as attempts of 
quackish social engineering.   At the same time, one can conclude that this was a case of dark 
social engineering for the Ukrainian culture, since ethnic Ukrainians were marginalized and 
degraded when their language was removed from the school and the church.  The Russian 
government understood that if allowed, the Ukrainian language could inspire a massive 
Ukrainian national movement.  The language became a target, since it constituted a threat to the 
territorial integrity of the empire.  
Another instance of dark social engineering and the next step in the anti-Ukrainian policy 
was the establishment of the 1875 special commission, intended to investigate the Ukrainian 
language issue.  The Commission was comprised of the Minister of Interior and Education, the 
Procurator of the Synod, and the Chief of Police.   They concluded that allowing the 
development of separate literature in Ukrainian would mean laying a foundation for the idea of 
an independent Ukraine.  Based on the commission’s recommendations, in 1876, Alexander II 
issued the Emsky Order, which prohibited the printing of any books in Ukrainian in the Russian 
Empire as well as bringing Ukrainian materials from abroad into the country (Hrytsayk 198-
199).  In 1881 the Minister of Interior lifted the ban for Ukrainian theatre and this became very 
important for the consolidation of the national spirit, although numerous limitations were 
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imposed on the repertoire.  In order to be allowed to operate, for every play staged in Ukrainian, 
a theatrical group had to stage a Russian play, engaging the same number of actors.  In addition, 
theatres had to exclude any foreign plays translated into Ukrainian and plays on the subject of the 
intelligentsia’s life in Ukrainian (Hrytsak 199). Since the intelligentsia spoke Russian on the 
stage of the Ukrainian theatre, this policy helped create an image of the Ukrainian language as 
that of uneducated peasants. Once again, it emphasized the low status of Ukrainian so that those 
who spoke it would be ashamed.  The Russian government again resorted to quackish social 
engineering and manipulated human emotions to achieve its imperial goals: the only way for a 
speaker of Ukrainian to avoid stigma was to speak Russian only.  In 1883 Ukrainian theatrical 
groups were prohibited from performing in the provinces of Kyiv, Volyn, and Podillya (Hrytsak 
199).  The ban on Ukrainian theatre from key regions demonstrates the fear of the Russian 
empire that organizations such as theatrical groups, even with their limited repertoire, could 
become a motivation for liberation.   
The oppressive policies of the tsarist government in the second half of the nineteenth 
century profoundly undermined Ukrainian liberation movements.   The authorities viewed the 
mere appreciation of Ukrainian culture for its aesthetical value as a threat.  Ukrainians were 
arrested, detained, and persecuted for wearing national clothing, speaking Ukrainian, and 
purchasing Ukrainian books legally printed in the country (Andriewsky 211-212).  At the end of 
the century only approximately a quarter of the descendants of the old Ukrainian elite considered 
Ukrainian as their first language (Hrytsak 197).  The Ukrainian intelligentsia was greatly 
influenced by Russian liberal political thought.  In 1870, as a result of russification and a loss of 
faith in the possibility of achieving anything through cultural activities, Ukrainian patriots and 
descendants of the Ukrainian elite joined the ranks of Narodnaya Volya, a Russian revolutionary 
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organization that participated in Russian revolutionary movements (Majstrenko 5, Hrytsak 197).  
Those who still had a desire for Ukrainian liberation now believed that social revolution would 
lead to national freedom.  Russian revolutionary movements were under the influence of western 
European ideas and political parties in Russia organized themselves using European models.   
Europe started to play an increasingly important role in the formation of Ukrainian self-
perception.   On the one hand, Ukrainians used westernization as a way of avoiding assimilation 
into Russian culture and politics (Wilson 98-99).  On the other, russification and almost two 
hundred years of Russian rule resulted in the absorption of the Ukrainian revolutionary 
movement by Russian liberal groups.  Ukrainians were therefore inclined to regard Russian 
political thought as an intermediary between themselves and Western Europe.  (Majstrenko 6-7). 
European liberal ideas infiltrated Ukraine through the Russian language (Wilson 99).   
At the same time, there were individuals and organizations that tried to promote the 
tradition of working towards Ukrainian independence and adhering to the cultural and ethnic 
distinctiveness of Ukraine started by Shevchenko and the Brotherhood.  Mykhailo Drahomanov, 
a professor at the University of Kyiv, was a vigorous defender of Ukrainian national rights.   His 
activities led to persecution by the tsarist government and resulted in forced emigration.  He 
appealed to the Europe’s progressive intelligentsia in order to draw attention to the prohibition of 
Ukrainian language and literature in Ukraine.  Drahomanov’s work as a literary critic and 
political activist greatly influenced the Ukrainian political movement and evoked heated 
discussions and protests.  Drahomanov revealed new paths for social, educational, and literary 
work (Shabliovsky 138).  Together with political and social groups he participated in Hromada, a 
South-Western Imperial Geographic Fellowship that was the voice of progressive Ukrainian 
liberal thought.  He developed a political program that incorporated ideas of Ukrainian 
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autonomy, a combination of national liberation and social revolution, socialism (with an 
emphasis on personal freedoms), and self-governance on all levels, from the village to the state.  
He did not accept the Marxist idea of a dictatorship led by one class or party.  Drahomanov’s 
position was different from that of Narodnaya Volya: he did not idealize the Russian community 
and was against terrorism as a means of achieving goals.  His principles of humanity and 
integrity became moral standards for Ukrainian revolutionaries (Hrytsak 198).  His influence on 
political movements and individual activists was so profound that he is regarded as the father of 
all Ukrainian political parties (Majstrenko 12).   At the beginning of the 20th century the degree 
of national self-consciousness amongst Ukrainians was determined by the national renaissance 
and national liberation movements of the previous century.  The ideas proclaimed by 
Shevchenko, the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, and Drahomanov influenced the 
Ukrainian socialist and non-socialist political groups, including the party, called Borot’bysty, 
which adhered to the position of cooperation with the Bolsheviks and other Soviet-type 
establishments of social order in Ukraine.   
The Russian government’s 1876 ban on printing books in Ukrainian was lifted in 1905 
(Hrytsak 211).   At that time Borys Hrinchenko8, a Ukrainian writer, prepared a dictionary of the 
Ukrainian language called Slovar Ukrayisnskoyi Movy (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 193, 330-331).  The 
authorities established a special Commission to look into the matter of publishing the dictionary 
(Plyushch 366-367).  The Commission approved the dictionary, which appeared to be an act of 
government support for the development of the Ukrainian language.  However, the approval 
came with a number of recommendations intended to eliminate some of the unique features of 
the Ukrainian language and make Ukrainian resemble graphically and phonetically (Chaplenko 
164-173).   One of the recommendations was to eliminate the use of ї as indication of the 
                                                      
8 Borys Hrinchenko (1863-1910) – Ukrainian writer, philologist, translator, folklorist (Shabliovsky 234). 
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palatalization of consonants before i (which was the practice in Ukrainian orthography of the 
time: дїти).  The second phase of eliminating ї, a letter non-existent in Russian, took place 
during the language reform of the thirties, when the Orthographic Commission, which intended 
to promote the assimilation of Ukrainian into Russian, recommended writing і instead of ї in 
such words as героїчний, прозаїк  (Nimchuk 269).   Both Imperial Russian agencies and later 
Soviet authorities modified the Ukrainian language by imposing Russian orthographic norms and 
letters as standard for Ukrainian.    
Before 1917, the Russian government prohibited the use of the Ukrainian alphabet.  
Though the Ukrainian alphabet is very similar to Russian, it features a number of unique letters.  
One can conclude that these few letters were viewed by the Russian empire as a manifestation of 
Ukraine’s separate national identity.  The Ukrainian alphabet was banned and writers had to 
transcribe Ukrainian text using the Russian alphabet.  This resulted in both the graphical and 
phonological assimilation of the language.  For example, to transcribe a uniquely Ukrainian 
front-mid sound и, the Russian letter ы had to be used (Nimchuk 242).  However, there is a 
difference between the sounds и and ы: the Russian sound is more rounded and higher.  This 
writing system, called yaryzhka ('ярижкa,' from the name of the letter ы, 'єри,’ or ‘яри’), did not 
allow for this difference in pronunciation (Nimchuk 242).   
The period between 1917 and 1938 involved substantial political, economic, 
administrative, and social changes in Ukraine.  It started during the short-lived 1917-1919 
independence, which saw a few changes of government.  The struggle between independent 
Ukraine and the Bolsheviks created two countries within the territory of Ukraine: independent 
Ukraine with a capital in Kyiv and Donetsk-Kryvorizsk Soviet Republic. The latter was formed 
with the assistance of military troops sent to Ukraine by the Russian Bolshevik Government and 
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had its capital in Kharkiv (Lytvyn 228-229, Magocsi Ukraine… 199).    When the Bolsheviks 
finally took control of Ukraine in its entirety, the Ukrainian people were forced into the social 
engineering experiment of building a new society.  Every stage of the historical period of 1917 to 
1938 impacted the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian language.   The Ukrainian language was 
used to support myths needed by the government to shape the society’s beliefs. 
The 1917-1919 period of independence demonstrated substantial efforts and 
achievements in the formation of Ukraine’s national identity and the development of the standard 
Ukrainian language.   The first government of independent Ukraine, the Tsentral’na Rada (the 
Central Council), was in power from March 1917 to February 1918.  Initially, it was a center for 
consolidating political and public organizations, but it subsequently became the Parliament that 
led the Ukrainian liberation movement (Lytvyn 218-224, 226-230).  The Tsentral’na Rada was 
the first example of a practical implementation of the idea of Ukrainian statehood.  With 
Mykhailo Hrushevskyj as Chair, and Serhiy Yefremov and Volodymyr Vynnychenko as 
Deputies, the Tsentral’na Rada proclaimed Ukraine’s independence and founded the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic in November 1917 as a response to the Bolshevik revolution (Lyvyn 223-
224).  However, as a result of the indecisiveness and procrastination of the Tsentral’na Rada in 
creating a regular army, the Russian Bolshevik troops were able to seize Kyiv in February 1918 
(Lytvyn 219-230).  The first period of Russian Bolshevik rule from February to March 1918 was 
short-lived due to the outcome of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsky, which was signed by Germany, 
Bolshevik Russia, and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Lytvyn 227).  The Russian delegation, 
headed by Leon Trotsky, recognized the sovereignty of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the 
legitimacy of the Ukrainian delegation in representing the Tsentral’na Rada (Lytvyn 227).  
According to the Treaty terms, Bolshevik troops were to be withdrawn from Ukraine and 
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German troops were to replace them (Freund 64-74, Kulchytsky The Phenomenon… 347, 
Lytvyn 227). 
The second period of the Tsentral’na Rada control was from March 7 – April 28, 1918.  
The Tsentral’na Rada returned to Kyiv after German troops took control of the city on March 1, 
1918 (Lytvyn 230).  However, the population, tired of war and political instability, wanted strong 
executive power and did not view the Tsentral’na Rada as capable of implementing a strong 
government (Lytvyn 230).  The Hromada (Ukrainian People’s Community), a party formed by 
landowners and military, articulated an argument for a change of government and engaged 
German military to implement it (Lytvyn 230).  On April 28, 1918, German military 
commanders disrupted a meeting of the Tsentral’na Rada where members were discussing a 
draft of the Ukrainian constitution and arrested two ministers (Lytvyn 230).  The new 
government, headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky, a descendant of an elite Ukrainian Cossack family 
and a decorated general of the Russian imperial army, was put to power as a result of this coup-
d’etat (Lytvyn 230).  Skoropadsky was backed by German occupiers, conservative landowners, 
anti-Bolshevik Russians residing in Kyiv, and those who fled to Kyiv from Bolshevik Russia.  
The Tsentral’na Rada was dismissed, along with its Ministries and land committees, and 
Hetmanate State was established by an order issued by Skoropadsky on April 30, 1918 (Lytvyn 
230-231, Mirchuk 226-227, Wilson 126). 
The Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky (April 30, 1918 – December 14, 1918) was a 
controversial period in the history of independent Ukraine.  Skoropadsky was elected a Hetman9 
of Ukraine at an agrarian congress held in Kyiv on April 29, 1918 (Lytvyn 230).  Some sources 
argue that Skoropadsky was backed by the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party (Lytvyn 230, 
                                                      
9 The word ‘Hetman’ comes from the times of Zaporizhzhya Sich and means ‘leader elected by Cossacks’ 
(Wilson 59). 
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Majstrenko 71).  However, according to Andriyevsky, a witness to the events, the election of 
Skoropadsky took place without the official participation of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian 
party, since the party, though being right-wing and non-socialist, considered the Ukrainian 
national interest as a priority (Andriyevsky 13).  This party always supported the Tsentral’na 
Rada despite their differences concerning matters of socialism and the socialist revolution.  Such 
support was warranted because the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party considered the 
Tsentral’na Rada as the principal Ukrainian government body and therefore demanded a 
compromise from the congress to keep the Central Council in action (Andriyevsky 11, 13-4).   
The Union of Landowners, another agrarian party, backed the coup.  This party consisted 
of prominent Russian and russified Ukrainian landowners who were indifferent or hostile to 
Ukraine’s independence (Mirchuk 230).  These two right-wing agrarian non-socialist parties 
directly opposed each other on the subject of national liberation.  Skoropadsky sided with the 
Union of Landowners, a stronger group, though in his memoirs, Skoropadsky admits that the 
ideas of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party were more appealing to him (Mirchuk 230-
233).  After the Tsentral’na Rada was brought back to power as a result of German occupation 
through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Ukraine could have quickly become merely an occupied 
territory, which would have had no resemblance to statehood (Lytvyn 231).  This situation 
prompted Skoropadsky to revolt and push the Tsentral’na Rada out of power. Skoropadsky’s 
government included many prominent Ukrainian scholars and professionals with high 
qualifications, including former members of the Tsentral’na Rada (Lytvyn 231-233).  His 
government is credited with many achievements, namely forming Ukrainian statehood, building 
and developing Ukrainian culture and education, and facilitating the ukrainianization of 
government bodies.   
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 Skorpadsky’s alliance with Russia and his attempts to shape a new national identity for 
Ukraine were founded neither on Ukrainian nor Russian ethnic ideals, but rather on his loyalty to 
the Ukrainian state (Wilson 127).  He wrote that Russia’s oppression of Ukraine was a product of 
the government; therefore, he refused to implicate the Russian masses as the source of this 
oppression (Wilson 127).  While gaining the support of Germans, Russians, and landowners in 
order to seize power, Skoropadsky positioned himself in a difficult situation.  The Russian 
monarchists and the Union of Landowners, alongside the Russian Bolsheviks, accused him of 
separatism (Lytvyn 236).  The continuation of German support was based on substantial grain 
and food requisitions imposed by Skoropadsky’s government on Ukrainian producers, which 
triggered opposition by Ukrainian peasantry (Majstrenko 72).  His bias towards Russia was 
evident in his favoritism of Russian political organizations in appointing officials, as well as in 
the arrests of supporters of Ukrainian independence, and this caused him to be condemned by 
pro-Ukrainian political groups and Ukrainian peasants (Majstrenko 62-63, Mirchuk 236-237).  
On November 14, 1918, while looking for a way out, Skoropadsky announced a federated union 
of Ukraine and Russia and brought an accusation of treason upon himself (Majstrenko 73). This 
was followed by an anti-Skoropadsky rebellion, headed by a body named the Dyrektorija 
(Directory), which comprised of representatives of the Ukrainian social democrat and social 
revolutionary parties, the Tsentral’na Rada, the Railway Association, and the Ukrainian party of 
socialist-seekers of independence.  On December 14, 1918, Skoropadsky resigned his authority 
to the Dyrektorija  (Lytvyn 235-236).   
The Ukrainian People’s Republic was revived under the Dyrektorija government 
(December 14, 1918 - December 5, 1919), and was headed by Vynnychenko, with Symon 
Petlyura as the Chief of Military forces (Majstrenko 89-90).  Later, when Vynnychenko resigned 
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and emigrated, Petlyura headed the Dyrektorija ’s struggle against Bolshevik occupation (Lytvyn 
237, Mirchuk 266). On December 5, 1919, Petlyura withdrew to Halychyna under the offensive 
attack of Bolshevik troops (Freund 108).  The Polish government recognized the Dyrektorija as a 
legitimate Ukrainian government and supported Petlyura’s failed attack on Kyiv in April  of 
1920 (Lytvyn 239).  After the Bolsheviks took over Ukraine, Petlyura headed the government of 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic while in exile (Lytvyn 239).  During his tenure, Petlyura 
actively supported development of Ukrainian culture and art.  The Dyrektorija, alongside 
members of the Tsentral’na Rada and with representatives from Western Ukrainian political 
groups, organized a symbolic act of unification of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, two ethnic Ukrainian territories that, for centuries, were 
split between foreign dominant powers (Lytvyn 244).  This event, known as the Akt Zluky (Act 
of Union), took place on January 22, 1919, and was of utmost significance for the formation of 
Ukraine as a nation (Mirchuk 266-267).  The Akt Zluky is celebrated in modern Ukraine as a 
symbol of Sobornist’ (Union) of Ukraine; in 1990, to mark the anniversary of the Akt Zluky, a 
human chain spanned across five hundred kilometers to link Kyiv and Lviv (Magosci Ukraine: 
An Illustrated History 304).   
Ukraine’s independence was not sustained for a long period of time.   The Russian 
Bolshevik government headed by Lenin had no intention to lose Ukraine.   At that time, Ukraine 
produced 70 percent of Russia’s coal, 96.7 percent of rolled metal, 81 percent of tin, 90 percent 
of silver, and 75 percent of cast iron (Lytvyn 226).   It was also a large producer of grains and 
food: in 1909 and 1913, Ukraine’s share in Russia’ production of wheat was 98%, rye 75%, oats 
27%, and sugar 82% (Borys 54-55).  Leon Trotsky10, a leader of the Bolshevik revolution wrote:  
                                                      
10 Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) – one of the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution, served as People’s 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs during the early years of Soviet rule (Freund 566-570). 
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“Remember we have to get Ukraine back to Russia.  Without Ukraine there is no Russia.  Russia 
cannot exist without the Ukrainian coal, iron, ore, bread and bacon, the Black Sea; the country 
will suffocate and the Soviet system will suffocate along, and we will as well” (qtd. in Lytvyn 
226).  Therefore, in 1918-1919 Moscow sent numerous troops to Ukraine (Lytvyn 236-237).  
The battlefields of 1918-1919 became the second stage of the imperialistic conquest of Ukraine 
by Russia.   
The Russian Bolsheviks seized power in Ukraine and made appointments to new 
governing bodies in Ukraine: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 
Ukraine (CPBU) and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Zaitsev 253).  Other political parties either disintegrated or joined the ranks of the 
governing Bolshevik party during the first years of Soviet rule, although they did leave an 
imprint on the Ukrainian political stage.  One of such parties was the party of Borot’bysty.  In the 
1920s, many of the Borot’bysts joined the Bolshevik ranks (Majstrenko 206).  The influx of 
Borot’bysts impacted the Bolshevik party.  Borot’bysts brought concepts formulated by 
Shevchenko, the members of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, and Drahomanov into the 
government of Soviet Ukraine and often used those concepts as a basis for formulating policies 
in the areas of culture and language.   
Following six years of war, Ukraine was left in ruins.  The policy of War Communism11 
added to the country’s destruction and, in combination with the two-year drought of 1921-1923, 
caused significant famine in southern Ukraine. (Nezhyvyj 71, Zaitsev 254).  Other parts of the 
new Soviet states were also experiencing economic crisis.  Lenin realized that the pursuit of War 
                                                      
11 War Communism (1918-1920) was an attempt to introduce a communist-type system of production and 
distribution by abolishing money, private property, and the free market.  Agricultural goods were seized from 
peasants without any compensation in return, ceasing all production. This period is characterized by mass 
repressions  (Freund 585-588, Reiman 1-2).    
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Communism would potentially trigger the country’s unrest; therefore, in March of 1921, he 
convinced delegates of the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks to 
issue orders initiating the New Economic Policy (NEP), a strategically forced political retreat 
and a restitution of free market principles (Reiman 2, Zaitsev 253).  This new policy allowed for 
free internal trade, transfer of small businesses into leases or private property, foreign 
investments, and replaced agricultural tax in kind with monetary taxes (Zaitsev 253).  The policy 
also aimed at boosting industrial and agricultural production, thereby improving the economic 
situation of the country.  The NEP (1923-1928) proved to be a successful economic endeavor.  It 
transformed the country entirely and secured its economic stability (Freund 399-403).  However, 
ideologically the Bolsheviks perceived the NEP as a dangerous compromise since it reinstated 
capitalistic features within the economy.  Despite censorship and political persecutions, the years 
of the NEP were tolerable for intellectual life, compared to the subsequent periods of the first 
five-year plans or the years following the Second World War, and served to enrich artistic life 
(Lewis Burgin 34-36, Reiman 3, Terras 79).  The dismantling of the NEP resulted from the 
Bolshevik Party’s decision to reassert Bolshevik fundamentals (Rees Stalin… 79).   The end of 
the NEP also meant the beginning of oppressive policies towards art, culture, and non-Russian 
ethnic groups.      
 The NEP coincided with korenizatsiya (indigenization), an important period of language 
and cultural development in Ukraine.  The NEP was the political and socio-economic 
background for cultural development under korenizatsiya.  Historians posit the official beginning 
of korenizatsiya as 1923, as evidenced by the 1923 proclamation of the Twelfth Russian 
Communist Party of Bolsheviks Congress that Russian great-power chauvinism was dangerous 
for the preservation of the achievements of the Bolshevik revolution.  In response, the 
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Bolsheviks introduced a policy oriented at the development of native cultures stemming from 
former Imperial Russia (Zaitsev 257).  This policy had a unique impact on the development of 
the Ukrainian language and the languages of other ethnic groups in Soviet Russia.  There is no 
unified opinion as to why the Bolshevik authorities introduced this policy.  At first, it appears 
that this was a step in demonstrating the Bolsheviks’ adherence to an individual’s right to self-
determination, guided by Lenin’s concern about Great Russian chauvinism.  In this sense, 
korenizatsiya can be interpreted as a policy of decolonization.  However, it can also be viewed as 
a Bolshevik attempt to lure non-Russian groups to support Bolshevism by favoring cultural and 
language development (Rees Stalin… 82).  Consequently, the meaning of this term can be 
interpreted as indigenization, i.e., putting down roots, or becoming native on a new territory.    
Korenizatsiya in Ukraine, known as ukrainianization, was a government policy aimed at 
fostering greater involvement of Ukrainians in the work of political parties as well as the 
introduction and use of Ukrainian in administrative matters, education, publishing, and press.   In 
Ukrainian cities, both the Bolsheviks and the Soviets were predominantly supported by the 
Russian proletariat.  Their political ideas were foreign to the other strata of society, particularly 
to the Ukrainian villagers.  In order to put down roots in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks had to make 
efforts to appear native and gain local support (Zaitsev 259).   For this reasons, some Ukrainians 
viewed korenizatsiya as a deception tactic and, therefore, mistrusted Soviet policy.  Symon 
Petlyura expressed this sentiment by calling korenizatsiya  “a certain tactical ploy by the 
Bolsheviks” (Bachynskyj  284).   Others, however, embraced ukrainianization as an opportunity 
to work towards a renaissance of Ukrainian culture and language (Bachynskyj 282). 
The Russian Bolsheviks faced a difficult situation in Ukraine since the country clearly 
demonstrated its aspirations towards independence.  Therefore, the Russian Bolsheviks realized 
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the importance and urgency of finding a solution to the problem presented by Ukraine.  As early 
as December 1919, the resolution of the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks, “On Soviet Rule in Ukraine,” provided that since Ukrainian culture was oppressed 
by the tsarist government, it was the duty of all its members to eliminate any “obstacles to the 
free development of the Ukrainian language and culture” (Bondarchuk 272, qtd. in Solchanyk 
66).  Although the resolution did not specify any practical methods for increasing the prestige of 
Ukrainian, it demonstrated the possibility of positive change in the overall attitude to the 
language.  This document is arguably a starting point for the development of definite plans for 
future action.  It is suggested that although the authorities had previously officially sanctioned 
policies reminiscent of korenizatsiya, nothing had been accomplished on this front since 1923 
(Martin 98).  Prior to 1923, however, Ukraine had gone through several important stages of 
cultural development including language standardization, elaboration, and measures to secure 
acceptance of the new standard by the population during the years of independence and under 
Soviet rule.12  
  
                                                      
12 After the Bolsheviks retreated from Kyiv in March 1918, the Russian Bolshevik government sent military 
troops to Eastern Ukraine and assisted in the formation of the Soviet Ukrainian government in the city of Kharkiv 
(Luckyj 166, Lytvyn  228). Donetsk-Kryvorizsk Soviet Republic, sometimes called Ukrainian Public of Councils, 
was formed in eastern Ukraine and had Kharkiv as its capital.  Mykola Skrypnyk, a member of the Soviet (Kharkiv) 
government, spoke out against the formation of a separatist republic (Lytvyn 228-229, Magocsi Ukraine… 199).  
The government consisted of Ukrainian Communists who were later joined by Borotbists, including some writers 
(Luckyj 166).   
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CHAPTER 2   SELECTION 
The process of developing a standard language includes four major stages: selection, 
codification, elaboration, and securing acceptance.  Selection is the process of deciding which 
vernacular to use as a foundation for the development of a standard variety. This decision is 
based on several rationales, such as the number of speakers of every vernacular, the territories 
they reside in, how much power each group has in the country, pre-existing writing systems, just 
to name a few.  If the standard language variety has a form that is different from those featured in 
the other vernaculars, the outcome of selection will be “the suppression of optional variability,” 
because only one form will enter the standard language (qtd. in Milroy and Milroy 6).  The 
ultimate suppression of non-standard vernaculars might put the speakers of those vernaculars at a 
disadvantage: after the process of codification is complete the standard forms become ‘correct,’ 
and forms designated as non-standard become ‘incorrect’ or ‘uneducated,’ causing stigmatization 
of the users of the vernacular forms.  The development of standard variety Ukrainian started 
during the years of independence and continued through Bolshevik periods of pre-korenizatsiya, 
koreniyzatsiya, and post-korenizatsiya.   
During the years of independence, the need to unite the nation impacted the selection 
process. In Ukraine, the selection process was neither conventional nor straightforward because 
of the historical and political challenges faced by the country.  Historically, the Ukrainian 
language was subjected to oppression and different parts of Ukraine were ruled by different 
foreign powers.  As a result, regional dialects underwent very different developmental processes, 
as they were influenced by different dominant languages.   In 1917, the nation was partitioned 
between large political players and the population spoke a number of dialects.   The period of 
independence and the Akt Zluky brought the idea of Ukrainian unity to the fore of political 
ambitions, and the Ukrainian government relied on the support of all Ukrainian regions.  Giving 
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preference to one dialect over another for the basis of codification was a dangerous gamble: any 
choice would incite outraged condemnation by the speakers of the rejected vernaculars, 
potentially resulting in the withdrawal of their support.  Therefore, the linguists chosen for the 
standardization project faced a challenging task from the outset.   
In 1917, Ivan Steshenko, the first Minister of Education of the Central Council and 
former member and leader of Hromada, assigned Ivan Ohiyenko, a professor at Kyiv University, 
to develop Ukrainian orthographic rules (Nimchuk 250).  Some time later, a number of 
Ukrainian linguists including Ahatanhel Krymskyi, Yevhen Tymchenko, and Mykola Hrunsky 
joined Ohiyenko’s codification project (Ohiyenko Narysy… 12).  The group members 
understood the history of the Ukrainian language, its regional variability, and the country’s need 
to have a standard language and to engage in the intensive development of a national identity. 
The protagonist of language standardization must select a variety, which will be used as the basis 
for the development process. In the course of Ukrainian standardization, selection was not a 
straightforward undertaking.   One can assume that Ohiyenko was not in favor of the 
conventional selection approach where one vernacular serves as the basis for a standard variety.  
In the preface to his book, Essays on the History of the Ukrainian Language System of the 
Ukrainian Orthography (Essays), Ohiyenko suggests that looking at orthography “from the solo 
position of one specific vernacular” is the root cause of extensive disagreements on the topic of 
Ukrainian orthography (qtd. in Ohiyenko Narysy… VII).  Ohiyenko advocated the use of both 
historical and linguistic analyses of the language as a way to selectively combine elements from 
various vernaculars into the standard variety, as opposed to selecting only one vernacular for 
codification purposes.  He presented a historical analysis of Ukrainian in the Essays and 
suggested in the preface that the availability and spread of historical linguistic knowledge would 
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lead to the establishment of “the very best official academic orthography” (qtd. in Ohiyenko 
Narysy… VIII).    
When Ohiyenko’s group undertook the first codification project, Ukrainian already 
featured almost fifty different graphizations13 developed and used by various authors, scholars, 
and scholastic groups between 1798 and 1905.  The Essays catalogue and compare these systems 
(Ohiyenko Narysy… 15-22).  However, none of these were sanctioned by any official agency 
and, moreover, periodic bans of the Ukrainian language hampered their elaboration and 
acceptance.    The catalogue includes the systems used by authors working in Tsarist Russia who 
represented Eastern and Central Ukrainian dialects as well as systems developed from Western 
Ukrainian dialects.  This indicates that Ohiyenko did not view Western Ukrainian vernaculars as 
secondary, undeserving of attention, or unfit for codification endeavors, nor did he consider them 
as candidates for suppression resulting from their rejection as sources of features for standard 
Ukrainian.  According to Ohiyenko, every scholar contributed to Ukrainian orthography, which 
became an all inclusive creation by the efforts undertaken during the nineteenth century 
(Ohiyenko Narysy… 14).  The development of the Ukrainian Orthographic rules undertaken by 
Ohiyenko and his colleagues involved the selection of features from various dialects and 
previously developed and used grammar systems, based on their historical and etymological 
attributes.  Selection was done not on the level of vernaculars but on the level of their specific 
features.   
In January of 1919, the rules were published under the title Major Rules of Ukrainian 
Orthography Approved by the Ministry of Public Education for School Use (Головнiшi прaвилa 
укрaїнського прaвопису, ухвaленi Мiнiстерством нaродної освiти для шкiльного вжитку); 
these were later reviewed, supplemented, and officially approved in February 1920 by the 
                                                      
13 Graphization is the adoption, development, or modification of writing systems and scripts (Cooper 125) 
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Ukrainian Academy of Science (Nimchuk 251, Ohiyenko Narysy… 13).  The preface specified 
that professor Ivan Ohiyenko was the author of the rules and that the rules covered debatable 
questions of Ukrainian orthography along with examinations of instances that “make our 
orthographic norms different from the orthographic norms of Halychyna”14 (“відріжняють 
наш правопис від правопису Галичини”) (Nimchuk 251).  This statement indicates that the 
rules were created with Central and Eastern Ukraine in mind.  Though differences between 
Ukrainian regional varieties are pointed out, the use of the term ‘orthographic norms’ in 
reference to Halychyna speech denotes the recognition of the achieved level of codification for 
that variety, as dictated by its separate history of development.  In this respect, the two 
orthographic norms were complementary to one another within Ukrainian culture, rather than 
antagonistic, as they would be in the case of standard vs. non-standard set-off.  The rules 
prepared by Professor Ohiyenko were based on the results of his analysis of other previously 
developed systems.  He and his colleagues included into the rules only those features that 
appeared most logical and relevant based on the historical and etymological analysis of the 
development of Ukrainian (Nimchuk 253).  This method deviates from the traditional approach 
of selecting one vernacular as a basis for the standard, while ignoring features of other 
vernaculars during codification.  
 Ohiyenko and his group developed and published the first sets of orthographic norms 
during the years of Ukraine’s independence.  It is possible that Ukraine’s political independence 
had some impact on the group members on both a personal and professional level.  As the 
developers of a standard language for their new nation, they may have experienced some 
political influence urging them to take into account the needs of the state.  In addition, Professor 
                                                      
14 Halychyna – or Galicia in English, is a historical region named after the city of Halych in Ukraine.  
Halychyna included the territories of today’s Ternopil, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions of Ukraine, as well as 
some territories that are now part of Poland (Magocsi Ukraine… 51-52, 210). 
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Ohiyenko was a member of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and understood 
how the standard would serve the government’s political needs.  Ukraine’s emerging national 
identity required building blocks that would represent the country’s long and glorious history, its 
rich and elaborate language, and ideas that would unite the nation.  After a period of foreign 
domination, Ukraine found itself to be a battlefield for various political forces, both external and 
domestic, who were fighting for the ultimate prize—Ukraine itself.  These circumstances 
required a strong message of unity and credibility.  By uniting the past collective work of 
prominent authors and linguists with the specialized linguistic and historical knowledge of the 
group’s members, Ohiyenko and his team were able to make a superlative contribution to the 
codification project undertaken during the tenure of the Tsentral’na Rada and the Dyrektorija.   
Ohiyenko’s approach to selecting the basis for the standard language required consulting 
historical data and linguistic traditions and systems developed in the past, as well as taking into 
account the legacy left by previous generations of Ukrainian authors and researchers in the 
process of codification.  This approach fell in line with the government’s attempts at engineering 
a unifying myth for the new country: the standard language was developed with an appreciation 
of the national cultural heritage, which belonged to all Ukrainian people.  Using the nation’s 
history and culture in shaping the standard language added an attribute to the standard that could 
serve as a link between disparate population groups.  Ohiyenko’s approach also demonstrated 
that Ukrainian was on a different developmental level than a language that would require 
standardization to begin with the selection of only one vernacular.  This developmental level was 
secured by the language systems developed and used between 1798 and 1905, despite 
government imposition of adverse socio-political conditions.  Previously developed writing 
systems served as a basis for the linguistic framework, which created the perception of a united 
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nation rather than a mere conglomeration of separate regional groups speaking local vernaculars.  
This also meant that the Ukrainian civilization did not begin with the proclamation of 
independence in 1917 but was the product of a long history. Ukraine’s distinct history and 
culture underscored the legitimacy of the country’s independence.  
Incorporation rather than selection may have been a reflection of the government’s 
mandate to unite the nation, but it also seemed to be in line with Ohiyenko’s personal beliefs.  
Nimchuk argues that there were some personal preferences in the process of selecting norms to 
include in the standard, but he does not specify whose, nor what type of preferences might have 
influenced the process (Nimchuk 253).  It seems that on a personal level, professor Ohiyenko 
highly regarded the principles of unity and strived to bring them into his project.  Ohiyenko  
believed that the power of a nation rests in its unity, rather than in variety or contrasts 
(Zaval’nyuk 111).  Professor Ohiyenko was the key organizer of a University in Kam’yanets-
Podilsky, a city located on the border of Western and Central-Eastern Ukraine.  He considered 
this location perfect for its symbolic value: the meeting place of two cultures (Zaval’nyuk 111).    
Ivan Ohiyenko was later ordained as a Ukrainian Orthodox priest, and during the course of his 
ecclesiastical work in Canada, he was the key organizer of a unity conference for three North 
American Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in 1960 (Wilson 248).  It is possible that the decision to 
incorporate linguistic features from various dialects and past language systems rather than 
selecting one specific vernacular for standardization was partially motivated by personal 
adherence to the ideas of unity and reconciliation.  Individuals can have as big an impact on 
language planning as can organized bodies. Alongside Ohiyenko, the individual that played a 
significant role in the codification of the Ukrainian orthographic norms was Ahatanhel Krymskyi 
(Nimchuk 253). Anatanhel Krymskyi, a member of the Orthographic Commissions of Ukraine in 
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1921 and 1926-1928, included the incorporation approach in the language planning projects of 
the post-independence period.    Krymskyi was part of Ohiyenko’s working group in 1917-1919, 
but also continued working on codification in 1921, and 1926-28, and furthered the tradition of 
incorporation of regional (including Western) features into standard. 
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CHAPTER 3  CODIFICATION 
3.1. Codification of the Ukrainian Language during the Years of Independence (1917-
1919) 
Codification is the stage of language planning where a standard set of language norms is 
developed for use by the target population; it is sometimes referred to as the “corpus planning of 
a language” (Holmes 102). Codification deals with linguistic forms and is designed to attain 
linguistic goals (Honberger 28-29).  Nevertheless, the ultimate function of a linguistic form can 
influence the forms selected for inclusion in the standard variety that is being created by the 
corpus planning process (Cooper 122-123).  In this respect, corpus planning goals are not purely 
linguistic and can be influenced by political agendas.  Political inspirations and manipulations 
had an impact on the Orthographic Codes adopted in Ukraine between 1917 and 1938.   
Professor Ohiyenko prepared the first version of Ukrainian orthographic rules in April 
29, 191815, in his book Most Essential Rules of the Ukrainian Orthography on the Instruction of 
the Orthographic Commission. Compiled by Privat-Ass.Prof. I. Ohiyenko.16. In April 1918, the 
Orthographic Commission of the Ministry of Public Education approved these rules (Nimchuk 
250).  Before granting the approval, members of the Commission held extensive debates and 
made some changes to the presented version; however, the rules were never disseminated for 
public use, since the Minister of Education, N. Vasylenko, had not announced them because of a 
change in government (Ohiyenko Narysy… 12).  Subsequent codification efforts included the 
publication of the Most Essential Rules17  in the 10th issue of the 1918 magazine Ukrayins’ka 
                                                      
15 The Central Council government was overthrown by Skoropadsky a day earlier, April 28, 1918, and 
dismissed by the order issued on April 30, 1918. 
16 ‘Найголовніші правила українського правопису. З доручення Правописної комісії склав прив.-доц. І. 
Огієнко.’ 
17 ‘Most Essential rules of the Ukrainian Orthography. Adopted by the Orthographic Commission of the 
Ministry of Education on May 24, 1918 in Kyiv’ (‘Найголовнішi правила українського правопису. Ухвалені 
Правоприсною комісією при Міністерстві освіти 24 травня 1918 р. в Києві). 
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Shkola (Ukrainian School) (Nimchuk 250).  The following individuals were part of the 
Orthographic Commission that developed the Most Essential Rules of 1918: professors 
Ohiyenko, Tymchenko, Smal-Stotskyi, Hrunskyi, Loboda and specialists Naumenko, 
Holoskevych, Kurylo, Shal’, Hantsov, Nikonovsky (Nimchuk 251). The codification work 
continued when the Directory Government led by S. Petlyura and V. Vynnychenko came to 
power.  Details of the codification projects are summarized in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1  Work on codification of the Ukrainian language in the first half of 1919.   
Date Event Individuals 
Involved 
Leader or 
Approval 
Outcome 
January 
1919 
I. Ohiyenko forms a 
Commission with the 
purpose  of editing a 
short orthographic 
code 
Ahafanhel 
Krymskyi 
Yevhen 
Tymchenko 
Ivan Ohiyenko
I. Ohiyenko Detailed review of the 
orthographic code 
approved by the 
previous 1918 
Commission and 
composition of Major 
Rules of the Ukrainian 
Orthography 
‘Головніші правила 
українського 
правопису’ 
January 17, 
1919 
Approval and 
publication of Major 
Rules of the 
Ukrainian 
Orthography 
‘Головніші правила 
українського 
правопису’ 
Ahafanhel 
Krymskyi 
Yevhen 
Tymchenko 
edited the 
Rules 
Approved by the 
Ministry of Public 
Education and 
signed by I. 
Ohiyenko, A. 
Krymskyi, and Y. 
Tymchenko 
 
March 16, 
1919 
Creation of the 
Orthography and 
Terminology 
Commission at the 
newly formed the 
Ukrainian Academy 
of Sciences 
Ahafanhel 
Krymskyi 
Hryhoriy 
Holoskevych 
 
  
Spring and 
Summer of 
1919 
A. Krymskyi was 
working to 
supplement Major 
Ahafanhel 
Krymskyi 
 
Ahafanhel 
Krymskyi 
 
New set of rules called 
‘The Most Essential 
Rules of the Ukrainian 
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Date Event Individuals 
Involved 
Leader or 
Approval 
Outcome 
Rules and streamline 
Most Essential Rules 
Orthography’ 
(‘Найгoловніші 
правила українського 
правопису ‘ 
May 17, 
1919 and 
July 12, 
1919 
Approval of new The 
Most Essential Rules 
by the General 
Meeting of the 
Ukrainian Academy 
of Science 
 Note:  in 1920 
these rules were 
endorsed by the 
Soviet authorities 
 
 
Source: Publications by Ohiyenko and Nimchuk (Ohiyenko Narysy… 12-13, Nimchuk 251-253). 
 
The majority of the rules of Ukrainian orthography were compiled in 1918 and 1919. The 
1920s and 1930s were devoted to the contested topic of spelling borrowings, which is the use of 
the letters ‘г’ and ‘ґ’ in place of foreign letters ‘h’ and ‘g,’ as well as the use of soft ‘ль’ or hard 
‘л’ in place of the foreign letter ‘l.’  Ohiyenko’s 1918 Most Essential Rules included the 
following:  
1. The letter ‘ґ’ is to be written according to the pronunciation of the relevant foreign words: 
ґімназія, телеґраф, ґенерал, ґазета, терминолоґія, психолоґія (Nimchuk 257). Examples 
of the use of ‘ґ’ include: gymnasia, telegraph, general, gazette, terminology, psychology.   If 
a transliterated foreign word contained ‘g,’ the letter ‘ґ’ had to be used in Ukrainian 
(Nimchuk 257).    
2. When a foreign word contains the letter ‘l,’ the corresponding sound, ‘л’ in Ukrainian 
transliteration, in most cases, should not be palatalized: ‘i.e. write a, є, o, y, not я, е, ьо, ю:’ 
клас, план, новела, билет, легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логика, флот, филологія, 
аналогія, лояльний, лозунг, Лузитанія, клуб (Nimchuk 257-258).  One can observe 
inconsistencies in the prescribed use of ‘є’ (produces palatalization) and ‘e’ (does not result 
in the palatalization of ‘л’ (‘l’)).  This inconsistency is marked by [!] in Nimchuk’s article 
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and could have been a mistake in the original text.  Based on the verbiage of the rule, ‘л’ 
should not be palatalized,’ the string of letters following the verbiage should have read ‘i.e. 
write a, e, o, y, but not я, є, ьо, ю’. 
The subsequent Major Rules18 also prepared by Ohiyenko, featured some modifications 
of the previous rules, including the elimination of the ‘e’ or ‘є’ ambiguity: 
1. The foreign sound ‘g’ is to be rendered through the letter ‘г’: гімназія, телеграф, генерал, 
газета, термiнологія, психологія (Nimchuk 258). 
Note: Often, ‘ґ’ can be written as well: телеґраф, ґенерал (Nimchuk 258). 
2. When a foreign word features ‘l,’ the corresponding sound ‘л’ in Ukrainian transliteration, in 
most cases, should not be palatalized, i.e., write a, e, o, y, but not я, є, ьо, ю: класa, план, 
новела, билет, легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логика, флотa, фiлологія, аналогія, 
лояльний, лозунг, Лузитанія, клуб (Nimchuk 258). 
Note: In this case, ‘л’ (‘l’) is often palatalized too: клясa, плян, фльота, новеля, 
фiльольогія, etc.  (Nimchuk 258).   
 James Dingley characterizes the rules codified by Ohiyenko in 1919 (Major Rules) as 
based “largely on eastern Ukrainian dialects and Russian orthographical tradition” (qtd. in 
Dingley 177).  In the Essays, Ohiyenko substantiated the use of hard ‘л’ and ‘г’ in the place of 
foreign ‘g’ in Ukrainian, based on the etymology of foreign words that, in most cases, entered 
Ukrainian directly from Greek and could be traced back to ancient religious scripts found in 
various parts of Ukraine.  The practice of rendering ‘g’ as ‘г’ and ‘l’ as hard ‘л’ is indeed similar 
to Russian.  The pronunciation used in Halychyna was different due to the influence of Polish.  
In the Essays, Ohiyenko referred to two areas: Ukraine, which he sometimes called Great 
                                                      
18 ‘Головнiшi прaвилa укрaїнського прaвописy ухвaленi Мiнiстерством нaродної освiти для 
шкiльного вжитку’ (Major rules of the Ukrainian Orthography Approved by the Ministry of Public Education for 
School Use). 
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Ukraine, as opposed to Halychyna (Ohiyenko Narysy… 115-121). He does not, however, 
mention ‘eastern Ukrainian dialects.’  One can deduce that both Dingley and Ohiyenko meant 
the dialects spoken in the territory referred to as Dnieper Ukraine, an area of Ukraine that had 
fallen under the rule of the Russian Empire (Magocsi Ukraine… 135, 139-140).  Ohiyenko 
disagreed with the general contention that matching the orthography of borrowed words in 
Russian and Ukrainian meant that Ukrainian simply followed the Russian fashion or the 
“Russian orthographical tradition” (qtd. in Dingley 117). In the 17th century and the first half of 
the 18th century, many borrowings entered the Russian language through speakers of Ukrainian 
who held positions across Russia (particularly through the Ukrainian clergy), as well as officials 
of Ukrainian origin who worked for various government institutions (Ohiyenko Narysy… 118-
120).  Many borrowings were brought into Russian, not directly from the West, but through 
Ukraine and in a form that was already Ukrainianized.  The use of Greek-origin words in 
Ukrainian dates back centuries before the development of the close ties and reciprocal influx of 
words between Ukrainian and Russian (Ohiyenko Narysy… 119-120).   In his earlier 
recommendations, Ohiyenko proposed to use ‘ґ’ to render foreign ‘g,’ which the subsequent 
Major Rules acknowledged as a possible orthographical variant, but he ultimately suggested to 
write ‘г.’  
 
Table 3.2  Comparison of spelling in the use of ‘г’ and ‘ґ,’ recommended by the Most Essential 
Rules 1918, Major Rules 1919, and the Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976. 
  
Most Essential Rules 
1918 
Major Rules  1919 Russian Spelling  
(Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976) 
Ґімназія Гімназія Гимназия 
Телеґраф телеграф, but also 
possible телеґраф 
Телеграф 
Ґенерал Генерал, but also Генерал 
 40 
 
Most Essential Rules 
1918 
Major Rules  1919 Russian Spelling  
(Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976) 
possible Ґенерал 
Ґазета Газета Газета 
Терминолоґія Термiнологія Терминология 
Психолоґія Психологія Психология 
 
A special chapter of Ohiyenko’s Essays was devoted to the use of ‘г’ and ‘ґ’ for 
borrowings.  He distinguishes between the first borrowings from Greek that entered Ukrainian 
between the 8th and 10th centuries from those that were brought to Ukraine via other European 
languages in later centuries.  Ohiyenko argues that the pronunciation of the Greek letter ‘’ in 
the 8th and 10th centuries was similar to /h/ or Ukrainian /г/, and therefore all words that entered 
Ukrainian at that time were pronounced with /г/ in place of ‘’19 (Ohiyenko Narysy… 161-162).   
In Rome, the Greek letter ‘’ was pronounced as /g/ and this spread to the European languages 
and then to Polish, before gradually entering Ukrainian with new borrowings and as a 
pronunciation variant for words that that had previously been used in the language.  As a result, 
in the 14th century, there was a need in Ukraine for a letter, which would correspond to the sound 
/g/ (Ohiyenko Narysy… 163).  The letter ‘ґ,’ as a symbol corresponding to the European sound 
/g/, appeared in Ukrainian written documents at the end of the 16th century. ‘Grammar’ by 
Meletii Smotrytskyi20 anchored this letter in the Ukrainian language (Ohiyenko Narysy… 164).  
Ohiyenko believed that Smotrytskyi had gone too far in recommending the use of ‘ґ’ in all Greek 
words, since this approach disregarded the history of earlier borrowings from Greek and the 
pronunciation of ‘’ in the donor language (Ohiyenko Narysy… 164).  In the Essays, Ohiyenko 
                                                      
19 A different theory stipulates that originally, proto-Slavic contained a voiced velar explosive, ‘g,’ which in 
the 9thcentury lenited to voiced velar fricative /h/ (/г/) (Nimchuk 282).   
20 Meletii Smotrytskyi, a clergyman and author of Slavonic Grammar (1619) (Magocsi A History…187).  
Smotrytskyi developed orthographic and orthoepic norms of Church Slavonic in Ukraine.  His version of Church 
Slavonic was greatly influenced by Ukrainian vernaculars.   The orthographic rules developed by Smotrytsky were 
consistently used in the Ukrainian church and circular literature in subsequent years (Nimchuk 244-245).   
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favored the “g = г” correspondence for Ukrainian and expressed his opinion that the sound ‘g’ 
was foreign and unnatural to the Ukrainian language. For this reason, Ukrainian tended to render 
‘g’ with ‘г’ in many borrowings from German; however, he admitted that it was possible that the 
sound ‘g’ had existed in the language prior to the 10th century (Ohiyenko Narysy… 165, 162).   
In comparison to Russian and Polish, Ukrainian holds a unique position in regards to 
rendering Greek ‘.’  In both Polish and Russian, the correspondence is “ = g” (the Russian 
letter ‘г’ is pronounced as /g/).   However, in Ukrainian, =h (/г/), and Ukrainian also features 
the sound /g/ (/ґ/). Russian does not have a voiced velar fricative comparable to the Ukrainian /г/.  
Ukrainian acquired the letter ‘ґ’ and its corresponding sound, /g/, as a result of close ties with 
Western Europe and the influence of Polish on Ukrainian.   This influence was more profound 
and prolonged on the vernaculars of Halychyna.  The magnitude of infiltration of /g/ into the 
vernaculars of Halychyna troubled Ohiyenko, since he considered this trend as contrary to “the 
Ukrainian indigenous tradition and vernacular pronunciation” (qtd. in Ohiyenko Narysy… 
166).   He denies that the “Moscow influence” caused the prevalence of ‘г’ use in the place of 
foreign ‘g’ in ‘Great Ukraine,’ but, rather, attributes it to the history of Ukrainian culture 
(Ohiyenko  Narysy… 166).  Nevertheless, in the Most Essential Rules, Ohiyenko recommended 
to spell borrowings with ‘ґ’ in the same customary manner used in Halychyna and preserved use 
of ‘ґ’ as optional in the Major Rules.                                
Regarding hard and soft ‘л,’ the earlier Most Essential Rules were similar to Russian 
spelling and prescribed hard ‘л’ only, while the later Major Rules introduced soft ‘л’ as an 
option. 
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Table 3.3  Comparison of spelling using soft or hard ‘л,’ recommended by the Most Essential 
Rules 1918, Major Rules 1919 and the Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976. 
 
Most Essential Rules 
1918 
Major Rules  1919 Russian Spelling  
(Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976) 
Клас  Класa, but also possibly 
Кляса 
Клас 
План План,  плян  План 
Новела Новела, новеля Новелла 
Билет Билет Билет 
Легальний Легальний Легальный 
Легенда Легенда Легенда 
Легіон Легіон Легион 
Лекція Лекція Лекция 
Логика Логика Логика 
Флот Флота Флот 
Филологія філологія, фільольогія  Филология 
Aналогія Аналогія Aналогия 
Лояльний Лояльний Лояльный 
Лозунг Лозунг Лозунг 
Лузитанія Лузитанія not provided 
Клуб Клуб Клуб 
 
Ohiyenko’s point of view on the use of soft and hard ‘л’ in foreign origin words is 
evident in his Essays.  He believed that early borrowings of ‘л’ from Greek were not pronounced 
soft; however, later borrowings that entered Ukrainian from German and Polish came with a soft 
‘л’ (Ohiyenko Narysy… 168).  Soft ‘л’ was observed to prevail in Halychyna, where even words 
that had originally entered the language with hard ‘л’ around the 10th century were attributed soft 
‘л,’ following the trend instigated by Polish influence (Ohiyenko Narysy… 169). Ohiyenko 
disagreed that if hard ‘л’ was observed in a foreign borrowing it would indicate that the word 
followed the Russian spelling (Ohieynko Narysy… 170).   He argued that if a foreign borrowing 
in Russian and Ukrainian displayed similar spelling, it was because in the 17th century, and at the 
beginning of the 18th century, Russian adopted many foreign words through the clergy and 
individuals educated in Ukraine (Ohiyenko Narysy… 119-120).  Ohiyenko uses the word клас as 
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an example of a spelling reflecting the traditional Ukrainian style of pronunciation with hard ‘л’  
(this form was introduced into the Russian educational system), while кляса represents the Latin-
Polish form of the word (Ohiyenko Narysy… 120).    Nevertheless, the Major Rules stipulated 
that ‘л’ could be used in its soft form as well: кляса, плян, фльота, новеля, фільольогія, etc.  
The variations in spelling suggested by the above guidelines of the Most Essential Rules 
and the Major Rules are not limited to questions of ‘г‘ or  ’ґ’ and  ’л’ (hard or soft).   Two other 
widely debated issues can be observed: the rendering of foreign ‘i’ in Ukrainian and the gender 
of borrowed words as they appear in Ukrainian.  The Most Essential Rules feature ‘и’ in 
transliteration of foreign ‘i’ (терминолоґія, филологія ), while the Major Rules present ‘i’ 
(термiнологія, філологія, фільольогія) (Nimchuk 257-258).  The list of examples in the Most 
Essential Rules includes the words ‘клас’ and ‘флот’ as masculine gender nouns with hard ‘л’ 
(Nimchuk 257-258).  The Major Rules add the variants ‘класа’ (feminine gender, hard ‘л’), 
‘кляса’ (feminine gender, soft ‘л’), ‘флота’ (feminine gender, hard ‘л’) and ‘фльота’ 
(feminine gender, soft ‘л’) (Nimchuk 258). Ukrainian noun gender, similar to other Slavic 
languages including Polish and Russian, is determined by the structure of the word— 
specifically, by its ending.   When a foreign word entered Ukrainian, it was traditionally 
attributed with a gender based on its ending, disregarding the word’s actual gender, if there was 
one, in the donor language (Ohiyenko Narysy… 187).   
 In contrast, when borrowing, the Polish language often tried to preserve the original 
gender of the word and if the foreign word ending contradicted the gender ending required by 
Polish grammar, the word ending was often altered to conform to grammar rules (Ohiyenko 
Narysy… 188-191).  This was particularly true for feminine nouns because Polish has a large 
number of foreign words that were attributed the ‘a’ (feminine) ending (Ohiyenko Narysy… 
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188-190).  This Polish tradition heavily influenced western Ukrainian dialects.  Some borrowings 
that underwent Polish transformation penetrated the language of Dnieper Ukraine as well, i.e., 
база (basis), криза (crisis), фаза (phase).  These words were accepted as natural in Ukrainian, 
since, through Polish, they had already received the widely accepted Ukrainian ‘a’ ending and 
they did not look foreign at all (Ohiyenko Narysy… 192).  The words клас – класа, кляса 
underwent this transformation as well: Latin feminine classis is represented in Polish as feminine 
klasa (Ohiyenko Narysy… 188).  The word flota entered Polish from Italian and preserved its 
feminine ending there.  (Ohiyenko Narysy… 189).  The Essays included lists and tables of 
comparison on how borrowed words appeared in Polish and in the vernaculars of Halychyna and 
Great Ukraine.  The word клас and флот are listed as words used in the areas of Great Ukraine, 
while класа, кляса, флота (Ohiyenko also provided a variant, фльота) were found in the 
vernaculars of Halychyna because “the Ukrainian language in Halychyna [was] following the 
Polish language” (qtd. in Ohiyenko Narysy… 191).   In the Essays, Ohiyenko argues that the 
Ukrainian tradition of borrowing formed as early as the 10th century, long before Russia and 
Russian existed in their present state (Ohiyenko Narysy… 190).  Numerous written documents 
dating back to the 11th century provide plenty of examples of borrowings. (Ohiyenko Narysy… 
190).  The mere concordance of the gender of a borrowed word in Russian and Ukrainian cannot 
support the conclusion that the Ukrainian word just followed the Russian model (Ohiyenko 
Narysy… 190).      
The Most Essential Rules contained a prescription for how to treat words beginning with 
‘i’21: “At the beginning of a word, where there is no ‘йі’ sound, one should write ‘i’ (not ‘и’)… 
                                                      
21 Ukrainian ‘i' is a letter that represents the sound /i/.   This sound is represented by the letter ‘и’ in 
Russian.  The letter ‘i' is not in the modern Russian alphabet. 
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however, before ‘н’ it is acceptable to write ‘и’22: инший, инколи, иней...” (qtd. in Nimchuk 
279).  This topic was also addressed in the orthographic rules adopted some time later.  The Most 
Essential Rules on feminine noun case endings: “Feminine nouns ending in a consonant, acquire 
the ending ‘и’ in singular genitive case.  In singular dative and singular locative, 'i' should be 
written, for example: Genitive case: з ночи, коло печи, з подорожи, цієї соли, нічної тіни, без 
сповіди, без відповіди, з радости, до смерти. Exception: в осени” (qtd. in Nimchuk 300).   
The Major Rules included 28 paragraphs on the spelling of Ukrainian words and 12 
paragraphs under the title ‘Прaвопис чужих слiв в укрaїнськiй мовi’ (Nimchuk 251-252).  They 
addressed, among others, the following issues: 
1. Use of –ія, –іє, and –ї in loan words: “In foreign words, write –ія, –іє, not –ia, -ie: 
матеріял, геніяльний, спеціяльний, фіялка, варіянт, діявол, діякон, пієтизм, гієна”.  
“The letter ‘i' after a vowel in foreign words should be rendered through ’ї’ (not ‘i'): Каїн, 
Михаїл, Гавриїл, Рафаїл, Енеїда, архаїчний, героїчний, руїна, архаїзм” (Nimchuk 309).  
This orthography followed Ukrainian pronunciation.  If a loan word contained ‘ie’ and ‘ia’ 
letter combinations, /i/ directly influenced the following /e/ and /a/ and made them sound 
iotified (/ja/ and /je/).   
2. Writing of the reflexive suffix –ся: It was to be written with the verb, rather than writing it 
before the verb as was done in Halychyna, following Polish (Dingley 177). 
3. Writing adjectivial suffixes: the soft sign is always to be present in adjectivial suffixes –ськ-, 
-цьк- (Dingley 177) 
4. Cluster ‘св’ and ‘зв’: no soft sign is needed before ‘в’: світ, звір (Dingley 177). 
                                                      
22 Ukrainian ‘и’ is a letter that represents the sound //.  The corresponding Russian letter ‘ы’ represents 
the sound //, which is close to the Ukrainian //, but is not exactly the same. 
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Ohiyenko posited that borrowed words, in many cases, had entered Ukrainian first from 
Greek, Polish, or German and were later brought to Russian from Ukrainian (Ohiyenko Narysy 
119).  The earlier rules complied by Ohiyenko recommended only the Western Ukrainian 
(Halychyna) technique of rendering foreign ‘g’ through ‘ґ.’ The subsequent Major Rules 
preserved this Western Ukrainian variant and added the Western Ukrainian option for rendering 
foreign ‘l.’ The Major Rules’ prescription to render ‘g’ and ‘l’ in loan words in the same way as 
they were rendered in the vernaculars of Dnieper Ukraine enticed Dingley to deduce that the 
rules were largely based on ‘Eastern Ukrainian dialects’ (Dingley 177).  This conclusion can be 
attributed to the Major Rules only in combination with a note that the rules also included 
Western Ukrainian variants as fully legitimate options for spelling.     
The Essays demonstrated that Ohiyenko favored the historical tradition of the ancient 
times and not the more recent Polonized forms.  Nevertheless, he included the spelling variants 
practiced in Halychyna in both Most Essential and Major Rules.  Both the Western and Dnieper 
regions of Ukraine had experienced a greater degree of Polish influence than had Russia and this 
fact had to be reflected, even if it meant the perversion of original forms as they had appeared in 
earlier Ukrainian, at the time of borrowing from Greek.  The spelling variations were primarily a 
result of Ukraine being partitioned between Poland and Russia for a long period of time.  
Western Ukraine, particularly Halychyna, underwent a more profound Polish influence 
compared to Dnieper Ukraine.   This history influenced both pronunciation and spelling and the 
variation could not be ignored during the development of Ukrainian orthographic rules.    
Ohiyenko’s codification projects were launched in response to the need for a standard 
language for a newly formed country.  For the first time in centuries, Ukraine had received its 
own statehood, which incorporated both the Western and Dnieper regions. Different historical 
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paths produced linguistic and cultural differences for the regions, but both of the regions 
contributed to Ukrainian civilization, and these differences made Ukrainian culture and language 
richer and more diverse.  It would have been inapt to ignore this fact during codification, 
especially since codification was meant to contribute to the Ukrainian state-building process.   
The Major Rules were approved five days before the symbolic Akt Zluky was brought into force. 
The unification, inclusiveness, and elimination of the dividing border between Western and 
Dnieper Ukraine were on the political agenda of the Ukrainian government and these tendencies 
can be traced to the orthographic rules proposed in 1919.             
The codification process was expected to produce linguistic norms, which were meant to 
guide users of the language towards the elected or developed standard.  The more 
straightforward the rules, the easier it would be to implement and follow them.  The 
incorporation of the country’s myth-building needs into the orthographic rules spared the country 
much discontent on the part of those whose vernacular would have been dismissed as unsuitable 
for the standard; this, however produced ambiguity, since it left unanswered such questions as 
soft or hard ‘л,’ feminine or masculine noun genders, ‘г’ or ‘ґ?’  This ambiguity is evident in 
Dingley’s assigning question marks to rules of hard or soft ‘л’ and ‘i' or ‘и’ where he provides  
the summary of Ohiyenko’s recommendations and questions (Dingley 177).  Had Ohiyenko and 
his group had an opportunity to continue their work, they may have developed a plan to 
implement and elaborate these rules and incorporate both Dnieper and Western Ukrainian 
orthographic traditions into one standard.  Unfortunately, Ukraine’s independence was short 
lived, and further codification continued on a different political background.   
The Major Rules (1919) and the Most Essential Rules became the grounds for further 
work, which continued after the Bolsheviks had taken over Kyiv at the end of 1919.   On 
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November 20, 1920, the Ukrainian Academy of Science approved The Most Essential Rules 
(1919) and the People’s Commissar of Education of Soviet Ukraine, H. Hrynko,23 endorsed the 
The Most Essential Rules, which had been developed and adopted under the Directory 
government (Nimchuk 252, Ohiyenko Narysy… 13).  Efforts to develop a standard Ukrainian 
language did not falter under Bolshevik rule.  The Bolsheviks needed the support of the 
Borot’bists, a party of individuals who adhered to ideas surrounding the cultural and 
administrative autonomy of Ukraine and thrived to build a new Ukrainian identity.  The 
development of a standard variety was essential for these projects, because a standard would 
project the unity of the nation by being the common mode of communication; the elevated status 
of a standard “can mobilize and empower people” (qtd. in Bilaniuk 2).  In addition, the 
Bolsheviks needed the Ukrainian language as a tool for promoting their ideology in Ukraine: 
eighty per cent of the population were Ukrainians and spoke Ukrainian and not every one of 
them could understand Russian.  (Solchanyk 64, Magocsi Ukraine… 231).  
3.2. Codification in Soviet Ukraine before and during Ukranianization  
The work of the Orthography and Terminology Commission was important in the 
development of the standard language, and had the potential to bring eastern and western 
linguistic communities closer together. Formed during the time of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic, it continued its work under Bolshevik rule.  The Commission was headed by A. 
Krymskyi and managed by H. Holoskevych.   In the second half of 1921, the Commission 
became part of a new agency, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language, formed under the 
umbrella of the Academy of Science (Nimchuk 252).  In 1921, as a result of the Commission’s 
                                                      
23 Hryhoriy Hrynko, Borot’bist, a member of the first Ukrainian Soviet government (Maistrenko 171).  In 
1922, Hrynko was expelled from the position of People’s Commissar of Education for his ‘excessive haste in 
carrying out ukrainianization’ (Solchanyk 68). 
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work, a book of new rules was prepared.  A comparison of the publications of 1919 and 1921 
indicated that the new rules had been based on and had supplemented the rules authored by 
Ohiyenko, and published in 1919 (Nimchuk 253).  The new book contained 32 rules on spelling 
of native words and 14 rules on spelling borrowings (Nimchuk 252).  The rules included the 
most consistent and rational traditions developed by Ukrainian linguists during the end of the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.  The code of 1921 was highly 
regarded and led to the 1922 publication of a set of rules, ‘Прaвописнi прaвилa, прийнятi 
Нaуковим товaриством iменi Шевченкa у Львовi.’  (Orthographic Rules Adopted by the Lviv 
Shevchenko Scientific Society) (Nimchuk 253).  As a result, Western Ukraine acquired a set of 
orthographic rules similar to the Code of 1921.  Ukraine made a step towards brining the 
linguistic communities of Dnieper and Western Ukraine closer to one another.   
The Soviet Orthographic Code of Ukrainian adopted in 1921 prescribed the following use 
of ‘г,’ ‘ґ,’ and ‘л’ (soft and hard) in foreign loan words: 
1. The sound ‘g’ in foreign words was to be rendered through ‘г’: гімназія, телеграф, генерал, 
газета, термінологія, психологія.  However, in a foreign family name, ‘g’ had to be 
differentiated from ‘h’: Гюґо, Ґутгейль, Ґріґ, Гартман (Nimchuk 258). 
2. In most cases, in foreign words, the sound ‘л’ was not to be palatalized, ‘i.e. write a, e, o, y, 
not я, є, ьо, ю, after ‘л’: класа, план, лавровий, лантух, латинський, новела, білет, 
легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логіка, флота, філологія, аналогія, лояльний, лозунг, 
Лузітанія, клуб...’  ‘Л’ is soft in only a few words that entered Ukrainian via Polish: 
пляшка, клямка, ляда, лямпа, канцелярія, льох (Nimchuk 258). 
3. Similar to the Most Essential Rules, the Orthographic Code of 1921 stipulated that ‘ія’ and 
‘іє’ had to be used to render foreign clusters ‘ia’ and ‘ie’: матеріял, геніяльний, 
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спеціяльний, фіялка, варіянт.  Foreign ‘io’ was to be transliterated as ‘io’ (ембріон, 
біоскоп, соціологія), except in ‘naturalized’ words, for which both ‘io’ and ‘йо’ would have 
been correct (куріоз – курйоз, серіозний – серйозний).   Also, the following words were to 
be written with ‘йо': бульйон, мільйон, медальйон.  ‘Ї’ was to be written for foreign ‘i’ 
following a vowel: Каїн, Михаїл, Енеїда, архаїчний, героїчний (Nimchuk 309). 
The short orthographic code of 1921 was not sufficient for the needs of the country and 
the codification process continued.   The next major development in the corpus planning of the 
Ukrainian language took place in July of 1925.  The Council of People’s Commissars of the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic mandated the creation of an Orthographic Commission 
under the umbrella of the People’s Commissariat of Education (the Soviet government 
department responsible for education) (Nimchuk 253). Oleksandr Shumskyi, 24  the People’s 
Commissar of Education of Ukraine, chaired the Commission.   Once again, the Commission 
included many distinguished linguists, and amongst them were individuals who took part in the 
previous commissions, as well as representatives from Western Ukraine: S. Smal’-Stotskyi, V. 
Hnatyuk, and V. Simovych.  The State Order on the establishment of this Commission 
emphasized that the Commission was to use the code of 1921 as the foundation for the rules it 
was to develop and that it was to formulate its recommendations based on the contemporary 
standard variety, which integrated the major dialects (Nimchuk 254).  The results of the 
groundwork done by Ohiyenko and his group during the time of independent Ukraine penetrated 
the orthography of Soviet Ukraine. This occurred through the use of rules developed in 1918-
1919 for the code of 1921, as well as through individuals appearing in the Orthographic 
Commissions of independent and Soviet Ukraine.     
                                                      
24 Oleksandr Shumskyi (1890-1946), Ukrainian national-Communist, proponent of Ukrainianization 
(Magocsi Ukraine… 225), former Borotbist (Magocsi A History… 532) 
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Table 3.4  Individuals participating in the work of Orthographic Commissions from 1919-1925.   
These lists are not exhaustive. 
Specialists working 
with the 
Codification 
Commissions in 
1918 and in 
January 1919 
Orthographic and 
Terminological  
Commission 
formed in March 
1919 
Orthographic and 
Terminological 
Commission as 
part of the Institute 
of Ukrainian 
Scientific 
Language of the 
Academy of 
Science 
1921 
Orthographic 
Commission of the 
People’s 
Commissariat of 
Education 
1925 
Ohiyenko  
Tymchenko  
Smal-Stotskyi 
Hrunskyi 
Loboda  
Naumenko  
Holoskevych  
Kurylo  
Shal’  
Hantsov  
Nikonovsky 
Krymskyi 
Krymskyi 
Holoskevych 
Krymskyi 
Holoskevych 
ShumskyiKrymskyi 
Tymchenko 
Holoskevych 
Solohub 
Yavorskyj 
Synyavskyi 
Pylypenko 
Kurylova (Kurylo) 
Iohanesen 
Kasyanenko 
Richytskyi 
Kalyuznyi 
Yalovyi 
Popov 
Hrunskyi 
Hantsov 
Sulyma 
Butvyn 
Koryak 
Khvyliovyi 
Yefremov 
Sekunda 
Kyrychenko 
Sokolyankyi 
Skrypnyk 
Dyatlov 
Nakonechnyi 
Sulyma 
Nimchynov 
Bulakhovskyi 
Kalynovych 
Demyanchuk 
Tkachenko 
Hladkyi 
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Specialists working 
with the 
Codification 
Commissions in 
1918 and in 
January 1919 
Orthographic and 
Terminological  
Commission 
formed in March 
1919 
Orthographic and 
Terminological 
Commission as 
part of the Institute 
of Ukrainian 
Scientific 
Language of the 
Academy of 
Science 
1921 
Orthographic 
Commission of the 
People’s 
Commissariat of 
Education 
1925 
Smal’-Stotskyi 
Hnatyuk 
Simovych 
 
Source: These lists have been developed based on the data presented by Nimchuk (250-256). 
 
All commissions that were working to codify Ukrainian aimed at developing a standard 
variety, which would represent features of various dialects: they ‘all the time kept in mind the 
spoken dialects and the history of the language’ (qtd. in Nimchuk 255). However, the process of 
corpus planning in Ukraine differed from the conventional approach to selection, where a 
specific vernacular was selected as adequate to be included in the standard language, while 
linguistic features of other vernaculars were dismissed.  The Ukrainian specialists involved in the 
corpus planning were reluctant to elevate a particular variant to the position of standard—rather, 
they chose to compromise and incorporate. The order establishing the new Commission of 1925 
recommended to use the same approach and to continue codification work based on the standard 
variety that would integrate major dialects (Nimchuk 254). As a result, the Draft Orthographic 
Code prepared by the Commission of 1926 can be viewed as derived from the Code of 1921. 
The spirit of building statehood, which, at the time of independence, fuelled the idea of 
incorporating the two writing traditions into standard Ukrainian, was still a guiding force for the 
members of the 1925 Commission.   One member, linguist Oleksa Synyavskyi, wrote that all 
individuals involved in the work of the Commission strived to eliminate linguistic 
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inconsistencies and they believed that only mutual compromises could eventually direct standard 
Ukrainian into a single, logically consistent avenue (Nimchuk 263).   The development of a 
viable, uniform language was the Commission’s goal.  Their plan of action included further work 
on the rules for spelling borrowed words.   In 1926, the Commission produced a Draft 
Orthographic Code of Ukrainian, based on the rules of 1921 (Nimchuk 258).  The Draft 
contained the following provisions: 
1. The letter ‘i' was to be used for rendering foreign ‘i' when placed after a consonant but before 
a vowel.  It was required to render foreign ‘ia’ as ‘ія,’ ‘іе’ as ‘іє,’ ‘io’ as ‘io,’ but ‘iu’ as ‘iy’: 
матеріял, історія, копія, Азія, соціялізм, спеціяльний, мініятюрний, паліятив, амоніяк, 
діялект, гіяцинт, авдієнція, гієна, клієнт, тріумф, тріумвірат, радіус, консиліум, 
медіум, ембріон, геліотроп, біоскоп, соціологія, аксіома, Онтаріо.  After vowels, ‘i' was 
to be rendered as ‘ї’:   Каїн, руїна, егоїст, Енеїда, прозаїк, наївний, целюлоїд (Nimchuk 
310). 
2. Foreign ‘l’ had to be rendered in Ukrainian as hard or soft depending on whether a word had 
been borrowed, how ‘l’ had been pronounced in other languages, and the means of 
borrowing.   It was impossible to identify all situations pertaining to ‘l’ in borrowings; 
however, in some types of borrowings ‘l’ was rendered in Ukrainian in a fairly consistent 
manner: 
o Foreign ‘le’ was to be rendered as ‘ле’: білет, колега, лекція, Каледонія (Nimchuk 259) 
o In foreign words that had come into Ukrainian from the West (regardless of their origins), 
especially for words of Greek origin, in most cases, one had to write ла, ло, лу (usually 
before a hard consonant) and ‘л’ in the final syllable position: аероплан, балада, капела, 
класа, філантропія, Ламартін, Платон, алопатія, аналогія, балон, глобус, лозунг, 
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семасіологія, філологічний, Коломбо, блуза, лунатизм, Лувр, балкон, Балкани, 
адмірал, бал. However, sometimes (especially before if followed by a soft syllable) one 
had to write ля, льо, лю (always лю from French lu and German la):  астролябія, 
вакуоля, лябіялізація, пляж, абсолютизм, алюміній, люк, флюс, целюльоза, Лютер, 
Лютеція, альбатрос, альгебра, альманах, асфальт, Альбіон, Альжир, культура, 
факультет, автомобіль, ансамбль, стиль, Версаль (Nimchuk 259). 
o ‘Л’ was consistently soft in such clusters as:  -лювати – анулювати; -люція – еволюція; 
-ляндія (in the names of countries): Голяндія, Ґренляндія; -ляр – екземпляр, окуляр; -
лярія – канцелярія; -лятор – акумулятор; -ляція – акумуляція; -льний – актуальний; 
-льоз,  -льоза, -льозний – скрупульозний, целюльоза (Nimchuk 259-260). 
  The 1926 Draft Orthographic Code contained the following provisions regarding the use 
of ‘г’ and ‘ґ’: 
1. Foreign ‘h’ and ‘g’ had to be rendered with ‘г’: агрономія, агент, агітація, егоїст, 
бравнінг, генерал, гегемонія, гігієна, гігроскоп, гангрена, гімназія, географія, фігура, 
телеграф.   
2. However, foreign names, family names, and geographical names were to be distinguished in 
Ukrainian – г  h and ґ  g: Ґотфірд, Ґустав, Ґергард, Геґель, Гавптман, Ґріґ, Чікаґо, 
Копенгаґен, Ґранада, Тегран.  Foreign ‘g’ was to be rendered as Ukrainian ‘г’ in 
geographical names that had entered the Ukrainian language a long time ago:  Галилея, 
Голгота, Рига, Єгипет, Англія, Киргизія, Грузія, Греція.  Also, in German geographical 
names, where ‘g’ followed a consonant, one was to write ‘г’ and not ‘ґ,’ because in the 
German language, ‘g,’ in most cases, was not pronounced: Зальцбург, Гамбург.  All 
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derivatives were to preserve the spelling of the original noun: копенгаґенський, ґвінеєць 
(Nimchuk 260).  
The Draft was debated at the Commission meetings and among members of the 
Ukrainian public.  A special All-Ukrainian Conference was held from May 26 to June 6, 1927 to 
discuss the proposed rules.  The debates were intense, especially surrounding the topics of 
transliteration of foreign ‘l’ and ‘g’-‘h.’  These were challenging issues since the Commission 
wanted to reach a compromise that could incorporate both the Greek and Western-European 
traditions.  As a result, the rules introduced by the Commission were rather difficult to use: in 
some words foreign ‘l’ was transliterated as a hard sound, in others, as soft, because the 
borrowings entered Ukrainian in different ways.  The older borrowings, especially those 
borrowed prior to the mid-nineteenth century, contained a hard ‘л;’ those introduced later 
contained a soft ‘л.’ Nevertheless the Draft was passed and the Ukrainian Orthographic Code 
was adopted by an order of the People’s Commissar of Education, M. Skrypnyk, on September 
6, 1928.  This Code prescribed the following treatment of borrowings: 
The rule regarding treatment of foreign ‘ia,’ ‘ie,’ ‘iu,’ and ‘io’ changed slightly in 
comparison with the 1926 Draft Code.  Those clusters of letters were to be rendered through ‘ія,’ 
‘іє,’ ‘ію,’ and ‘іо’: матеріял, історія, спеціяльний, амоніяк, діялект, авдієнція, гієна, 
клієнт, тріюмф, радіюс, консиліюм, медіюм, ембріон, геіліотрон, біоскоп, соціологія, 
аксіома, Онтаріо.  ‘I’ after vowels was to be rendered through ‘ї’: Каїн, руїна, егоїст, Енеїда, 
наївний, целюлоїд (Nimchuk 310). 
Words of Greek origin, which entered Ukrainian during ancient times with hard ‘л,’ as 
well as old borrowings from other languages were to be written with hard ‘л’ (ла, ло, лу, л): 
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1. ла – атланти, атлас, Лакедемон, латинський, фабула, фаланга, філaнтропія, and 
always ‘a’ after double ‘лл’ – вілла, Гелладало: аналогія, логіка, диплом, кілограм, пілот, 
хлор, циклоп, always ‘o’ after double ‘лл’: Отелло (Nimchuk 262) 
2. лу: лунатизм, плутократія (Nimchuk 262) 
3. л at the end of a syllable: адмірал, бал (meaning grade), but баль (meaning banquet or 
party), Балкани, фалд, фалш (Nimchuk 262) 
4. foreign ‘le’ to be transliterated through лe: білет, галера, делегат, Палермо, телеграма, 
холера (Nimchuk 262) 
5. in words of English origin: at the end of a word and before consonants, no ‘ь’: Албіон, біл, 
булдоґ, ґолкіпер, Велз, Далтон (Nimchuk 262) 
6. Soft ‘л’ is to be used for more recent borrowings from Western European languages: 
o ля: аероплян, баляда, балянс, бациля, гіперболя (always ‘ля’ in the endings), , 
ґалянтерея, деклямація, заля, іслям, скаля, флякон. (Nimchuk 262). A few exceptions 
to this rule were suggested, however.  
o льо: бальон, бльокада, Кольомбо, льозунг, фльора, фльота (Nimchuk 262) 
o лю: блюза, Лювр, люпа, металюргія (Nimchuk 262) 
o ль should be written at the end of a syllable: автомобіль, альгебра, Альжір, алькоголь, 
альхемія, асфальт, балькон, бінокль, бухгальтер, васаль, вольт (Nimchuk 263).   
Like the rules regarding ‘л,’ the rules for rendering foreign ‘h’ and ’g’ were also difficult 
and ambiguous.  If ‘g’ was part of an older borrowing, especially one that entered Ukrainian 
from Greek, it had to be transliterated through г:  Англія, газ, газета, гама, гегемонія, 
генеалогія, генерал, геній, географія, граматика, грам, кілограм, Германія, гігієна, Грузія, 
група, гімназія, гіпс, градус, граф, дифтонг, егоїзм, Рига, трагедія, фігура (Nimchuk 263).  
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In newer borrowings coming from Western Europe, however,  ‘ґ’ had to be used in place of the 
original ‘g’: aґент, аґітація, аґроном, Гюґо, ґвардія, Ґвінея, Ґергард, ґарантія, ґірлянда, 
ґлядіятор, ґрандіозний, Ґріґ, ґума, дириґент, інтеліґент, лінґвіст, міґрація, Чікаґо 
(Nimchuk 263).    
Throughout its work, the Commission carefully considered if a word was Greek or not 
(Nimchuk 263).  Though sometimes it was hard, even for a linguist, to determine if a word had 
come into Ukrainian from Greek or other languages, the members of the Commission believed 
that with time, the population would be able to learn and master the spelling of each particular 
word and subsequently the need to know the etymology of a word would disappear (Nimchuk 
263).  They believed that the correct spelling would elevate into a writing habit (Nimchuk 263-
264).  This approach had some merit, since in some other languages—English, for example—a 
lot of spelling peculiarities had to be memorized.  Similarly, one now just remembers when to 
use hard ‘л’ and soft ‘л’ in modern standard Ukrainian.  People spell these words and others 
correctly not because they know their origin, but rather because they memorized the correct 
spelling and pronunciation.  The members of the Commission believed that the rules they 
developed would be manageable: 5-10 years later, everything, they hoped, would become natural 
(Nimchuk 263-264).  Though the rules regarding the transliteration of ‘l,’ ‘h,’ and ‘g’ in 
borrowed words were difficult to use even for linguists, they were unanimously adopted and 
approved by the Commission.  The rules were also accepted beyond the borders of Soviet 
Ukraine by the Ukrainian population in Halychyna, Bukowyna, Transcarpathia, and by émigrés 
living overseas (Nimchuk 266).  This was an important achievement in the process of developing 
the standard variety in Ukraine.   The nation received a set of rules that codified the spelling, 
punctuation, phonetic, and morphological structure of the Ukrainian language.  The Code 
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reflected the historical past of the Ukrainian people and the impact of other nations on the 
language of Ukraine. 
The emergence of a standard language can be relatively peaceful and natural, without 
battles, pressure, or debates.  On the other hand the standard may be engineered under 
circumstances where speakers of rival dialects take zealous actions to ascend their vernacular to 
the level of a standard (Joseph 60-61).  The discontentment of those who failed to ensure their 
vernacular became a standard could result in their negative outlook on the standard; they may 
believe their vernaculars are suppressed by the standard and acts of suppression may have indeed 
taken place.  These dynamics may break up the nation and the standard, functioning as a 
separating factor instead of being a unifying force.  The major principle in developing the 
Ukrainian standard language was to incorporate, rather than select.  In this way, the language 
planners involved in the process of codification between 1918 and 1928 tried to diminish the 
inevitable effects of a standard variety’s separating function.   
The incorporation approach, however, was fraught with challenges too.  It did not 
eliminate the rivalry between dialects, but rather shifted it to the level of individual rules, 
examples, and exceptions.  Synyavskyi described the tension between the writing traditions of 
Dnieper Ukraine and Halychyna at the All-Ukrainian Orthographic Conference as tenacious and 
lingering, and it was not so much the rivalry of the two orthographic and linguistic traditions, but 
rather a battle of the two cultural and historical supremacies (qtd. in Nimchuk 260).  The 
incorporation rather than selection approach made the process of codification intense and the 
resulting orthographic rules were complicated and difficult to use.  S. Yefremov, a member of 
the Commission, sarcastically remarked that this form of compromising had resulted “in few 
literate souls remaining in Ukraine” (qtd. in Nimchuk 264).  Despite the intensity of the debates, 
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the developers of the 1928 rules were linguistically oriented. The arguments of individuals 
representing both traditions were articulate and substantiated (Nimchuk 260).  The members of 
the Commission were motivated by the desire to use all their linguistic and cultural knowledge to 
give their nation a standard language capable of reflecting the unique linguistic and cultural 
traditions of the nation.  In this respect, during codification, rationales of political nature were 
given some consideration, alongside the purely linguistic properties of existent vernaculars.   
3.3. Codification of Ukrainian during the Post-Ukranianization Period (1933-1938) 
In 1933, the Soviet government disrupted what was, for the most part, a linguistically 
motivated process geared at the development of standard Ukrainian.  The abolishment of both 
the NEP and the ukrainianization policy marked the end of a period of relative liberalism in the 
country.  The Soviet authorities undertook to prepare a number of politically motivated changes 
to the 1928 code. In 1933, the Soviet authorities established another Commission with the 
assignment of finding and remedying the rules, which, as the government claimed, were taking 
Ukrainian away from Russian—rules that were seen as bourgeois and nationalistic (Nimchuk 
264, 266-267).  The new Commission, issued amendments to the rules without any public 
discussions.  The new rules followed the spelling patterns of similar borrowed words in Russian.   
1. The Commission compiled a list of words that were supposed to contain hard ‘l’ (л) and 
those that were to be written with soft ‘l’ (ль).   
o ‘La,’ ‘lo,’ ‘lu,’ ‘le,’ ‘l’ –borrowings from foreign languages were to be rendered through 
hard ‘л’:  формула, клас, соціологія, Ла-Манш, пленум, лекція, телеграф (Nimchuk 
268) 
o Soft ‘л,’ similar to Russian, was to be used in the words автомобіль, регулятор, пляж 
(Nimchuk 268).   
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o The transliteration of borrowings from English was to be done through hard ‘л’ 
(Мелвелл, голкіпер), unless a word had been adopted with the soft sound (біль, бульдог, 
Вільсон), or through the years was traditionally pronounced softly (лямпа, заля, новеля) 
(Nimchuk 268).  
2. The rule regarding foreign ‘h’ and ‘g’ provided that both letters, disregarding their 
pronunciation, were to be transliterated using ‘г’: гіпотеза, гандбол, Гюго, генерація, 
графік, гума, міграція, гегемонія, Гете (Nimchuk 268).   
3. The rules of 1933 also changed the Genitive Case endings of third declension feminine nouns 
from ‘и’ to ‘i.’ If the suffix ‘ен’ was present, the Genitive ‘и’ ending for neuter nouns was 
left unchanged (імени) (Nimchuk 300).   
4. It was recommended to write ‘i' instead of ‘ї’ after vowels in all borrowings: героічний, 
прозаік, геніальний, aрхаічний, егоізм, Енеіда) (Nimchuk 310-311).      
The Soviet government claimed the Український правопис (Ukrainian Orthography) of 
1928 oriented the language towards Western bourgeois culture and therefore ought to be 
abolished.  Later changes to Ukrainian orthography, made in 1938, furthered the integration of 
Russian features into standard Ukrainian (Nimchuk 268-269).  The alphabet presented in the 
1938 Draft code of Orthographic Rules did not contain letter ‘ґ’ at all.  The Genitive case ending 
of neuter nouns containing the suffix ‘ен’ was changed to ‘i’ to resemble the Russian style 
pronunciation and grammar (iмені (Ukrainian) имени (Russian) (Nimchuk 268-269).   The rules 
of 1938, like the rules of 1933, emphasized that ‘i,’ not ‘ї’ was to be written after vowels in loan 
words (героічний, прозаік) (Nimchuk 269).  This change directly copied the Russian 
pronunciation and spelling of corresponding words (героический, прозаик).  It also initiated the 
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process of phasing out the presence of ‘ї’ in Ukrainian.  The gradual abolishing of ‘ї’ was 
beneficial for the assimilation of Ukrainian into Russian, since there is no ‘ї’ in Russian.   
The history of language development is strongly intertwined with the history of a nation.  
The structure and elements of a language, reflect the historical path of its speakers and 
borrowings, and serve as indicators of historical, cultural, and trade ties between the speakers of 
both donor and recipient languages.  Language also marks the separateness of a group (Fasold 3-
4).  The 1933-38 changes to the spelling rules of borrowed words in Ukrainian removed any 
differences in the graphical appearance of the borrowed words in both Ukrainian and Russian.   
Graphically foreign words started to look identical or almost identical in the two languages.   
Depriving Ukrainian of its distinct features diminished the separateness of Ukrainian 
speakers from Russian speakers and eradicated all evidence of the separate historical pathways 
of the two nations.  The new orthography suggested that the borrowings came to Ukrainian from 
Russian.  New orthographic rules in Ukrainian abolished its diversity and created the perception 
of similarity and indivisibleness from Russian culture.   Historical connections between Ukraine 
and other Western civilizations were lost in the language. Through the orthographic rules of 
1933 and 1938, the Soviet government rewrote not only the history of the Ukrainian language, 
but also the history of the nation.  Conveniently, this served the purpose of building a new 
monolithic society.   
The changes of 1933 and 1938 also permitted the dictatorial Soviet government to build a 
rather closed society.  The Soviet government did not encourage knowledge of foreign languages 
or the gaining of international (especially Western) experience by the general public.  The 
amendments to Ukrainian spelling rules eliminated the need to know the spelling of foreign 
words in order to determine the correct Ukrainian spelling. This resulted in fewer chances that 
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the country’s population would be exposed to potential Western influences through foreign 
language acquisition. Isolated from the rest of the world, people could receive only the 
information given to them by the Soviet authorities.  Information was censored, altered, and 
engineered to direct people into believing what the authorities needed them to believe.  In this 
respect, standard Ukrainian was altered on the level of grammar forms, spelling, and even letters 
of the alphabet to engineer linguistic and historical unity of both Russian and Ukrainian ethnic 
groups.     
An alphabet, as a system of writing, is a very important attribute and tool of any 
language.  On the level of symbol-sound, it gives a deeper understanding of the language’s 
contemporary phonological system, as well as the historical mechanisms of its development.  An 
alphabet can serve as a tool for language change; at the same time, it can become the target of a 
political mandate (Joseph 32-39).  The Ukrainian letters ‘г’ and ‘ґ’ and their corresponding 
sounds reflect different histories of the development of Ukrainian and Russian.  Eliminating the 
letter ‘ґ’ from the Ukrainian alphabet and replacing it with ‘г’ led to the gradual disappearance of 
the sound /g/ from Ukrainian.  Etymological dictionaries still recommended pronouncing ‘ґ’ in 
many words; however, because this sound was not distinguished in writing and was not 
supported by a discrete symbol, it began to disappear.  A similar fate was in store for the letter 
‘ї.’  In Ukrainian, traditionally, reading and articulation follow exactly the graphic representation 
of the text (Ohiyenko Narysy… 14).  ‘Ї’ was being eliminated not only from pronunciation but 
also from borrowed words—authentic Ukrainian words began to lose it.   Even the name of the 
country, Україна, was altered to follow the Russian spelling, and was written ‘Украіна’ on the 
1944 poster, ‘Ukraine is Free!’. 
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Figure 3.1   Poster, “Ukraine is Free!” 
 
Source: Magocsi, Paul Robert.  Ukraine: An Illustrated History.  Seattle: University of  
Washington Press. 2007. Print  
 
Technological advancement and its call for standardization and automation can be used 
by social engineers in their efforts to out-maneuver the public and attain hidden goals, especially 
when they can use rationalization and automation as means to deny alternatives and eliminate 
diversity   (Alexander and Schmidt 12-13).  Researchers examining the techniques of social 
engineering expressed this concern primarily because of today’s mass standardization triggered 
by computerization and automation.  The problem is that if there is a force in the society, 
including official governments, wishing to pursue a hidden agenda, they can expoloit the modern 
world’s move towards standardization to achieve their goals.   While Bolshevik social engineers 
labelled “bourgeois” everyone and everything that ought to be exterminated, in today’s world, a 
collective action can be induced relatively easily if the elimination of inefficiencies is passed off 
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as legitimate concern.  Current information systems and social networks make individuals easily 
accessible, meaning all sorts of messages can be delivered instantly to millions of people, with 
the possibility of measuring the public’s response, thereby making the danger of social 
engineering even more profound today than it was in 1917-1938. 
This concern is also relevant to the pre-computer and social networking era, since a quest 
for efficiency and cost-savings could result in deliberate or accidental propaganda.  In the past, 
propaganda appeared in printed materials such as newspapers, books, and posters as a tool to 
deliver messages, both hidden and expressed, to the masses.  There could be a number of reasons 
why the poster УКРАІНА ВІЛЬНА! (Ukraine is Free) shows ‘I’ instead of ‘Ї’ in the word 
“УКРАЇНА” (“UKRAINE”).  For example, the artist’s personal unawareness of the correct 
Ukrainian spelling of the word could have been the reason for the misspelling.  However, it 
could also be a result of the 1933 and 1938 elimination of ‘ї’ from borrowed words—it is 
possible this elimination pushed its way past borrowed words and into authentic Ukrainian 
words, i.e., УКРАІНА vs УКРАЇНА.   Alternatively, one of the reasons could be an effort to 
make the printing process simpler and cheaper by means of using one symbol, ‘I,’ to depict both 
‘I’ and ‘Ї’.  
The spelling “УКРАІНА” leads the reader to mentally pronounce the word ‘Ukraine’ in a 
Russian sounding manner, “Украина.” If the change of spelling was dictated by an effort to 
improve the efficiency of printing processes and did not intend to alter the Ukrainian 
pronunciation, this technological shortcut involuntarily brought Ukrainian closer to Russian in 
pronunciation.  Efforts to improve efficiency of production or technology that are undertaken 
without consideration for both the human and historical aspects of the matter can result in 
unanticipated adverse social impact.  If the changes involve modern technological systems and, 
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especially, if the true intentions of a social engineer are passed off as improving efficiency, the 
resulting problem could be so profound as to incite the emergence of “a wholly new and 
terrifying social order” (qtd. in Alexander and Schmidt 12).  One can argue that although it was 
simpler and cheaper to maintain one letter in the printing system rather than two, there was a 
political reason for the new spelling, “УКРАІНА,” especially if the assimilation of Ukrainian 
with Russian had become the official policy behind the codification work of 1933 and 1938.  
Similarly, when the Latin script of the Soviet Central Asian alphabets was replaced with Cyrillic 
in the 1930s, the authorities could have claimed that the high cost, problems with accessibility of 
printing equipment, and technical difficulties associated with supporting Latin script made the 
switch to Cyrillic a rational solution. The true primary reason, however, was ideological: using 
the same script across the country emphasized that there were no barriers of graphization within 
the Soviet Union, where Russian was the language of power (Crisp 29, Millar 185-186).       
 The authorities perceived the symbols ‘ґ’ and ‘ї,’ which are not part of the Russian 
alphabet, as barriers separating the Ukrainian and Russian languages.  Political interference 
eliminated the letter ‘ї’ and the sound it represented from borrowings and this process also began 
to affect native Ukrainian words.   The letter ‘ґ’ was especially troubling for the Soviet 
authorities.   It not only made Ukrainian printed text look distinctively different from Russian, 
but it also symbolized the separate history of the development of Ukrainian. It indicated that 
Ukraine had a historical and cultural past that was different from Russia’s experience.  The 
Russian language contained the sound /g’/; however, it did not have a sound corresponding to the 
foreign /h/.  In this respect, Ukrainian, with the possession of both /g/ and /h/, was better 
equipped to transliterate foreign words.   This feature may have also been troubling for the 
Soviet authorities because the Russian language, which was glorified as the language of the 
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‘older brother’ and the language of Lenin, was not supposed to be less versatile than the 
language of a national minority.  The existence of both /g/ and /h/ in Ukrainian aligned the 
Ukrainian phonological system with the systems of other European languages.  In order to align 
the Ukrainian language with Russian, the authorities sacrificed the sound /g/ (/ґ/).   
One can argue that since /g/ existed in Russian and /h/ did not, in order to bring Ukrainian 
closer to Russian, it would have made sense to eliminate /h/ and replace it with /g/ throughout the 
language.  This argument would have been true for the phonological, but not the graphical 
alignment of the two languages.  In the 1930s, graphical representation was probably more 
important for the creation of the right impression.   Printed literature was the primary means of 
reaching the broadest audience.  If a Ukrainian text looked like Russian in print, it would project 
the overall impression that the two languages were the same.  Also, printed word was culturally 
always given more respect in Ukraine and Russia than spoken word.   
On the other hand, it would have been very difficult and expensive to change the public’s 
speaking habits for thousands of words containing /г/ and convert their pronunciation to the 
Russian-like sound by replacing /г/ with /ґ/.  The Soviet authorities did not have to be concerned 
with presence of the /г/ sound in Ukrainian.  In southern Russian vernaculars this sound is used 
in place of the standard Russian /g/.  Three hundred years of Ukraine being a part of Russia made 
Russians aware of the Ukrainian sound /h/ corresponding to the Russian /g/.   The sound /h/, 
since it was not a standard Russian sound, was deemed provincial, incorrect and one used only 
by uneducated speakers.   In fact, this preconception made the existence of the authentic 
Ukrainian sound, /г/, corresponding to the Russian /g/, beneficial to the Soviet language 
planners.  The elimination of /g/ made Ukrainian look inferior and substandard—this was one of 
the reasons why the Soviet authorities were so zealous in abolishing the letter ‘ґ.’  The letter was 
 67 
 
called bourgeois and everything bourgeois was to be destroyed.  In fact, the letter was so 
troublesome to the totalitarian regime that Stalin personally got involved to ensure that it ceased 
to exist (Nimchuk 289).  The ‘bourgeois’ letter /ґ/ disappeared, alongside the orthographic rules 
that were perceived by the Soviet authorities as orienting the Ukrainian language towards the 
Western, or, as the Soviet propaganda presented them, “bourgeois” cultures.      
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CHAPTER 4  ELABORATION 
4.1. Elaboration during Ukraine’s independence (1917-1919) and pre-korenizatsiya 
(1919-1923) 
Elaboration is a stage of language planning aimed at extending the standard variety into 
new areas of use.  This involves developing a specialized terminology (terminology planning), 
launching standard language acquisition programs, and spreading the standard into all societal 
domains.   The implementation of this stage requires extensive planning and substantial 
resources.  Elaboration is also an on-going process:  changes, new concepts, and discoveries call 
for the development of terms to describe and name them.  While codification deals with 
linguistic aims and forms, elaboration is related to the functions of and attitudes to language 
(Holmes 102, Hornberger 29).  The aspect of attitude towards language is addressed primarily at 
the securing acceptance stage.  At the same time, at the elaboration stage, a new standard 
language can encounter resistance when introduced to domains that traditionally use a different 
variety for communication.  Resistance can further complicate the intrinsically difficult and 
complex elaboration stage.   In this respect, securing acceptance efforts, if implemented in 
combination with language elaboration, could ease the process of spreading the new variety 
within the society and produce better results.  Similarly, in the elaboration stage, when a new 
standard language enters the areas of science, education, literature, and art it gains the 
endorsement of those realms, which contributes towards building the prestige of the new 
standard and therefore promotes its acceptance.   
Elaboration was an important opportunity for independent Ukraine to promote its 
language and culture, making these visible within the society and using them as the building 
blocks of national identity.  The elaboration efforts of 1917-1919 were two-fold: on one hand, 
the government undertook the introduction and spreading of the new Ukrainian orthographic 
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code across Ukraine, and on the other, the government faced the broader-spectrum need to 
reintroduce the Ukrainian language into the russified administrative, political, social, and cultural 
spheres.   Along with the Ukrainian language, the new orthographic rules penetrated various 
areas.   
The Bolsheviks also recognized that Ukrainian could serve their political needs.  In 
December 1919, the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks passed a 
resolution “On Soviet Power in Ukraine,” which called to promote the development of the 
Ukrainian language and culture (Bondarchuk 272, Solchanyk 66).  Though the resolution did not 
specify any practical methods for increasing the prestige of Ukrainian, it showed that the 
Bolsheviks foresaw the possibility of spreading the Ukrainian language and culture, since it fell 
in line with their goal to destroy the Russian monarchy.  One can view this document as the 
Bolsheviks’ starting point for their future elaboration plans.   
Bolsheviks needed to find support within the local population of Ukraine, as well as from 
existing political parties.  This further enticed the Soviet authorities to make concessions to the 
pressures of promoting Ukrainian national ideas and to introduce some practical steps supporting 
Ukrainian language and culture.  The Bolsheviks wanted to demonstrate that they were not 
foreigners in Ukraine and that their ideology had native Ukrainian coloring.  On February 27, 
1920, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, a 
state body of Soviet power in Ukraine, passed a Decree calling for the “use of Ukrainian in all 
civil and military entities on par with Great Russian” (Bondarchuk 273).  Since then, 
government organizations were required to accept applications and other documentations made 
in Ukrainian.   As a result, Soviet civil servants had to posses the necessary language skills to 
conduct paperwork in Ukrainian.  Language acquisition planning, as a component of the 
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elaboration stage, came to the fore in subsequent government actions because language 
acquisition programs have a higher probability of success if the language being acquired serves 
useful functions in the society (Cooper 185).  Beginning in February 1920, the Soviet 
bureaucracy and military personnel in Ukraine were required to know Ukrainian for their daily 
work.  Furthermore, In September 1920, another resolution, which compelled government 
employees to learn Ukrainian in evening schools, confirmed the language requirement for civil 
service employees (Bondarchuk 273). The resolutions had clear instructions regarding hiring 
policies and measures, which, if implemented, would have allowed the inclusion of more 
Ukrainian speakers into the civil service (Bondarchuk 273).  The February 1922 plenary meeting 
of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine confirmed the commitment to use Ukrainian in 
its work.  The meeting documentation stipulated that the knowledge of Ukrainian was essential 
for public administration (Bondarchuk 273). 
Soviet power could have secured its future in Ukraine only if the Ukrainian people 
adopted Bolshevik ideologies.   In order for the Bolsheviks to appear that they belonged in 
Ukraine and that the Bolshevik ideology was a domestic phenomenon, they needed to speak the 
language of their target audience.  Their true intention behind introducing Ukrainian into the 
civil service was not a desire to facilitate bureaucratic procedures for speakers of Ukrainian but 
rather to make Soviet power appear natural in Ukraine, as well as to increase the number of 
Ukrainian members in the Communist Party.   The government’s attempts to conceal its true 
intentions and to engender the population’s collective action indicate the presence of a social 
engineering agenda (Alexander and Schmidt 9-15).  The Bolsheviks played on national 
sentiments and used the Ukrainian language as a tool when pursuing the goal of gaining local 
support in Ukraine.   
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Government resolutions prescribing the introduction of Ukrainian into new areas of use 
and the promotion of Ukrainian language acquisition contributed to the elaboration process.  
However, when a language begins functioning in a new area, it is usually not equipped with a 
sufficient vocabulary.  As a result, the elaboration process requires specific projects and 
resources to allow for the development of the necessary lexical items.  In the early twenties, the 
only foundation that elaboration could rely on was the process of Tsarist Russia russifying 
Ukraine through bureaucratic control and oppression.  This gave the elaboration process a flavor 
of self-made social engineering: the Bolsheviks were going through a process similar to 
russification, only this time Ukrainian was the language to be imposed, and the entire process 
relied solely on prescriptive measures.  On the other hand, the government’s resolutions were not 
supported by any proven theory nor any tested experiences and presented no tangible framework 
for the implementation of the recommendations.   No professional task group was created to 
implement the elaboration policies and no resources were allocated to plan and fund these 
comprehensive and scientifically substantiated measures.    Therefore, the elaboration of 1920 
can be considered quakish social engineering, a type of social engineering that does not 
implement recommendations in practice but relies on ideologies in their stead.   
4.2. Elaboration during Ukrainianization  
In August of 1923 the first public presentation articulating the principles and steps for 
implementing ukrainianization was made, based on a number of preceding resolutions passed by 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (Magocsi A History… 
538-540).  This document declared that the goal of ukrainianization was to remove any cultural 
inequality resulting from past repressions.  In order to achieve this goal, the government called 
for “the ukrainianization of the entire government apparatus” and the “spreading of knowledge 
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of the Ukrainian language” in order to “guarantee for the Ukrainian language a position to which 
it is entitled because of the numerical and other specific importance of the Ukrainian people on 
the territory of Soviet Ukraine” (qtd. in Magocsi A History… 539-540).  This regulatory act 
provided political and legal grounds for numerous elaboration projects.     
In looking at the events of the period and the interpretations and opinions expressed by 
observers and participants of ukrainianization, it is clear that even the implementers of 
ukrainianization policies had different understandings regarding its ultimate purposes, and 
therefore different groups tried to achieve different results.  Researchers disagree when 
discussing which actual considerations Moscow had behind their strategy.  Under the 
complicated and difficult circumstances of the civil war, it was important for the Bolsheviks to 
seek the cooperation of the Borot’bists and therefore to demonstrate that they respected the 
Borot’bists’ political platform and national sentiments. Lenin’s statement at the ninth Congress 
of the RCP(b) indicates that the Russian Bolsheviks understood the necessity of compromises: 
“we promised the Borot’bists maximal concessions…” (qtd. in Bondarchuk 272). Moscow 
wanted Ukraine to return under its rule; therefore, the situation forced the Russian Bolsheviks to 
break away from the chauvinistic policy towards Ukraine, pursued by Tsarist Russia over the 
centuries.  Ukrainianization was an effort to gain control over Ukraine’s national renaissance and 
streamline it into the direction Moscow needed.   
Different interpretations of ukrainianization circulated in Ukrainian society, as well as 
among the implementers of the policy.  Many Bolshevik leaders considered the program as a 
means for spreading socialist ideas and for the ‘sovietization’ of Ukrainian society.  For example, 
the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, M. 
Popov, wrote in one of his articles: “Ukrainianization has never been and is not our purpose; it 
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is solely our means to set up a strong contact with the Ukrainian masses…  The practical 
meaning of …ukrainianization is to get the masses involved in the domain of the communist 
influences” (qtd. in Bachynskyj  283).  V. Zatonsky, who chaired the revolutionary committee of 
the Halytska Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920 and was a Commissar of Education of Ukraine in 
1922-1924, referred to ukrainianization and industrialization as ways of reaching “a complete 
victory of the socialist elements in material and spiritual cultures” (Bachynskyj  283).  The 
Ukrainian language was a better a tool than Russian for proliferating the Soviet ideology in 
Ukraine.  The Ukrainian language was brought into the area of Soviet propaganda and acquired a 
number of new words that represented concepts of Soviet ideology.  Many of these words 
originated in Russian and were ukrainianized or translated before being used in Ukrainian.  For 
example, the adjective ‘советский’ (Soviet), which originated from the Russian совет 
(council), was not brought into the Ukrainian language in its Russian form.   The adjective was 
re-invented in Ukrainian through translation, using the root of the authentic Ukrainian word рада 
(council).  The new term ‘радянський’ emerged in the language as a natural phenomenon to 
denote the ruling power; as such, it appeared in the official name of the republic Українська 
Радянська Соціалістична Республіка (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic).  The Russian 
noun ‘большевик’ (Bolshevik) got altered into ‘більшовик’ to resemble the genuine Ukrainian 
pronunciation and to seem as its own in the language and also within the local social and 
political terrains.  In trying to legitimize its rule in Ukraine by attracting the local population to 
its ideas, the Soviet government took the Ukrainian language into an entirely new domain—
Soviet political ideology.       
The range of opinions about what ukrainianization was meant to achieve included the 
derussification of the Ukrainian proletariat living in the cities.  This task was proposed by V. 
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Chubar, the chairman of the association in charge of developing and spreading the Ukrainian 
scientific language (Bachynskyj 283).  V. Zatonsky echoed this proposal by saying “we will 
ensure that the Ukrainian ... when he goes to the city will not be russified” (qtd. in Magocsi A 
History… 541).   L. Kaganovich25 considered ukrainianization a temporary measure to appease 
intractable nationalists and to lure them into submission to the Soviet center in Moscow 
(Bachynkyj 283).   O. Shumsky identified the two most important aspects of ukrainianization: 
the expansion of the role that Ukrainian language and culture played in society and the 
satisfaction of the interests and needs of the national minorities (Bachynkyj 283). Shumsky was 
an active promoter of ukrainianization and argued against Russian and russified party leaders 
who opposed this policy.  Overall, he sought expansion of political autonomy for Ukraine as the 
main goal of ukrainianization (Zaitsev 259). Mykhailo Volobuyev26 headed the campaign for 
Ukraine’s economic independence.  In 1928, he published an article where he argued that 
Ukraine held the position of a colony in USSR’s economy, just as it had in Tsarist Russia.  
Volobuyev emphasized that Ukraine’s economy was self-sufficient enough to be directly 
integrated into the global economy, without going through Russia.  These interpretations of the 
policy provoked enormous controversy and haunted their authors later.  Nevertheless, these 
diverse ideas about ukrainianization were propelling Ukrainian into new spheres and presenting 
new opportunities for the language to develop its vocabulary. 
4.3. The Spread of Ukrainian into the Areas of Publishing and Education 
One of the priorities of the elaboration process was to inform speakers that a new 
standard was being developed and what that new standard language entailed.  The publication of 
                                                      
25 Lazar Kaganovich, trusted associate of Stalin, was appointed the first secretary of the Communist Party 
of Bolsheviks of Ukraine in April 1925. 
26 Mykhailo Volobuyev (1900-1932) was a Marxist economist who argued that Ukraine should be in charge 
of its own economy (Magosci 564, 574, 781). 
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Ukrainian orthographic codes was especially difficult during Ukraine’s independence (1917-
1919) due to constant military actions and changes of government.  Nevertheless, the printing of 
textbooks and copies of the new orthographic codes was a priority for the governments of 
independent Ukraine.  In 1918, The Most Essential Rules of Ukrainian Orthography  
(‘Найгoловніші правила українського правопису‘) was published in the tenth issue of 
Ukrainian School magazine (Nimchuk 250).  The Ministry of Education of Ukraine immediately 
undertook steps to publish the required textbooks for schools (Nimchuk 251).  In 1919, tens of 
thousands of copies of the Major Rules of Ukrainian Orthography were printed across Western 
and Eastern Ukraine (Ohiyenko Narysy… 13).  The war, political instability, and economic ruin 
were not obstacles for independent Ukraine when it came to printing the new orthographic code.  
The development of standard Ukrainian was a high political priority and the government 
perceived it to be in its best interest to make the new Orthographic Code available to the 
country’s population.   
An increase in Ukrainian publications provided opportunities for practical applications of 
the new Orthographic rules.   In 1917-1918 the publishing industry flourished in Ukraine; over 
sixteen million copies of Ukrainian books featuring eighteen hundred titles were published 
during this time (Magosci A History… 491).  Furthermore, two hundred and thirty nine 
newspapers were published in Ukrainian (Bilaniuk 79).  Three major Russian-Ukrainian 
dictionaries came out in 1917-1918 in Kyiv (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 331).  In 1918, two 
Commissions were established within the Ukrainian Academy of Science with the purpose of 
compiling data for specialized dictionaries (Ohiyenko Istoriya 331).  Following centuries of 
oppressive Russian policies, which included a ban on printing books in Ukrainian, the country’s 
freedom and its government support secured the Ukrainian language in the field of publishing.   
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With the arrival of the Bolsheviks at the end of 1919, the publishing industry suffered an 
economic collapse and printing in Ukrainian diminished.  Publishing in Ukrainian was revived 
with a resolution passed by the Council of People’s Commissars of  Soviet Ukraine in September 
1920: the resolution proposed that each provincial capital should have at least one Ukrainian 
language newspaper (Bondarchuk 273).  In 1921-1922, a number of periodical publications 
switched to Ukrainian, including one of the central government newspapers, Visti (Bondarchuk 
272-273).   As a result, in 1922, there were one hundred and eighty six Ukrainian newspapers, 
although still fewer than during the independence years (Bilaniuk 79).   In 1920, the Soviet 
government of Ukraine forced the State Publishing House of Ukraine to ensure that the country 
had sufficient textbooks and literature in Ukrainian (Bondarchuk 273).  Ukrainianization 
stimulated the growth of Ukrainian newspapers and increased the publishing of books in 
Ukrainian.    At the end of twenties, eighty nine percent of newspapers and eighty percent of 
books in Ukraine were published in Ukrainian (Bachynkyj 284).  By 1930, publication numbers 
in Ukrainian finally reached the levels maintained during Ukraine’s independence (Magosci A 
History… 541).  In 1933, three hundred seventy three of four hundred twenty six newspapers 
were in Ukrainian (Zaitsev 259).   The increased appearance of the Ukrainian language in print 
was a significant progress in overcoming the effects of tsarist oppression, thereby increasing the 
prestige of the language and spreading the standard variety.    
An important component of the elaboration stage of language planning is spreading a 
language and its standard variety into the realm of education.  This ensures the success of 
language planning efforts and serves as a basis for constructing a national identity.  When a 
particular language is not part of a country’s education system this may suggest its inadequacy 
for education, poor vocabulary, or may signal an unwanted association with a particular group 
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(Schiffman 57).   The governments of independent Ukraine recognized the importance of 
education in Ukrainian and spread the newly adopted Orthographic rules to schools and 
universities.  The resolution for Ukraine’s autonomy passed by the Tsentral’na Rada was calling 
for the ukrainianization of the school system (Magocsi A History… 472-475).  In practice, this 
political declaration translated to the beginning of ukrainianization in elementary schools and 
secondary education institutions (gymnasia), as well as the organization of courses in Ukrainian 
for teachers and the publication of Ukrainian textbooks (Magosci 490-491).  These programs 
continued during the period of the Hetmanate (Magosci A History… 491).   
The Central Council introduced a system of innovative educational institutions called 
Ukrainian People’s Universities and opened such institutions in many cities.  These universities 
were meant to become centers of knowledge in Ukrainian accessible to the Ukrainian people and 
aimed to fulfill cultural and educational needs on a community level; however the Council did 
not bring Ukrainian to the ‘classical’ universities (Zaval’nyuk 110). The Hetmanate government 
also made steps towards the ukrainianization of national higher education institutions. In 1918, 
the Kyiv People’s University became the Kyiv State Ukrainian University, and a new University 
was opened in Kam’yanets’-Podil’s’kyj (Magocsi A History… 491, Zaval’nyuk 113).  Ivan 
Ohiyenko made a substantial contribution to the establishment of the University in Kam’yanets’-
Podil’skyj.  He passionately promoted the idea of a University in the city that was the meeting 
place of the two branches of the Ukrainian culture, Western and Dnieper Ukraine. He succeeded 
in convincing government officials that there was a need to have a university in Kam’yanets’-
Podil’skyj and he overcame many barriers in the process (Zaval’nyuk 111-113).  During the 
period of the Hetmanate, over one hundred and fifty Ukrainian gymnasia were opened (Lytvyn 
232).  The Hetmanate is also credited with another important step in the development of 
 78 
 
Ukrainian science and education in its establishment of the Ukrainian Academy of Science 
(Lytvyn 232).  The independence years resulted in significant accomplishments in the 
development of the Ukrainian educational system.  This momentum was carried forward into the 
initial years of Bolshevik rule and continued to fuel the development of the Ukrainian 
educational infrastructure during the years of ukrainianization.   
The Bolsheviks considered the educational system to be the primary means of conveying 
their ideologies to younger generations since the delivery of socialist ideas to Ukrainophone 
children in a language they could easily comprehend was most effective.  During the early 
twenties, there was a transition in instruction from Russian to Ukrainian within elementary 
schools and political education establishments in rural areas.  On September 21, 1920 the 
Council of People’s Commissars of Ukraine 27  passed a resolution requiring all educational 
institutions to include Ukrainian in their mandatory curricula (Bondarchuk 273).  During this 
time, the Narkomat (Ministry) of Education started developing a plan to incorporate Ukrainian as 
the language of instruction in education institutions. In February 1922, the government once 
again confirmed its language policy and its promotion of the Ukrainian language at a plenary 
meeting: it passed a provision that the language of instruction in schools should reflect the 
wishes of the local population (Bondarchuk 274).  Many Russian party leaders supported a 
contrary idea: the instructors should determine the language of instruction.  This latter position, if 
adopted, would have been very unfavorable for the Ukrainian language, since higher education, 
under the tsarist regime, was Russian language-based.  The majority of the instructors did not 
know Ukrainian and it was very unlikely that they would have chosen to use it in their teaching.  
The government’s assertive action opened the door for education in Ukrainian.     
                                                      
27 The Council of People’s Commissars of Ukraine carried out functions similar to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
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In 1923, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education was given full authority in the area of 
ukrainianization for the educational system (Magosci A History… 543).  The People’s 
Commissars of Education, Hryhorij Hryn’ko (1920-1923), Oleksandr Shumsyj (1924-1926), and 
Mykola Skrypnyk (1927-1933), made significant contributions to the development of 
educational infrastructure and to the ukrainianization of the educational system (Zaitsev 261).  
The ukrainianization of education enticed intellectuals of Ukrainian orientation to cooperate with 
the Bolshevik authorities.  Teachers and educators actively participated in ukrainianization and 
promoted Ukrainian language and culture through a network of Ukrainian language classes and 
lecturing centers (Bachynskyj 282).  The spread of Ukrainian in education proved to be 
successful.  In 1927, ninety percent of literacy centers and almost eighty percent of general 
education schools used Ukrainian as their language of instruction (Bachynkyj 284).   By 1929, 
eighty percent of schools, over sixty percent of professional colleges, and thirty percent more 
education institutions used Ukrainian as the language of instruction (Zaitsev 259).   Ukrainian 
history, language, literature, and economic geography were mandatory subjects for all students, 
and at the end of the thirties; knowledge of Ukrainian was a pre-requisite for enrolment in, and 
graduation from, a higher education institution (Magocsi A History… 543).   
Education is key in upholding a language or a standard variety. The education system 
reinforces the use of the standard and helps to preserve it by giving it stability (Joseph 45).  The 
progress made in introducing Ukrainian in general, and particularly in introducing the new 
Ukrainian orthography rules into elementary, secondary, and post secondary institutions during 
the years of independence, Bolshevik pre-korenizatsiya years, and the ukrainianization period, 
gave the language stability and generated a sense of worthiness among speakers of Ukrainian.   
Similarly, the Orthographic Codes of 1933 and 1938 benefited from the reinforcement of formal 
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education using these norms.  The education system secured the permanency and perseverance of 
the new standard.  The norms adopted in 1933 and 1938 (with slight amendments) are still in use 
in Ukraine today.  Generations of people were educated based on these norms, new books were 
written in the standards of 1933 and 1938, and books from preceding years were either banned or 
bowdlerized to follow the standard.  The Soviet government withheld information about the 
Orthographic code of 1928 leaving the society with the impression that the existing norms were 
the only norms ever used in the Ukrainian language.  Therefore, at present, it is difficult for the 
Ukrainian society to accept any alternative to the existing rules as legitimate variability.        
4.4. The Spread of Ukrainian to Specialized Areas 
During a war, the army is a vital and central force that ensures the continued existence of 
a nation.  Therefore, the army became another attractive arena for elaboration projects during the 
years of independence and also during the times of Soviet rule. On April 7, 1917, a decision was 
passed by the All-Ukrainian Military Congress to restructure the army in order to reflect the 
country’s ethnic and territorial make-up (Mirchruk 80).  This process created opportunities to 
form Ukrainian-speaking units and promote national independence ideas within the army 
(Mirchuk 80-85).  The decision further stipulated that military schools were to be opened in 
ukrainianized units of the army; textbooks for military education were to be published in 
Ukrainian, and Ukrainian literature was to be supplied to military libraries and schools. The 
Ukrainian army of the independence period had to adopt the Ukrainian language as an attribute 
of the nation. The Soviet government also took steps to introduce Ukrainian into the army, and 
the Bolsheviks, too, understood the importance of the Ukrainian language for their military 
program.  Because they did not want their army to appear as foreign invaders, on February 21, 
1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-West Battle-Front sent out instructions to 
 81 
 
its military commanders recommending them to use Ukrainian while communicating with the 
local population.  In order to satisfy the need for Soviet military officers to be fluent in 
Ukrainian, the Soviet authorities established the Schools of Red Sergeants in Kharkiv and Kyiv, 
and Ukrainian was to be used as the language of instruction in these institutions (Bondarchuk 
273).  In all these ways, the introduction of Ukrainian to the national army produced an 
impression of the government’s strong endorsement of Ukrainian. 
Ukrainianization left its mark on Ukrainian cities—Russification and the migration of 
Russian workers into Ukraine affected Ukrainian urban centers to a greater extent than Ukrainian 
rural areas.   Most Russophones in Ukraine lived in cities.  Industrialization and the beginning of 
the NEP reversed the decline of urban populations retreating to villages to survive the war and 
the revolution.  Ukrainian cities began to grow at the beginning of twenties with a substantial 
influx of Ukrainophones from villages (Magocsi A History… 540).  Traditional speakers of 
Ukrainian became russified after moving to urban areas and ukrainianization was meant to break 
that tradition (Magocsi A History… 541). Urban signs and posters were written in Ukrainian as a 
result of laws passed in 1925 when the government invested in repainting and remaking the 
signage (Magocsi A History… 541).  The names of the cities, streets, stores, and facilities in 
Ukrainian greatly enhanced the visibility of the language and served as constant reminder of the 
existence of Ukrainian ethnicity.          
The development of a specialized vocabulary serves the communication needs of specific 
areas of knowledge, research, and industry.  Developing terminology is a continuous process 
requiring government-supported planning, which from the fifteenth to twentieth century, 
Ukrainian intellectuals working in conditions of alien cultures could not experience (Ohiyenko 
Istoriya… 335-336).  Independence provided political conditions that favored the spread of 
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Ukrainian and triggered the need for specialized Ukrainian terminology.  Terminology 
development was part of the elaboration strategy from the outset of Ukrainian language planning.  
The establishment of a permanent Terminological Commission under the umbrella of the Kyiv 
Scientific Society in August 1918 generated formalized support for those doing terminology 
work (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 337).   The codification Commission formed on March 16, 1919 was 
named ‘Orthographic and Terminological Commission’ and was intended to work on the 
development of terminology as well as dealing with orthography (Nimchuk 252).   Ukrainian 
schools and government organizations felt the pressing need to have suitable Ukrainian 
terminology; therefore, in 1917, numerous individual ad hoc groups emerged across Ukraine 
with the purpose of producing terminological dictionaries (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 336).      The 
work done on Ukrainian terminology during the independence years became the foundation for 
elaboration achievements in subsequent years, but it was a grueling task for a nation that, for 
centuries, was deprived of opportunities to use its language in any official capacity.   
The collapse of political, administrative, and economic structures caused by the 
Bolshevik invasion of Kyiv made the task of compiling and publishing dictionaries even more 
challenging.  Thus, the work of both Commissions came to a halt in the winter of 1920-1921 due 
to a power outage (Ohiyenko  Istoriya… 337).  The change of government and political structure 
in Ukraine, from the Directory to the Soviets, may have also played a role in the cessation of 
work: the members of the Commissions might not have been sure that the Bolshevik government 
had plans to support their work.  The Bolsheviks officially sanctioned the role of the 
Orthographic and Terminological Commission in 1921 when it was amalgamated into a brand 
new organization, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language, which was formed as part of 
the Academy of Sciences (Nimchuk 252).   The amalgamation of the Kyiv Scientific Society 
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with the Academy of Science introduced the members of Kyiv Scientific Society’s permanent 
Terminological Commission into the Institute as well (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 337).  The Institute 
became a large organization employing highly qualified specialists and linguists and was central 
to the development of specialized Ukrainian terminology during the years of ukrainianization.    
The Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language was organized into six divisions, as follows:  
1. Natural Science Division.  Sections: botany, geology, geography, zoology, mathematics, 
medicine, meteorology, physics, and chemistry. 
2. Technical Division.  Sections: roads and bridges, hydromechanics, mechanics, construction, 
electrical engineering, mining, agricultural engineering, auto industry, and aviation. 
3. Agricultural Division 
4. Socio-Historical Division. Sections: sociology, economics, pedagogy and psychology, 
linguistics, philosophy, and business language. 
5. Law Division 
6. Art Division.  Sections: archaeology, architecture, painting, wood carving, crafts, music, and 
theatre (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 337).   
All divisions of the Institute preferred using authentic Ukrainian words rather than international 
loanwords. Industry representatives and history books were widely consulted in the process of 
developing specialized terms (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 338).  This methodology of terminology 
planning differs from the approach that guided the development of terminology in Russia, where 
preference was given to international loanwords.  In order to encourage the influx of materials 
into the Institute, mail addressed to the Institute did not require postage. Findings were recorded 
on specially printed terminological cards, an overall number of which reached two million 
(Ohiyenko Istoriya… 338).  Almost twenty dictionaries of specialized terms were published by 
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the Institute in 1923-1931, and thirty four more were contracted for printing in 1926, but the 
State Publishing House of Ukraine failed to print them (Ohieynko Istoriya… 338-339, 361-362).  
Prior to publishing a book, the government-run print houses sent the Institute their manuscripts 
for terminology verification and correction (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 338-339).  This procedure 
gradually unified terminology use across Ukraine.  In 1927, the Institute commenced work to 
establish its own periodical publication, Visnyk, which was supposed to provide the public with a 
summary of the Institute’s accomplishments, lists of prepared and published dictionaries, 
discussions of relevant linguistic and historical issues, and overall assistance with spreading the 
functions of Ukrainian to new areas (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 339).  The policy of ukrainianization 
secured the political and financial support needed for the development of technical terminology 
in Ukrainian.  By streamlining all their work through one organization, the Institute of Ukrainian 
Scientific Language allowed for the concentration of funding and professional knowledge, 
approaching terminology planning with a single methodology and setting up guidelines and 
authority for the elaboration of Ukrainian and its new standard variety into new areas of use.  
The increased availability of the required vocabulary and the systemized elaboration efforts 
facilitated the expansion of the functions of Ukrainian within the society.   
The formalization of spelling rules fostered the development and publishing of new 
Orthographic dictionaries.  After the Draft Orthographic Code was adopted in 1926, Hryhorij 
Holoskevych prepared a new addition to his orthographic dictionary to reflect the new spelling 
rules.  H. Holoskevych was a member of the Orthographic Commissions organized in 1918, 
1919, 1921, and 1925.  A new (sixth) edition of his dictionary was published in 1926 in Kyiv, 
and after the adoption of the new orthographic rules in 1928, Holoskevych published a larger, 
forty-thousand-word edition of the dictionary in 1929 (Holoskevych, preface).  Because of the 
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authorship of the dictionary, sometimes the Orthographic Codes of Ukrainian of 1926 and 1928 
are referred to as the Orthographic Rules of Holoskevych.  The Ukrainian diaspora in the West 
accepted the Orthographic rules of 1926 and 1928 and has been using them ever since 
(Rudnyc’kyj 5-6).  Even today, Holoskevych’s dictionary is used by many as the guideline for 
Ukrainian spelling and grammar.    
   The abandonment of ukrainianization in 1933 reflected adversely on terminology 
planning and vocabulary development.  All work on Ukrainian technical terminology was 
suspended and, instead, Russian terminological vocabulary was introduced into Ukrainian.  
Purges at the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language resulted not only in specialists resigning 
from their work but also in severe political repressions (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 339-340).  The 
change in official policy resulted in the Institute being characterized as producing dictionaries 
based on bourgeois linguistics and therefore needing reorganization under government control.  
As a result, the Institute received a new name and a new mandate: all technical terms were now 
required to follow the Russian model (Ohiyenko Istoriya… 340-341).  Terms with native roots 
were abandoned and replaced with Russian-style international words.  This process produced the 
impression that the Ukrainian language was inferior since it did not have authentic scientific 
terminology.  Publication of Visnyk was stopped after the Institute’s reorganization and the fate 
of most contributors to Visnyk was grave (Ocheretyanko 601). Ukrainian had many words with 
roots that were different from the roots of corresponding Russian words.  If there was a Russian-
looking synonym in circulation, post-1933 dictionaries always placed a Russian-looking 
synonym first and the authentic Ukrainian word, second.  Subsequently, in many cases, the 
Ukrainian version was labeled archaic.  The official line started to favor the use of Russian in 
official functions and, gradually, Russian started to replace Ukrainian in both research and 
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science.  All these changes forced Ukrainian out of the very prestigious area of science and 
research.   
4.5. Communist Party of Bolsheviks Putting down Roots in Ukraine 
Ukrainianization resulted in an increase of ethnic Ukrainian members in the Communist 
party.  In 1922, seventy nine percent of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine 
considered Russian as their language of communication and only eleven percent spoke Ukrainian 
(Bondarchuk 274).  The ethnic composition of the party in 1922 was as follows:  Ukrainians 
constituted twenty three percent of the membership of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 
Ukraine and in 1933, the membership reached sixty percent (Zaitsev 258).  Ukrainians, however, 
occupied the lower levels of the party hierarchy: they represented sixteen percent of the 
membership of the Party’s Central Committee in 1924, and forty three percent in 1930, and only 
non-Ukrainians were appointed by Moscow to chair the central Committee in 1923-1953 
(Zaitsev 258).   
Ukrainian also entered the area of Marxist theory and Bolshevik political ideology.  The 
Ukrainian institute of Marxism-Leninism was opened in Kharkiv in 1924, which for a while was 
headed by Halychyna native, Matvij Yavorskyj, who developed a Marxist interpretation of the 
history and class struggle of Ukraine. Together with Mykhailo Hrushevskyj, he challenged the 
tsarist myths of the common historical past of Russians and Ukrainians (Magosci A History… 
21-23, 564, Wilson 142, Zaitsev 261).  Books propagating Bolshevik ideology were brought to 
rural Ukrainians by means of mobile libraries (Magosci 2007 226).  Elaboration of the Ukrainian 
language into the domain of Bolshevik propaganda and Marxist theory resulted in a binary 
transformation of the Ukrainian society: the ethnic composition of the Communist party of 
Ukraine shifted to include more Ukrainians and the Bolshevik ideology penetrated rural areas 
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inhabited by speakers of Ukrainian.  The Moscow masterminds behind the ‘putting down roots’ 
policy successfully engineered the ukrainianization of the party and the sovietization of the 
Ukrainian population with one clean shot—the elaboration of Ukrainian into the realm of 
Marxist theory.                 
4.6. Literature and Theatre 
In the twenties and early thirties, Ukraine experienced a boost of cultural life, as well as a 
widespread experimentation and innovation in literature, theatre, cinematography, and visual 
arts.  Scholars maintain that this period was characterized by the relative freedom of literature 
and arts, a search for new forms of cultural expression, and optimism among artists (Bliss Eaton 
xxiii-xxiv, Magocsi A History… 544-545, Wilson 137-142, Zaitsev 261-262). Ukrainian writers 
formed numerous literary groups and spread the Ukrainian language to various literary genres.  
Some groups aligned with Proletcult, a Soviet literacy and cultural organization, and developed 
Ukrainian proletarian literature (Luckyj 167, Zaitsev 261).  At the same time, some freedom of 
cultural expression, still tolerated by the Communist party, fostered the development of non-
proletarian styles, such as peasant literature, neoclassicism, symbolism, futurism, and formalism 
(Zaitsev 261).  Ukrainian writers even developed their own line of literature called panfuturism, 
which incorporated all ‘isms’ (Wilson 136).  Literary groups came to life, disintegrated, and re-
emerged on a regular basis.  Some writers chose to be independent of any group, considering 
them superfluous and unable to deliver quality literature (Ilnytzkyj 99-100).  The diversity of 
outlooks on literature, its purposes, and forms of expression culminated in Literary Discussion, a 
social debate, in which many intellectuals participated by making public speeches at gatherings 
and publishing articles in newspapers and magazines.  The vigorous development of literature, 
sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Renaissance, was a momentous factor that greatly 
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promoted the spread of the Ukrainian language and elevated its status.  At the same time, 
adoption of the Orthographic Codes also contributed to literature development because it 
equipped writers with standard Ukrainian, an important tool. 
 Les’ Kurbas, an actor and theatre director, promoted the development of traditional and 
avant-garde Ukrainian theatrical art during the years of ukrainianzation.    He was highly 
regarded for his own original style and is considered one of the best avant-garde directors, not 
only of Ukraine, but also of the entire Soviet Union (Bliss Eaton xxiii).   In 1922, Les’ Kurbas 
organized and an experimental avant-garde theatre in Kyiv, named Berezil’, which he later 
moved to Kharkiv and headed until 1933 (Magocsi Ukraine… 228).  Berezil’s innovative 
theatrical techniques, the talent of its actors and the creative, collaborative environment drew the 
attention of the public and artists, making it very popular.   Berezil’ brought Ukrainian back to 
the theatrical stage, first in Kyiv and later in Kharkiv, and demonstrated that it was not only 
suited for peasant-themed repertoire, but also for urban modernistic themes.  Les’ Kurbas’ 
innovations included Expressionist techniques of stage image, repertoire of gestures, visual 
device, and interaction with the audience (Wilson 137).    Audience interaction produced a major 
momentum for the elaboration of the Ukrainian language.   The plays were in Ukrainian and the 
actors also communicated with the spectators in Ukrainian.  Berezil’ not only exposed the 
audience to the Ukrainian language but also created an impetus for engagement in a conversation 
in Ukrainian in a public artistic setting.  This experience created a sense of comfort for some 
individuals to use Ukrainian and this feeling could prompt them to choose Ukrainian when 
communicating in another public sphere.  Berezil’s work generated a powerful step forward for 
Ukrainian language and culture.      
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4.7. Post-Ukrainianization Elaboration 
 Ukrainian artists embraced the opportunity created by the revolutionary spirit, the 
country’s independence, and ukrainianization, and embarked on the energetic modernization of 
Ukrainian culture and art.   Despite the limitations imposed by Bolshevik ideology, the years of 
NEP are considered relatively tolerable for intellectuals (Ilnytzkyj 105, Terras 79).  Ukrainian 
artists aspired to take their national culture to a level of originality and authenticity where it 
would be identified with Ukraine and its people.  In its search for distinctly Ukrainian forms of 
cultural expression, Ukrainian art departed from the tradition of following Russian models 
(Magocsi A History… 544).  It culminated in an appeal to artists— get “away from Moscow!”—
made by a Ukrainian writer, Mykola Khvylyovyj28 (qtd. in Wilson 138, qtd. in Zaitsev 259).  The 
swift development of artistic and intellectual domains in Ukraine surpassed the boundaries 
determined by Soviet ideology and imperial authority (Ilnytzkyj 105).  The spiritual departure of 
Ukrainian artistry from Russian foundations was a threat to the Soviet empire because it had the 
potential to become a catalytic force for political disintegration.   
By the time Ukraine broke free culturally from Russia, the years of Soviet propaganda 
had already made substantial advancements in securing the presence, and some degree of 
acceptance, of socialist ideologies within Ukrainian society.  Many Ukrainian artists pushing for 
the independence of Ukrainian culture expressed their socialist convictions, and the goal of their 
creative efforts was to build a Ukrainian socialist culture that would serve the needs of both the 
peasants and the proletariat.  For those artists who did not convert to socialist beliefs, the 
authorities engaged an extensive range of intimidation and censorship tools (Lewis Burgin 36-
37, Sicher 181, Terras 79).  The Soviet authorities felt it was time to stop supporting Ukrainian 
                                                      
28 Mykola Khvylyovyj (1893-1933), last name at birth Fitilyov, a Ukrainian writer who dominated literary 
politics in Ukraine from 1925-1933 (Luckyj 168, Magocsi Ukraine… 226, Zaitsev 259). 
 90 
 
culture and redirected the creative process into purely socialist pro-Russian avenues.  The 
Ukrainian language and its official orthography suffered as a result of this change in policy.  
After years of elaboration, government-promoted contractions of Ukrainian came into play.  The 
Ukrainian language was pushed out of many areas, and where it did remain, it was engineered to 
exhibit features identical to Russian.             
The Communist party began backing away from ukrainianization, engaged in firmer 
ideological control, and started to steer Ukraine into a stricter integration with the Soviet Union.  
The authorities blamed artists of practicing bourgeois nationalism in order to subordinate cultural 
life to a political party doctrine.   In 1927 The All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers 
was formed and party control was felt throughout that organization (Zaitsev 262).   The end of 
NEP and beginning of the first five-year plan was marked by a fast disappearance of any 
remaining freedom.  Artists had to glorify the Communist Party and Stalin in order to survive, 
and the intensive censorship network ensured that only those works that were strictly in line with 
the official policy would be published.  Through censorship, “Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan 
effectively subordinated literature and the other arts to the Party’s political and economic 
programs” (qtd. in Lewis Burgin 37).   The official policy engaged in practices similar to the 
ones used by Tsarist Russia for oppression and russification (Zaitsev 270).   However there was a 
significant difference between tsarist and Stalin’s methods:  tsarism engaged only in prohibition, 
while Stalin’s system introduced editions and insertions to make the original artistic work better 
reflect the ideological position of the ruling party (Lewis Burgin 38). 
Following ukrainianization, the oppression of Ukrainian is evident in the discontinuation 
of operations by many institutions that promoted Ukrainian language and culture.  The 
government closed down the Research Institute of the History of Ukrainian Culture, the Institute 
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of Agricultural Economics, the Shevchenko Institute of Literature Studies, and many Ukrainian 
theatres, including Berezil’ (Zaitsev 270- 271).  The number of Russian language theatres 
between 1931 and 1936 increased from nine to thirty (Magocsi A History… 571).  All literary 
groups were dismissed and writers had to become members of the Union of Writers of Ukraine 
in order to continue their work (Zaitsev 271).  The number of the Ukrainian newspapers and 
magazines decreased: in 1931 ninety percent of newspapers and eighty five percent of magazines 
were Ukrainian, and in 1940 the corresponding statistics showed that only seventy percent of 
newspapers and forty five percent of magazines were published in Ukrainian (Zaitsev 270).   The 
attack on Ukrainian led to its retreat from the areas of life where it had recently advanced, and 
the decrease in its prestige triggered a roll-back to Russian, especially in the east and in urban 
centers.   
The linguistic engineering of assimilating Ukrainian with Russian through the changes to 
Ukrainian orthographic rules in 1933 and 1938 was an authoritarian act—the government was 
not interested in the public’s opinion.  There were no discussions of the new draft rules in the 
press or at conferences and only 350 copies of the draft changes were published (Nimchuk 269).  
The government-run education system had no choice but except and reinforce the new spelling 
rules.  In addition, the government used education as an avenue to advance its pro-Russian 
agenda.  The number of Ukrainian language schools decreased substantially during the post-
ukranianization years (Zaitsev 270).  In 1938 Russian became the mandatory language for all 
students and in many schools Russian replaced Ukrainian entirely (Magosci A History…571).  
The era of intensive language elaboration during ukrainianization came to the end.  The 
Bolsheviks brought the cycle of history back to the practices of intensive eradication of the 
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Ukrainian language.  After ukrainianization had fulfilled its purpose, matters were brought back 
to the reality of Russian imperial ambitions.  
4.8. Ukrainianization and Soviet Social Engineers 
The Moscow headquarters of the Communist Party gradually put a firm grip on art in the 
whole of the USSR—Ukrainian art was to share exactly the same fate as all the other Soviet 
Republics. The Ukrainian artists and political leaders who truly believed that Soviet structure 
granted Ukraine the freedom to self-determine its present and future were in fact blinded by 
communist utopia (Luckyj 167-168).  When individuals at power implement a utopian social 
project they use the masses as their subjects and, as a result, the outcome presents adverse effects 
for ordinary people (Alexander and Schmidt 3-4).  Ukrainianization, or the elaboration stage of 
language planning, aimed at spreading Ukrainian language to the areas of Bolshevik ideology, 
government administration, education, science, Russophones, and russified circles of the society.  
It was an undertaking executed with the help of the social engineering techniques.    
Firstly, the policy of ukrainianization was implemented to overcome the Ukrainian 
political forces that had emerged during the period of national independence.  Secondly, when 
one analyzes the elaboration of Ukrainian into the area of political ideology, the policy appears 
deceitful.  The government was not interested in spreading Ukrainian into new areas of use for 
the mere sake of elaboration as part of language planning.  It was solely concerned about 
capturing the interest of the Ukrainian crowd through Bolshevik political speeches.   Thirdly, 
building a self-governed socialist society in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian language would have 
its status dictated by the total number of Ukrainian speakers and their contribution to the 
economy and society, was a mere utopia.  The true power was in Moscow, just as it had been 
before the Revolution (Luckyj 167-168).  The most efficient and rational way for Moscow to rule 
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Ukraine would be through the Russian language only, which would be even easier to implement 
in a unified socialist society than it had been in Tsarist Russia (Magocsi A History… 533-537).  
The Russian language could also serve as a unifying symbol for different ethnicities within the 
USSR.  Therefore, ukrainianization was indeed planned to be nothing more than a temporary 
anomaly of the socialist construction—an illusion created for those who wanted to believe in it.   
Fourthly, the elaboration of Ukrainian during ukrainianization bears features of self-made social 
engineering.  It did not have the scope of theoretical knowledge supported by successful practical 
experience to be called sociotechnic proper, but the implementers of the elaboration process 
possessed sufficient personal knowledge and talent to be able to organize successful social 
activities on an individual basis.  Elaboration greatly relies on bureaucratic control and 
authoritarian support, which means that elaboration projects ultimately conglomerated into a 
pool of experiences; however, this process had started as a number of government directives.  
Fifthly, human beings were not considered as individuals in the elaboration measures; they were 
just a mass of people targeted by the government policy of spreading Ukrainian. The elaboration 
aspect of language planning exhibited cases of physical human suffering during the years of 
ukrainianization and NEP, an instance of dark social engineering.  The increasing censorship and 
oppression of artistic expression also contributed to the human suffering during that period.  The 
era of mass sufferings began with the end of NEP and the beginning of the first five-year plan in 
1928 and culminated in 1933 and 1938.  These sufferings can be mostly associated with the stage 
of language planning called securing acceptance.        
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CHAPTER 5   SECURING ACCEPTANCE 
The success of the movement towards linguistic uniformity depends on broad social, 
political, and cultural variables, as well as the attitudes of various vernacular communities.  
Status planning is an important stage of standard variety development and must be well designed 
and executed by the government in order to secure the acceptance of an official language by the 
public. Because it deals with people’s beliefs and attitudes, which often require alteration, 
securing acceptance is a difficult task.  Therefore, this stage of language planning frequently 
involves social engineering techniques throughout its various status planning projects.  The 
process of elevating the prestige of a standard language is considered to be the first and most 
important factor in ensuring the favorable perception of a standard language (Joseph 61-62).   
The prestige of a language is significantly determined by the attitude of a nation’s elite towards 
that language and their role in language planning.  Support by the elite class can increase the 
success of language planning initiatives (Cooper 183).  People tend to demonstrate greater 
openness to concepts and things that are actually or conceptually connected to them.  Even 
minimal involvement by members of the speech community in the process of language 
standardization may produce a sense of relatedness between the community and the standard, 
ultimately easing its acceptance.  Constructing a standard on the principles of logic enhances its 
perception as the correct and first-rate form of the language (Joseph 116, 161).  This notion of 
quality and superiority of the standard language can contribute to language acceptance by groups 
for which these factors are valuable.   
Achieving the goal of standard language acceptance depends on many variables, 
including the availability of resources, the socio-historical situation of the community, and the 
methods deployed to motivate speakers to use the standard language.   Legislation is considered 
the most direct approach to securing the emergence and survival of the standard language 
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(Joseph 61).  Government can use legislation to initiate, guide, and control the implementation of 
language policies; however, successful acceptance of the standard is often possible only if the 
relevant legislation is adopted at the highest level (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 116-117, 
Willemyns 186, 191).  Prior to and following the Bolshevik Revolution, the authorities of 
Ukraine regularly resorted to passing legislation in order to secure compliance with their 
language policies.   
A new standard language reflects the concepts and perceptions that guided the language 
development process.  If a particular vernacular was selected to serve as basis for the standard, 
the distinct features of that vernacular will be present in the standard language.  Their presence 
will always serve as a reminder of the fact that the community that supplied the vernacular for 
the standard language possessed some unique qualities that matched the selection criteria.  
Associating with the standard language strengthens a community through the acquisition of 
standard language attributes such as purity, primacy, and rightness (Ehret 336).  It is insignificant 
whether one agrees with the reasons for which a particular vernacular was chosen to become the 
standard or whether one understands the qualities that got attributed to the community as a result 
of the introduction of the standard.  In fact, when circumstances force an individual to use the 
standard variety, for example in the educational setting, he will involuntary reinforce those 
opinions about those qualities without necessarily agreeing with them.   
Acceptance of the standard variety by a society can shift the mindset of its members and 
draw them closer to the notions engineered for them by language planners.  Consequently, the 
acceptance stage of language planning serves as an instrument for altering established attitudes.  
An opposite directional process can also serve the engineering agenda: if a society is led to 
change its beliefs and become more susceptible to the standard, the chances of its acceptance 
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increase.   These two processes are entangled in the history of Soviet language planning.  On one 
side, linguists were called to engineer orthographic rules that would allow the government to 
achieve its goals, and at the same time, Soviet official policies predisposed society to accept the 
results of the work of the language planners.   
 In 1917-1919, the leaders of independent Ukraine were committed to supporting 
initiatives that had potential for securing acceptance of the new Orthographic Code and of 
Ukrainian as the official language.  Printed word is highly regarded in Ukraine; therefore, the 
decision to print a substantial number of copies of the rules and the appearance of the summary 
of the rules in media publications swayed the public to receive the new standard favorably.  The 
involvement of prominent scholars in developing the orthographic rules enhanced their 
credibility.  National programs initiated by the first Central Council government were continued 
by the Hetmanate and positively influenced national esteem; these programs included 
introducing the Ukrainian language into education and establishing the Ukrainian Academy of 
Fine Arts, the State Library, the State Archives, and the Ukrainian Academy of Science 
(Magocsi Ukraine… 201).  Aspirations of nation building during Ukraine’s independence, 
fuelled government initiatives directed at elevating the prestige of Ukrainian culture to secure the 
acceptance of both the language and the idea of an independent country.  Unfortunately, the short 
duration of Ukraine’s independence did not allow these programs to come to fruition.             
 The role of the national elite in securing acceptance of the official standard language is 
significant.  Elites are likely to engage in language planning only if it benefits them (Cooper 
183).  Thus, the Bolshevik leaders’ ambitions to intensify their influence in Ukraine by appearing 
indigenous resulted in the promotion of Ukrainian within their agencies and in the Ukrainian 
society at large.  These efforts, however, had little to do with securing acceptance of Ukrainian 
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as an official language, and were primarily driven by their desire to ensure the reception of their 
ideology in Ukraine.  Ukrainian was meant to become a medium of communication with the 
masses and “a weapon of communist education” (qtd. in Solchanyk 66).  Bolsheviks deployed 
the myth of a proletarian state to symbolically legitimize their power (Gorham 10).  The 
establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Kharkiv (1917) was done not for the purpose 
of building a socialist Ukrainian state and elevating the status of the Ukrainian language, but 
rather to tempt the Ukrainian people to support the Bolshevik party (Stakhiv 62-63).  Ironically, 
therefore, the promotion of the Ukrainian language was engineered primarily for Ukrainians 
rather than for the Russian speaking population (von Hagen 370).  Nevertheless, official 
proclamations by Bolshevik rulers favoring Ukrainian elevated its status in society.  Those who 
accepted Bolshevik national policies in Ukraine at their face value believed that the government 
and the Bolshevik elite endorsed Ukrainian and promoted its use.  The resulting increase of 
language prestige was an inevitable side effect of the Bolsheviks’ attempts to appear indigenous 
and facilitated acceptance of Ukrainian as the official medium of communication in Soviet 
Ukraine.                
 Soviet Ukrainian nationality was institutionalized during the early years of Bolshevik 
power in Ukraine.  Ukrainian culture and language thrived mainly before and during the 
ukrainianization period.  The promotion of Ukrainian was a departure from the internationalist 
ideology traditionally embraced by Russian Bolsheviks.  This produced much confusion within 
the party and the society.  Numerous theories are offered on the Bolsheviks’ undertaking of 
ukrainianization (Bachynskyj 282-283).  Nevertheless, there were groups that genuinely 
embraced the opportunity to contribute to the development of Ukrainian language and culture.  
The ideas proposed by Drahomanov and Shevchenko fostered the platform of the Borot’bists’ 
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party.  After their unification with the Bolsheviks, the Borot’bists persevered to achieve their 
objectives through ukrainianization.  Ukrainian scholars and artists welcomed the opportunity to 
advance Ukrainian culture and language and greatly contributed to the elevation of Ukrainian 
cultural and linguistic prestige.       
Ukrainianization was also used to demonstrate to the population of Western Ukraine that 
Ukrainians could have their national interests satisfied only in Soviet Ukraine.  The Bolsheviks 
wanted to exhibit positive methods of solving national and ethnical issues to the colonial 
countries in hopes of gaining their support for socialist ideas and a world revolution.  They 
partially attained this external goal, since some Ukrainian émigrés viewed ukrainianization as a 
positive force and, therefore, they promoted the idea of cooperation with the regime.  Some 
émigrés even returned to Ukraine to play a part in implementing ukrainianization policy 
(Magosci A History… 541-542).  They used Ukrainian predominantly in their professional 
activities, and this factor was an immense force in elevating the prestige and acceptance of 
Ukrainian.    
Other groups were suspicious of Bolshevik official policies or became quickly 
disillusioned after a brief encounter with them.  Upon returning to Ukraine, Volodymyr 
Vynnychenko realized the hypocrisy of the Bolshevik position and acknowledged that it was not 
possible to be both a revolutionary and a Ukrainian at the same time (Bilaniuk 79-80).  Those 
who believed the only purpose of ukrainianization was to strengthen Bolshevik rule in Ukraine 
called the process “false ukrainianization” (Zaitsev 257).  Dmytro Dontsov29  illustrated this 
trend:  “what can the Ukrainian language mean, if it is used to bring anti-Ukrainian ideas by 
aliens” (qtd. in Bachynskyj  283).  In this respect, ukrainianization was in fact an act of 
                                                      
29 Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1937), born in Dnieper Ukraine, was an ideological inspirer of the Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He fled to Halychyna in 1908 and then moved to the West (Magosci A History… 
597, 738). 
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sovietization; the program of securing the development and high position of Ukrainian was 
actually aimed at securing the acceptance of Bolshevik ideology by the Ukrainian population.    
In his play ‘Myna Mazailo,’ Mykola Kulish30 gave an unsurpassed sharp and humorous 
account of ordinary people’s perceptions and attitudes towards ukrainianization in Ukraine.  The 
title of the play is the first and the last name of a Ukrainian man whose family members hold 
different opinions about government policies in the area of nationalities and languages.  Aunt 
Motya, residing in Kursk (Russia), denounces her Ukrainian roots and adheres to the positions of 
Russian chauvinism.  In the play, however, she speaks mostly in Ukrainian, with the addition of 
some Russified forms or Russian words.  She refers to the new Ukrainian sign of the city name at 
the railway station as spoilage of the city (Kulish 151).  A language that held such low prestige 
for centuries provoked Aunt Motya’s claim, in Russian, that it would be more decent to be raped 
than be ukrainianized (Kulish 186).   In the text, Kulish wrote that phrase in Ukrainian 
transliteration rather than in Russian.  This gives the reader a perception that Aunt Motya might 
have said the phrase with a Ukrainian accent: “По-моєму прілічнєє бить ізнасілованой, 
нєжєлі українізірованой” (qtd. in Kulish 186).  The rhyme and rhythm of her statement as 
presented in the Ukrainian original intensify its effect. 
Russification policies left an imprint in Myna’s mindset: he strongly believes that 
Russian is the high variety and yearns to become part of it.  He suspects ukrainianization to be a 
manoeuvre to turn him into a back countryman and second-class bureaucrat who will never get a 
promotion.  With the support of his wife and daughter, he plans to change his last name to the 
Russian-sounding “Mazenin” in order to achieve affiliation with the Russian culture.   The 
announcement of the name change is published in the local newspaper and Aunt Motya frames 
                                                      
30 Mykola Kulish (1892-1937) was a Ukrainian playwright engaged in depicting Soviet reality in Ukraine 
in the twenties and thirties (Wilson 137, 141). 
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the page.  For Myna, ukrainianization was a threat of derogation and, therefore, it intensified his 
longing for Russianness, culminating in the name change.  Apparently, in some cases 
ukrainianization efforts produced results other than the growth of Ukrainian culture and the 
securing of acceptance of Ukrainian language and national identity.   
Myna’s son, Mokij, is a young Communist, who is portrayed as an enthusiastic promoter 
of ukrainianization.  Though Mokij is optimistic about ukrainianization, Kulish’s play satirically 
depicts the contradictions between Ukrainian national aspirations and Soviet reality.  Although 
ukrainianization contributed to the elevation of the status of Ukrainian culture and language, it 
could never realize its full potential because of the historical oppression and because the policy 
was never meant to serve the Ukrainian nation.  The suspicions regarding this policy are 
expressed in the warning by Uncle Taras that (Soviet) ukrainianization was a way to uncover all 
Ukrainians, and then to destroy them entirely, so that not even a trace of their spirit or scent 
would be left: “Їхня українізація – це спосіб виявити всіх нас, українців, а тоді знищити 
разом, щоб і духу не було…” (qtd. in Kulish 169).  Individuals sharing this opinion did not have 
to be convinced to accept and use the Ukrainian language; rather, they had a problem accepting 
the government’s language policy because it did not appear trustworthy.             
 There was no conformity of opinions among Bolshevik party leaders on how much 
ukrainianization was needed.  Some groups in the party, especially Russophones and Russian-by-
ethnicity individuals opposed ukrainianization entirely (Bondarchuk 274, Stakhiv 54-55, Zaitsev 
258).  In 1920, Skrypnyk reported approximately 200 cases of legal lynching for the use of 
Ukrainian (Bondarchuk 273).  Olexandr Shumsky believed that ukrainianization was too slow 
due to the opposition of the Russian-speaking bureaucracy (Zaitsev 259).  The opposition to 
ukrainianization was evident in some party leaders’ promotion of the theory of “[a] struggle of 
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two cultures” (qtd. in Magosci A History… 537).  This theory suggested that in a society where 
two cultures and languages are present, none should receive any particularly special support.  A 
fair competition will secure the victory of the stronger and, therefore, better language.  The 
promoter of this theory, Dmytro Lebid’, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, posited that the Russian culture of the urban proletariat was 
higher, and therefore, should not be replaced by the lower and weaker Ukrainian culture 
(Magosci A History… 537).  If this approach had been transformed into actual policy, it would 
have secured an even more prominent place for Russian in Ukraine.  The Ukrainian language 
was weak and Russian enjoyed high status as a result of past language policies directed at 
oppressing Ukraine.  If implemented, the “struggle of two cultures” would have taken place on 
an unlevel playing field.    
Moscow had a tactical consideration in introducing the policy of ukrainianization.  The 
Bolsheviks needed to compromise with the Borot’bists to seek popularity among the Ukrainian 
masses, and to prevent Ukraine from shifting further away from Russia—a shift that had started 
in 1917.  The Bolshevik government was forced to engage in ukrainianization to strengthen their 
position in Ukraine, just as they did in 1921 when they allowed private entrepreneurship in trade 
and industry in order to save the country from complete economic collapse.  Disparity between 
the declared and actual government agendas indicates that the authorities were engaging in social 
engineering (Alexander and Schmidt 6-7).  In order to deal with opposition to ukranianization 
within the Bolshevik party, officials at the party’s Moscow headquarters decided to shuffle party 
executives around and move some of them out of Ukraine (Zaitsev 258).  Following this change, 
those who believed in the freedom of Soviet Union nationalities to self-express and develop their 
cultures headed ukrainianization.  While implementing ukrainianization policy, the Soviet 
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government in Ukraine immersed itself in “the Utopian atmosphere that communism spread 
around” (qtd. in Luckyj 168).  The availability of utopian ideas for those in power who engage 
the masses in social projects is fraught with the possibility of deploying social engineering 
techniques (Alexander and Schmidt 3-4).  Indeed, language status planning efforts during 
ukrainianization were undertaken with the objective of inducing a collective action of acceptance 
of the Ukrainian language.  In the post-ukrainianization years, the Ukrainian masses once again 
had to accept the new Orthographic code of Ukrainian, alongside the diminishing role of 
Ukrainian and the increased importance of Russian.   
People are more willing to accept things they believe are becoming their own. Therefore, 
an idea can gain acceptance easily if the members of the group to whom the idea is being 
proposed begin to consider themselves as contributors to the development of that idea. Members 
of the Ukrainian Bolshevik elite who were appointed to implement ukrainianization accepted the 
policy as their own.  Among the Bolsheviks were those who felt that socialism and the revolution 
would benefit from an autonomous Ukraine, and Skrypnyk is considered one of those Bolsheviks 
(Stakhiv 52-57).  Borot’bists that moved under the umbrella of the Bolshevik party also 
supported ukrainianization because it reflected their original platform (Zaitsev 258).  Though 
ukrainianization processes were initiated in Moscow by resolutions on national questions and 
korenizatsiya, the implementers of ukrainianization took it to heart and tried to make the project 
as successful as possible.   
In order to develop a balanced approach and secure the acceptance of a new standard 
language, language planners must decide on the allowable degree of direct human intervention in 
the language during the standardization process. The standard Ukrainian language that was 
created as a result of codification efforts in 1917-1919, 1921, and 1926 included features 
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representing several regional varieties.  Although none of the regional groups could say that the 
standard was based exclusively on their vernacular, each could potentially favor acceptance of 
the standard because it included some distinctive features of their vernacular.  Ultimately, the 
standard was accepted both in Dnieper and Western Ukraine as well as by Ukrainian émigrés 
living in the West.        
 Chances of acceptance can also increase if consultations are made with the project’s 
largest stakeholders.  The government order establishing the Orthographic Commission of 1925, 
required the People’s Commissariat of Education to hold a special conference, which would 
provide an opportunity for academia and literature representatives to participate in the 
development and discussion of spelling and grammar rules (Nimchuk 253-254).  The standard is 
viable if the planners make choices that are beneficial both historically and logically (Joseph 14).  
The conference was an avenue for sourcing contributions of the best specialists to increase the 
chances of making well-informed choices.  The involvement of professionals from various 
industries in the process of developing a specialized terminology for the Institute of Ukrainian 
Scientific Language also added to the predisposition of Ukrainian society to accept the new 
standard.      
Public involvement in standardization may increase the chances of successful acceptance 
because through participation, individual members of society might start viewing a standard as a 
product of their efforts.  Moreover, if the public is aware of the standardization process, its stages 
and what it entails, the language planners can sense at the early stages of standardization if 
acceptance of a standard would become a problem. In 1926, The Ukrainian Orthography (Draft) 
was published in Kharkiv to foster awareness about the draft rules in broad circles of society 
including linguists, writers, editors, and teachers (Nimchuk 256).  The entire country participated 
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in intense discussions about the draft rules.  The newspaper Visti VUTVK (Вiстi ВУЦВК) had a 
special supplementary section for discussions of Ukrainian Orthography (‘Укрaїнський 
прaвопис: Дискусiйний бюлетень’). Several academic magazines, alongside the non-
specialized magazine Україна (Ukrayina), had pages dedicated to the codification processes 
(Nimchuk 266).  These broad public discussions not only made people aware of the upcoming 
new orthography but also made them participants in the codification process.   Between May 26 
and June 6, 1927, the draft was discussed, voted on, and adopted in Kharkiv during the national 
conference that gathered representatives from various regions of Ukraine (Dingley 180, Nimchuk 
257, 266).  To a certain degree, public discussions facilitated the acceptance of the new code; 
however, because the rules were complex, there were initially some expressions of 
dissatisfaction.      
After codification is complete, people begin consulting the orthographic rules, and the 
standard variety becomes thus associated with correctness.   The concept of correctness is often 
considered interconnected with logic: if something can be logically argued, it must be correct.  
Similarly, a standard language is also expected to be logical (Thomas 160) because it is easier to 
accept a concept or rule that seems logical.  The work undertaken in 1926 to draft a new 
orthographic code was greatly concerned with questions of logic and linguistic and etymological 
validation.  The Orthographic Commission took into account the historical and literal traditions 
of the language and tried not to disrupt what was logical in the language (Nimchuk 255).  
Although the Commission could substantiate the choices it made, it is hard to determine if the 
logic here made acceptance any easier.  The resulting rules were complex and did not necessarily 
make the acceptance easy for the general public.   
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Through legislation, governments have an effective tool of resolving issues surrounding 
the acceptance of prescriptions dictated by the language or any other policy.  Legislation 
provides direct, univocal, and defined guidelines to the society and stipulates penalties for non-
compliance.  The Soviet Decree of 1920 on the use of Ukrainian in civil and military service set 
out that violators will be punished as ‘dictated by the severity of the military-revolutionary laws’ 
(qtd. in Bondarchuk 273).  The overall reliance on bureaucratic control for the implementation of 
language policies is a feature of self-made social engineering.  However, depending on the 
gravity of the punishment, it can be viewed as a dark method:  ‘severity of the military-
revolutionary laws’ often meant the death penalty, since human life was not valued by the 
Soviets.  In fact, in the first years of Soviet power, punishment by shooting was a widespread 
practice.    
The Decree on Ukrainianization adopted on August 1, 1923 stipulated that civil servants 
were given one year to learn Ukrainian.  Non-conformity would cause a civil servant to lose his 
job (Magocsi A History… 539).  The newspaper page that featured Myna Mazailo’s 
announcement about changing his last name also contained a notice from his office that he had 
been fired for the systematic and deliberate sabotage of ukrainianization (Kulish 202).  Dismissal 
might have also been considered a harsh punishment but at least it had a clear definition of 
retribution.  In this respect, securing acceptance of Ukrainian by the Decree of 1920 could result 
in more severe punishments than dismissal.  The ambiguity of the 1920 Decree provision that 
non-conformity ought to be punished according to the terms dictated by the revolutionary time 
could result in executions and killings.  In 1928 the resolution of the People’s Commissariat of 
Education officially approved and brought into effect the orthographic code adopted at the All-
Ukrainian conference.  (Nimchuk 264).  It became obligatory to use these norms in official 
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government domains, education, and media, however non-conformity did not entail any 
disproportionally severe retribution such as practiced in the early years of the revolution.  
Draconian punishments, such as arrests, exile, and executions were brought back to secure 
acceptance of the policies that were behind the orthographic codes of 1933 and 1938.  Even if 
there was no guilt in someone’s actions, fabrications were widely used to eliminate the 
individuals who were perceived by the authorities as a threat to Soviet ideology.              
The emergence of new power requires the language to effectively communicate its ideas, 
goals, and promises in order to gain society’s acceptance.  Bolsheviks were well aware of this: 
Karl Marx stipulated that the credibility and authority of a revolutionary movement can be 
strengthened if language is put to its service (Gorham 4).  Language, perceptions, and identities 
are interconnected concepts that influence one another.  Changes introduced into the language 
can alter speakers’ perceptions of the external world and of themselves; however, the opposite 
can also be true, where a change in people’s beliefs and traditions can assist in securing the 
acceptance of a new official language and the social and political goals attainable by means of 
language planning.  The Bolshevik government never relied solely on language planning tools.  
It continuously used massive Soviet propaganda to influence society in order to secure 
acceptance of any government policy, including a new standard language. 
The victory of the Bolshevik Revolution brought with it a new social structure—a 
socialist society.  This new society was unlike Russia before the revolution and it was unlike any 
other country in the world in terms of its ideological, political, social, economic, and 
administrative organization.  Socialism in Russia and other Soviet republics was based solely on 
Marxist theory without any practical experience to support the argument that socialist society 
could be a viable project.  These facts place the Bolsheviks’ construction of a socialist society in 
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the category of quackish social engineering (Podgórecki 27).  Reliance on ideology, engagement, 
and the manipulation of people’s emotions are intrinsic features of quackish social engineering.  
Communist ideology was elevated to the level of sacredness in the Soviet Union.  The history of 
the Soviet Union is a string of events charged with human emotions, ranging from pride and 
enthusiasm, to hatred and mortal fear.            
 The largest ideological project of the Soviet authorities was the creation the “New Soviet 
Man.”  Depending on the means and circumstances, tactics including incentives, propaganda, or 
mere blustering were used to force the obedient acceptance of this mythical concept and to 
secure the upbringing of the New Soviet Man.  Language planning in the Soviet Union was 
subordinated to this cause.  Bolsheviks wanted to mold the language and the citizens to reflect 
their ideology (Gorham 10).  Nothing was too small or insignificant for the process of shaping 
the New Soviet Man.  Traditions, family allegiances, truth, names, graphical images of letters, 
literature—everything was altered to create the new Soviet identity.  The Soviet totalitarian 
regime readily sacrificed historical accuracy, social convention, and even human life in the name 
of attaining its ideological goals.   
When trying to alter public conscience, social engineers pay special attention to the 
young generations.  When the youth becomes patriotic and loyal it is easy to manufacture any 
myth for them and even use them as material for creating these myths (Podgorecki 108).  In 
order to secure its existence and future, the Bolshevik regime needed to ensure that children 
absorbed the ideology of allegiance to the soviet socialist state.  Parents and grandparents of the 
20s had been brought up before the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore held values that were 
contradictory to socialist ideals.  As a result, the Bolshevik authorities saw family as a threat and 
put it under attack.  They suggested that the traditional pre-revolution family structure and values 
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ought to be replaced with new ways of life and new beliefs.  The objective of the Soviet 
educational system was to raise a generation of young communists who would be ready to 
relinquish family ties as a result of their loyalty to the Communist Party and the Soviet State.   
The Soviet youth were expected to identify with Bolshevik ideology and collectivism, as well as 
with new Soviet people and be ready to sacrifice their families in the name of the Soviet power.      
The story of Pavlik Morozov is perhaps the best example of an effort to bring about a 
new Soviet identity.  The myth of Pavlik Morozov, a product of falsifications delivered through 
Soviet propaganda, was created by the Soviet government to destroy traditional family values. 
Since the beginning of the 1930s, generations of Soviet children, including those residing in 
Ukraine, were reared on the story of Pavlik Morozov, a boy who caused his father’s arrest in the 
name of Soviet power and was later killed by his relatives in revenge (Conquest 295, Kenez 
116).  This tragic family story was manipulated and twisted by Soviet propaganda to set a 
prominent example of young pioneer’s31 devotion to Soviet power.  Children were expected to 
follow their hero, Pavlik Morozov, who had renounced his bourgeois family values and passed a 
horrific test to become a New Soviet Man.  In this respect, the Soviet approach to raising 
children is considered an example of dark social engineering.  The facts of Pavlik Morozov’s 
story are not quite clear.  During Soviet times, a few official versions of the Pavlik Morozov 
legend were circulated.  The events took place in the village of Gerasimovka, in the Urals area of 
Russia, but Pavlik Morozov and his family were in fact of Belarusian origin; nevertheless, in the 
Soviet propaganda he was identified as Russian (Csaba 118).  It was clear that the authorities did 
not appreciate Soviet heroes of any ethnic background other than Russian: as a new type of 
people, Soviets were to be Russian by ethnicity.   
                                                      
31 Young pioneer – member of the All-Union Pioneer Organization, a Soviet children’s organization 
established for the purpose of educating of the young generation as “steadfast, revolutionary, communist fighter[s]” 
(Zalkind 347-354). 
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The Pavlik Morozov myth did not rely on historical accuracy and his ethnic origin was 
not the only misrepresentation.  The myth had inconsistencies in the accounts of Pavlik’s age, 
physical appearance, how and to whom he reported his father, and the identity of his killers.  The 
actual story cannot be fully verified; however, certain accounts contradict the official version and 
indicate that Pavlik had never been a pioneer and was a troubled youth who turned against his 
father not for political reasons but as a result of his parents’ marital problems (Csaba 118-120, 
Kenez 114-116). In order to instill their beliefs, Soviet authorities needed a model for the 
children of the new society.  This form of dark social engineering was used to create a person 
with tremendous loyalty to Soviet power that could not be stirred by any feelings, such as 
allegiance to blood relationship, ethnicity, or truth.  Children became human raw material for the 
engineers of a new Soviet society and new Soviet identity.   Pavlik’s role was to convey the 
supremacy of Russian ethnicity in the realm of new ideology and loyalty to Soviet power.  The 
new power needed to disconnect children from older generations. Therefore, Pavlik became a 
tool that partitioned families and removed youth from the influence of parents and grandparents.  
Family ties were severed and replaced with the sense of Soviet kinship.   
Family, however, is a kernel structure in the process of primary language acquisition: 
language is transmitted by the family in its authentic and unrefined form from generation to 
generation.  Proper names are an integral part of the core native vocabulary.  With the new social 
order being introduced, family structure, family names, and given names were affected.  Under 
the influence of Soviet propaganda, people invented new names and changed their names for 
ideological reasons, or even to pursue their individualistic inspirations that had little to do with 
politics.  The 1924 Decree of the Soviet government allowed this practice and set out the 
procedure (Freund 388).  Examples of new last names taken by people to reflect the Bolshevik 
 110 
 
cause are Maiskaia (Майская), Oktiabr’skii (Октябрьский), Leninskii (Ленинский), 
Mashiniskii (Машиниский), Kombainov (Комбайнов), and Boitsov (Бойцов). Tracing such bold 
political statements in the following name changes, Khliupina (Хлюпина)  Borovaia 
(Боровая), Samodurov (Самодуров)  Poliarnyi (Полярный), Kurochka (Курочка)  Orlov 
(Орлов), is not as straightforward as in the previous examples (Gorham 31).  The purpose of the 
latter changes was likely to revamp personal image.  Nevertheless, in both instances people were 
renouncing their family identity and history.  For a person of Ukrainian background, an 
additional trait could be cleansed: anything in the name that indicated Ukrainian ethnicity, as in 
the case of Myna Mazailo.  On the flipside, individuals who supported Ukrainian national 
identity and had Russian-sounding last names changed them to Ukrainian; for example, Mykola 
Khvylyovyj’s last name at birth was Fitiliov (Zaitsev 259).  Ukrainian culture attributes great 
importance to names—Ukrainians, like many other groups, believe that a person’s last name 
communicates family history and that, collectively, last names communicate the history of the 
people. The New Soviet Man, however, was stripped of his ancestry and ethnicity, and his very 
name served as a dividing point between his old and new identities.      
The russification of Ukraine during Soviet times resulted in a widely spread phenomenon 
of grandparents speaking Ukrainian and their grandchildren speaking only Russian.  The new 
language policy broke an important link of communication between the older and younger 
generations.  It was harder for young people to embrace the values of their grandparents who 
spoke a language they did not understand and was considered backwards, non-prestigious, 
bourgeois, and nationalistic by the official propaganda.   Grandparents, and in some cases 
parents, were unable to communicate effectively with their children due to language challenges.  
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Consequently, the void created in the area of beliefs and moral principles was an excellent 
opportunity for the state to saturate these young minds with communist ideas.        
It is easier to manipulate the minds and modify the behavior of children than adults.  In 
his speech at the Third Congress of the Communist Youth League in 1920, Lenin expressed a 
concern that the proletariat can only destroy the old way of life but cannot effectively develop 
and use a new value system because of the rearing in the bourgeois world (Rosenberg 30).  The 
process of overcoming existing traditions, habits, and perceptions was a tedious and time-
consuming task.  Anything resembling or reinforcing pre-revolutionary values had to be removed 
from all social, cultural, and official settings.  To a great degree, the fate of the revolution 
depended on the ability of the population to quickly adapt to the new social order (Beer 185-
189).  Soviet authorities began excluding from the societal domains any ideas that could hamper 
the acceptance of and adaptation to the new way of life.  This project required strict control, 
leaving no room for any personal freedom.  To achieve this state of affairs, the government 
deployed a massive system of censorship to ensure that memories of the past social order or 
other associations with western societies would not be triggered.          
  The totalitarian nature of Soviet society meant government involvement in all aspects of 
life.  If something was published or appeared in society, it had government endorsement and  the 
Soviet government made sure that its endorsement was attached only to the things that could be 
beneficial for the authorities.   Therefore, communist press always gave hostile reviews to 
anything that fell outside the boundaries of the official ideology (Terras 79). Writers that did not 
conform to government policies were at risk of incrimination and attacks (Sicher 181).  Between 
1917-1931, there was elaborate censorship in the Soviet State (Lewis Burgin 35-36).  In order to 
be published, Soviet writers had to engage in self-censorship (Lewis Burgin 34, Yermolayev 10).  
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Hence, they developed a gap between the opinions they could express publicly and their true 
beliefs, which they kept to themselves (Nakhimovsky 222).  Stalin, himself, engaged in 
censoring, correcting, and editing literary works.   In his letter to Ukrainian playwright 
Oleksandr Kornijchuk, Stalin notified him that he added a few words on the sixty-eighth page 
“for greater clarity” (qtd. in Bliss Eaton xxiv).  By the end of NEP and beginning of the first 
five-year plan in 1928, Stalin effectively harnessed Soviet literature to serve the ideological 
needs of the ruling Communist party.    
The introduction and securing acceptance of the Orthographic Codes in 1933 and 1938 
did not involve public discussions, printing large numbers of copies, or consultations with 
specialists.  The major tools for securing acceptance were deterrence and ideological myths.   
Many linguists who contributed to the previous codes had already been arrested or investigated 
(Dingley 181).  The code was introduced as an indisputable prescription for action, and mass 
repressions obliterated the public’s courage and desire to engage in to accept or not to accept 
discussions.  The myth of the New Soviet Man was instrumental in securing acceptance of the 
new rules.  The main character trait of the engineered Soviet Man was an unbridled devotion to 
Soviet power and the Communist Party—a devotion so strong that relinquishing one’s origins or 
killing one’s family members was acceptable in the name of Soviet loyalty.  The true Soviet Man 
would readily accept and salute any decision made by the Soviet authorities. Planting and 
fostering the Soviet Man’s traits within the social moral fiber facilitated the public’s acceptance 
of government policies, including a new standard language.           
Changes to the orthographic rules were introduced in 1933 and 1938 with the intention of 
altering Ukrainian orthography to resemble Russian spelling.  This process falls in line with the 
theory and policy of convergence of nations and languages in the Soviet Union (Isayev 352-353, 
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356).  The convergence policy suggests a planning process that leads to the fusion of ethnic 
groups in the Soviet Union into one homogeneous community, the Soviet people, and promotes 
the convergence of ethnic languages into one common language (Knowles 150). By injecting 
Russian grammar forms and words into Ukrainian and by eliminating Ukrainian letters that were 
non-existent in Russian, the creators of the convergence policy demonstrated their preference for 
Russian as the future super language.  The glorification and accentuation of Russian culture, 
language, and people began in 1933 (Zaitsev 270).  This process in combination with the 
elimination of authentic Ukrainian forms from the standard language and their replacement with 
Russian forms prepared a foundation for Russian as the only language of Soviet society.      
When high and low language varieties coexist in a society, there is often an issue 
surrounding the superiority and inferiority of the languages and their respective groups because 
speakers of the high variety often perceive speakers of a low variety as inferior (Joseph 52).  
Soviet ideology is partly based on the premise that ideas that do not conform with Soviet 
doctrines are bourgeois, backward, and inferior.  After the attack on the 1928 Orthographic Code 
labeling it as bourgeois, the use of Ukrainian became associated with bourgeois nationalism 
(Dingley 181, 184).  As a result, Ukrainian was lowered to an inferior status while Russian 
gained prestige as the language of Bolshevism, Lenin, and the revolution.  In the thirties, 
Russians regained their prominent place in the cultural and political hierarchy and Soviet 
patriotism began exhibiting characteristics of Russian nationalism (Kappeler 378-379).  
Together, these factors contributed to the acceptance of Russian as the high variety in Ukraine 
and encouraged people to embrace it as their language.  Fear also strengthened the position of 
Russian since anyone perceived by Soviet authorities as exhibiting bourgeois traits or behaviors 
was severely punished in the Soviet Union (Alexopoulos 13-14, 176-180, Rees Stalinism… 48).  
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Therefore, people felt safer when they used Russian in public settings because they did not want 
to be seen as connected to bourgeois values through the Ukrainian language.    
Language planning is the fulfillment of political or social ideals and, as such, it reflects 
the viewpoints of the groups that determine the social and political order. Both language 
planning and the standard language project those ideals to society.  The Ukrainian Orthographic 
Codes of 1933 and 1938 were meant to undermine the Ukrainian language and impose Russian 
on Ukrainians.  The acceptance of those Codes by members of the society suggests an intrinsic 
acceptance of the idea that Russian was becoming the high variety and would eventually become 
the only language of Ukraine.  Ironically, the standard variety was promoted as a strengthening 
force for national identity, a tool to advance the language, but in reality it would lead to the death 
of the Ukrainian language.           
 The NEP introduced elements of a free market economy to the Soviet Union and allowed 
society to experience life based on principles other than communist doctrines.  Culturally, NEP 
allowed for a multitude of opinions and played a part in developing Ukrainian culture.  Over 
time, NEP was branded as a policy that strengthened bourgeois traditions (Rosenberg 31-32).   
The New Soviet Man could not be oriented to capitalist economic principles.  Instead, he was to 
posses viewpoints and traits that were different from those brought up in a capitalist regime 
(Alexopoulos 6).  The introduction of the first five-year plan in 1928 reinstated the country to the 
economic management models of war communism and instituted absolute state control over 
society (Reiman 106, 117).  Command economy became the only acceptable method of 
managing and organizing the country’s industries and commerce.  Similarly, the Bolsheviks 
terminated any cultural ideas that promoted the distancing of society from Moscow.  By this 
time, the Soviet regime had gained strong positions in Ukraine and no longer needed 
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ukrainianization.  Once NEP and ukrainianization had produced the desired results, the Soviet 
government terminated both policies.  From that point on, the government resorted to terror and 
suppression in order to achieve its goals, commencing one of the darkest periods in the history of 
social engineering. 
Ten years of ukrainianization (1923-1933) transformed Ukraine into a consolidated, 
modern nation with the Ukrainian-speaking elite working constantly to advance Ukrainian 
culture.  Soviet authorities deemed this state of affairs as threatening to the empire and reopened 
their pursuit of the cultural and linguistic subordination of Ukraine. In order to reverse Ukraine’s 
progress towards autonomy and to reorient social values to the Soviet identity, the government 
increased its control over Ukrainian economy and social life by stifling the nation’s linguistic 
and cultural development through the ideological and administrative oppression of its political, 
cultural, and intellectual elites (von Hagen 371).  This was done through massive purges that 
swept the Soviet Union in 1934-1938 and were subsequently named the Great Terror (Service 
27).  Such purges started earlier in Ukraine, however, and Ukraine’s experience between 1929-
1933 was a preface of the difficult times that awaited the Soviet Union during the years of Great 
Terror (Magocsi A History… 567, Zaitsev 266).  Arrests, intimidations, and mass killings swept 
through Ukrainian cities and the countryside and left survivors with no choice but to submit fully 
to Soviet ideology in order to be spared. 
The 1933 introduction of the Orthographic Code directing Ukrainian language towards 
amalgamation with Russian was not accidental.  The Soviet authorities used language planning 
to gain a stronger grip on Ukraine.  Mass repressions turned the Ukrainian people into obedient 
servants of the state.  Therefore, the government had no reason to be concerned with the new 
standard’s reception by the public.  Through arrests, false accusations, and executions, the 
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government ensured acceptance of the orthographic codes (1933 & 1938) and of the concurrent 
policy of reinforcing the status of the Russian language. Social engineering can be conducted on 
both the micro- (individuals) and meso-level (organizations and institutions) (Alexander, 
Schmidt 16); it was carried out in Ukraine accordingly, on both levels. However, considering the 
targets of persecution, it is also evident that a much broader plane of engineering was used by 
Soviet authorities who launched a vendetta against entire Ukrainian social classes, regardless of 
whether or not individual representatives of the class were supporters of Soviet power. Two 
social classes, the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasants, were subjected to years of cruelty and 
persecutions (Kulchytsky The Phenomenon… 359). The Soviet authorities identified these 
classes as the most unreliable, most bourgeois, and least fitting the image of the New Soviet 
Man.  These groups also had the closest connection to the Orthographic Code of 1928: the 
intelligentsia widely participated in the development of the Code and peasants were the speakers 
who supplied vernacular forms—as Ukrainophones they were ready and willing users of the 
Ukrainian standard.  These classes were horribly battered during repression periods and lost any 
strength or motivation to express their opinions on the subject of orthography.   
 In order to achieve utter conquest, the Soviet government resorted to the destruction of 
Ukraine’s elite. In fact, Ukrainian political elites experienced arrests as early as 1929 (Zaitsev 
266).  In 1930, a trial was held regarding the Union of Liberation of Ukraine and involved thirty- 
one individuals, all former members of various Ukrainian political parties, including nine 
officials of the Tsentral’na Rada (Shapoval 333).  In January 1933, Stalin sent P. Postyshev as 
his representative to rule Ukraine; in 1935 Ukraine announced the existence of the All-Ukrainian 
Borot’bist Center, which was accused of conducting activity deemed hostile to the Soviet rule 
(Zaitsev 268-269).  As a result, former members of the Borot’bists party were persecuted and 
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members of the Communist party of Ukraine were subjected to the same treatment.  In 1937 
almost all key officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 
Ukraine and the government of Ukraine were arrested and killed (Zatsev 269).  Of one hundred 
and two members and candidates to the Central Committee, one hundred were persecuted and 
most of them shot; of eleven members of the Party’s Political Bureau, ten were killed and all 
nine members of the party’s organizational bureau were executed (Zaitsev 269).  The organizers 
and executors of earlier repressions faced the same fate as their victims: in 1939 P. Postyshev 
was summoned from Ukraine, arrested, and shot (Zaitsev 269).  The terror was absolute and all-
inclusive, and society descended into a state of constant fear and suspicion.  People became 
afraid to express their opinions and began to conceal their true beliefs.   
The achievements of ukranianization in the area of education were seriously undermined 
as a result of the Great Terror.  In 1927, Olexandr Shumsky, the Commissar of Education and the 
man responsible for ukrainianization, was exiled from Ukraine for supporting Mykola 
Khvyliovyj (Zaitsev 259-260).  He was accused of propagating nationalistic ideas, was arrested 
in 1933, and killed in 1946 by security service while returning to Ukraine from exile (Zaitsev 
260).  According to Postyshev, the following purges were made in the Ukrainian education 
system in 1933: two thousand people working in education were fired, including two hundred 
scholars and editors, as well as two hundred department and sector heads (Shapoval 340-341).  
Education boards also underwent a complete change of personnel: all officers in the regional 
school boards and ninety percent of members of the district school boards were repressed and 
replaced (Shapoval 341).  Terminations swept secondary and higher schools: four thousand 
school teachers, two hundred and ten lecturers, and eighteen out of twenty nine directors of the 
teacher training institutes were fired (Shapoval 341).  As a result, the education system lost many 
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individuals who participated in discussions surrounding the 1926 draft orthographic code and 
who worked to elaborate the Ukrainian standard through acquisition planning.  The Orthographic 
Code of 1933 not only supplanted the Code of 1928, but nearly all individuals who worked with 
and used the Code of 1928 in the education system were removed and replaced with those who 
had no association with the standard adopted in 1928.  Essentially, people were shoveled around 
like dirt to smooth the acceptance of the new standard.           
 Ukrainian academia was also subjected to repressions and suffered many losses.  
Hrushevskyj was placed under close surveillance by Soviet secret police and his viewpoints were 
thoroughly scrutinized by the authorities (Shapoval 330-331).  In March of 1931, Hrushevskyj 
was exiled from Kyiv to Moscow, was arrested a few days after his arrival, and was subjected to 
exhausting interrogations, during which the police threatened him with execution several times; 
he died in 1934 (Zaitsev 270-271).  The authorities arrested and sentenced economists 
Volobuyev and Yavorskyj to labor camps, where they both died (Magosci 1996 564).  Many 
linguists were arrested and exiled, or simply executed (Dingley 181).  Many members of the 
Commission who worked on the 1928 Code, including V. Hantsov, A. Prykhodko, S. Pylypenko, 
O. Synyavsky, A. Krymskyi, O. Kurylo, Y. Tymchenko, M. Sulyma, S. Yefremov, and H. 
Holoskevych, were accused of bourgeois nationalism and repressed (Magocsi A History… 565, 
Nimchuk 266-267, Zaitsev 266). M. Skrypnyk, the Commissar of Education and participant of 
the 1926 codification project, committed suicide after being accused of counterrevolution and 
deviation from the official Bolshevik regime (Magocsi A History… 567).  Intellectuals that 
succeeded to escape purges and continued to work in Ukraine had no choice but to make every 
effort to firmly secure Soviet Ukraine’s image as an integral part of the Soviet Union.    
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Arrests and executions of Ukrainian artists took place predominantly in 1933-1934.  
Overall, more than a half of the members of the Association of Writers of Ukraine were arrested 
between 1934-1938 (Zaitsev 271). The authorities also targeted the intelligentsia and artists who 
came from Western Ukraine to Dnieper Ukraine during ukrainianization because they were 
perceived as bourgeois threats (Zaitsev 271).  Les’ Kurbas died along with other prisoners when 
a barge transporting them was intentionally sunk in an act of execution (Bliss Eaton xxiii).   M. 
Khvyliovy committed suicide because he could not stand to see his colleagues being falsely 
accused and executed (Zaitsev 271).   He remained a devoted Communist even upon his death by 
writing in his suicide note ‘Long live communism, long live socialist construction, long live the 
Communist Party!’ (qtd. in Luckyj 176).  Paradoxically, mass arrests and persecutions inflicted 
by the Soviet authorities did not shake Khvyliovy’s fascination with communist utopia.  
Nevertheless, he was perceived as a person who was dangerous to Soviet totalitarianism.  A 
fundamental feature of colonial power is that it exists in a perpetual state of fear of being 
overthrown.  The Soviet government’s fear of losing Ukraine led to the implementation of 
various measures in order to strengthen Soviet positions in Ukraine.  Artists, who are the cultural 
leaders of a nation, significantly influence the process of shaping that nation’s views on both 
collective and individual levels.  Therefore, up to eighty per cent of Ukrainian intelligentsia were 
killed or sent to camps by the Soviet authorities (Wilson 146). Artists and academics did not fit 
with the qualities of the New Soviet Man and, therefore, they had to be neutralized or removed 
from the new Soviet society in order to prevent their influence on the rest of the population.   
Given the shocking nature of the repression exercised by the Soviet government, it is 
possible, as warned by Semen Petlyura, that the true purpose of ukrainianization was to single 
out individuals who supported Ukrainian culture and independence and to kill them (Bachynskyj 
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283).   The government was well equipped to undertake cultural cleansing.  The 1926 Census 
included a question to determine one’s ethnicity, allowing the government to easily identify each 
person’s ethnicity, class, origin, and whereabouts through the passport system, which was 
introduced during the first five-year plan (von Hagen 370).  If some classes and nationalities 
were considered enemies of the Soviet power, the authorities had tools to find individual 
members of those groups.  The label ‘bourgeois’ served as grounds for arrest and execution 
during the course of the ideological war.         
The peasantry was a target of Soviet terror throughout the history of the Soviet Union.  
The hostile attitudes of Soviet authorities towards peasants were evident through economic and 
political repression, unbearable taxes, confiscation of ‘surpluses,’ and massive deportations 
(Channon 185, Reiman 51-52).  Even peasant literature was under attack: writers and poets from 
the rural areas were labeled as representatives of the “bourgeois literary profession” (qtd. in 
Ogden 55).  Peasant writers were to be de-peasantized, imprisoned, or executed, since the new 
socialist society had no room for peasant literature (Ogden 53-72).   The authorities were 
particularly preoccupied with the issue of peasantry in literature because peasant writers and 
poets kept images of the vanishing countryside alive and raised concerns about society turning its 
back on its traditions, ways of life, and family structure.  Looking to the past threatened the 
survival of the New Soviet Man concept.  The myth of Pavlik Morozov was intended to discredit 
the traditional ways of life of the village.  His image allowed the government to proclaim 
wealthy peasants as enemies of the Soviet power and the traditional village, as an evil and 
depressing force (Kenez 116).  The myth also served as a diversion of attention from the 
executions being carried out by the Soviet authorities, by depicting enemies of collectivization as 
the ones who engaged in murders (Kenez 115).   Peasants in the Soviet Union were deemed to be 
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a threat to Soviet power due to their conservatism, adherence to traditions, and opposition to 
collectivization.  Ukrainian peasants were the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism, and as a 
result they were subjected to the policies aimed at making them weaker as a group.   
In order to subjugate the Ukrainian peasantry, Soviet authorities deliberately created 
conditions that led to a mass starvation in the Ukrainian countryside.  The government did this 
by increasing the grain collection quota in 1932 by 44% (Wilson 145).  Other agricultural 
produce and personal possessions, including clothing, were consistently collected in lieu of grain 
(Conquest 230, Kulchytsky Nevidoma… 303).  Villages were not compensated in any way for 
the expropriated goods.  Those who were unwilling or unable to deliver grain because they did 
not have any left were persecuted as criminals, imprisoned, deported to labor camps, and often 
executed and their property confiscated (Nezhyvyj 168-169, 193).   Even when people began 
starving to death, the campaign did not stop.  The collection teams often found dead bodies in the 
yards and houses, ignored them, and kept looking for non-existent grain (Nezhyvyj 172).   It has 
been suggested that the purpose of sweeps towards the end of the famine was not grain 
collection.  Dead bodies in a house were proof that there was no food remaining in that house; 
the true mission of those final raids was to ensure and prove to the government that everybody 
was dead (Nezhyvyj 172).  The Soviet grain collection policy led to the greatest humanitarian 
disaster in the history of Ukraine.   Various sources estimate rural population loss in Ukraine due 
to deportations, collectivization, and artificial famine in 1932-1933 at 3.5 to 8 million people 
(Bilocerkowycz 18, Conquest 303-307, Graziosi 6, Kul’chytski 362-414, Levin 34, Nezhyvyj 
202).  Rural Ukraine was speaking Ukrainian; therefore, the collectivization and the terror-
famine was an implacable assault on the existence of the Ukrainian language by eliminating its 
speakers.  In A History of Ukraine, Magosci presents a map of population loss in various areas of 
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Ukraine to illustrate the demographic changes during the period of collectivization and famine 
(562). 
 
Figure 5.1 Population Loss in Ukraine in 1929-1933 
Source: Magocsi, Paul Robert. A History of Ukraine. Toronto Buffalo London:    
    University of Toronto Press.          
 
Some scholars and members of the public argue that the deliberate famine was an act of 
genocide, or ethnic cleansing, because the government’s grain collection policy led to the 
eradication of the core group of speakers of the Ukrainian language (Rees Stalin... 83, Ryabchuk. 
177, Wilson 144-145).  There is evidence that the grain procurement goals were not entirely 
economic but also political.  In many cases, the collected grain was left to rot in government 
yards rather than being distributed to the starving population (Conquest 265-266).  Survivors of 
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the famine also testified that, in many cases, the grain collection teams were destroying cooked 
or other food that was not suitable for collecting (Kulchytsky Nevidoma… 304-306).  The 
purpose of food destruction was to ensure that peasants would indeed die (Kulchytsky 
Nevidoma… 306).  In 1930-1933, the government also undertook an initiative to send 
operational harvesting and milling equipment to scrap yards (Nezhyvyj 153).  These actions 
resulted in crop wastage because it was not harvested and processed in time due to shortages of 
agricultural equipment.  Following the famine, government orders, plans, and actions were made 
to move people from other republics to repopulate villages that had been wiped out by the 
famine. This was done to change the ethnic composition of Ukrainian rural areas (Nezhyvyj 185-
186,199).  Subsequently, Stalin admitted that he had wanted to deport all Ukrainians, but there 
had been too many to do so (Conquest 334).  The famine effectively decreased the number of 
Ukrainians in Ukrainian villages.   
During the famine, the situation in Ukraine was unbearable; people were going mad, 
committing suicide, eating animals, snails, grass, tree bark, acorns, and manure because it 
contained whole grains. There were cases of murders for food, cannibalism, and mothers would 
tell their children to eat them when they died.  Desperation drove people to steal.  Scavenging 
even five spikelets left behind on the field after harvesting could lead to ten years of 
imprisonment or even execution; fishing in the rivers was prohibited and punishable by law 
(Conqeust 234-235,240, 257-258, Kulchytsky Nevidoma… 249-250, Nezhyvyj 172, Zaitsev 267-
268).  In the midst of this dreadful time, some families fell into the squabbles and fights amongst 
themselves, whereas others demonstrated extraordinary love: in a witness account about a 
woman exhausted to the point that she could hardly speak, the observer describes how the 
woman kept telling legends and fairy tales to her four children so they could forget their hunger 
 124 
 
for some time (Conquest 256-257).   This experience was deeply traumatic and impacted 
people’s perception of human relations, their value of human life, their sense of self-esteem, and 
of their own identity.  The Soviet government’s policy led to the destruction of traditional rural 
ways of life, the degradation of society’s value system, the death of millions of people, and the 
removal of ethnic Ukrainians from their home land, resulting in their dispersal across vast locales 
of labor camps.   
In 1932 passports, which were required for travel within the country, were issued to 
Soviet citizens; however, peasants were excluded from this system and did not receive passports 
(Nezhyvyj 172 – 173). The internal passport system was a tool of surveillance and control over 
urban dwellers.  For rural areas, this system meant that peasants were prisoners in their villages.  
The cities, roads, railway stations, and Russian, Romanian, and Western Ukrainian borders were 
guarded by military and police and any noticed villagers were arrested, shot, or sent to camps 
(Conquest 236-237, Nezhyvyj 194-196).  Despite the danger, millions were on the move in 
search for food because staying behind at home meant death for themselves and their family 
members (Conquest 236-237).  Most travelers died on the road, were deported, or killed; 
however, even if they returned home safely, they often found their families dead.  Villages were 
left without food and without effective means to escape the famine.  As a result, millions 
perished in this tragedy.   
Whereas ukrainianization shifted power and societal dynamics towards Ukraine, the 
famine reversed this process and the power became centralized in Moscow (Bilaniuk 84, Rees 
Stalin… 83-84).  The Soviet authorities did not need ukrainianization any more because the 
Communist ideology had already developed deep roots in rural Ukraine.  Allegiance to Soviet 
power was evident given the cooperation of local Communist party activists with the Red Army 
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and internal police forces sent to Ukraine from other republics for the purpose of collecting grain 
(Kulchytsky Nevidoma… 263-264, 331, Magosci 558, Nezhyvyj 148).  At the end of the famine, 
when there was no food or goods left for the government to expropriate, these activists were not 
given any more food allotments.  They were left to starve and their fate was similar to that of 
their victims (Conquest 234, 258).  A number of the activists became disillusioned with Soviet 
power and the tragedy unfolding in Ukraine was unbearable for them.  Some were courageous 
enough to protest, write letters to party leaders, quit the party, and risk their own lives to save 
others (Nezhyvyj 193).   Some grain collectors, from Ukraine and other republics, survived and 
provided statements about their state of mind during the famine. Others were naive and truly 
believed in the communist utopia (Nezhyvyj 273). In order to survive, those who realized that 
things were not right in Ukraine had to persuade themselves of the historical necessity of terror 
in rural Ukraine to secure “the universal triumph of Communism” (qtd. in Conquest 232-333.)  
The affliction of the artificial famine in Ukraine was a test that revealed that the Soviet ideology 
was deeply rooted in the minds of certain segments of the Ukrainian population.    
The spread of Soviet ideology within the population served as a foundation for creating 
the New Soviet Man.  It was an undertaking of social engineering, in which people and their 
language served as the material.  Nilokai Bukharin32 stated that executions and labor camps were 
a means of producing a Communist humanity from the human material of the capitalist epoch 
(Beer 2).  The Ukrainian famine and the multiple waves of purges between 1929 and 1938 
ensured that the base material was free of any ideas that could hamper the formation of the 
Soviet identity.   In this sense, the famine was a form of deliberate and brutal ideological warfare 
against the Ukrainian people (Wilson 145).  The population of the Soviet Union was supposed to 
                                                      
32 Nikolai Bukharin was member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until 1929 
when he was removed as a result of a conflict with Stalin  (Reiman 8, 14, 113, 177-178).  
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believe and follow only those conventions established by Communist and Soviet ideologists.  
Language was an important element of the identity of the New Soviet Man and language 
planning activities were the main tool of this myth.    
 The important features of the New Soviet Man are enumerated in Nadezhda 
Krupskaya’s33 article, “What a Communist Ought to be Like” (Krupskya 38-41), and all these 
characteristics have a connection to the famine.   The first, and most important quality is to be a 
hard worker and appreciate collective work.  The famine was designed to ensure that peasants 
would accept collective and state farms as the only method of agricultural production and 
organization, and this way, wealthy peasants who were supporting individual farming concepts 
would disappear (Magosci A History… 557).  Post-famine, many peasants tried to escape to 
urban centers and become industrial workers in order to separate themselves from the setting that 
was the subject of mass killings.   
According to Krupskaya, true followers of the communist ideology had to promote the 
speedy arrival of the communist era by influencing the masses and convincing them to accept 
communist ideology (Krupskaya 38-39).  The construction of a utopian communist society was 
the ideological foundation of every project implemented in the Soviet Union.  Utopia implies an 
entirely new way of life, disconnected from any features from one’s present or past.   The famine 
served to destroy the anti-socialist elements of rural Ukraine and to bring the victory of 
communism to the agrarian sector.  The Soviet authorities denied the fact that the famine had 
taken place in Ukraine, since the Soviet doctrine declared the socialism system as working 
towards the well-being of people not against it (Nezhyvyj 176, 280).  Massive campaigns of lies 
and punishment for the truth were acceptable means of influencing public knowledge.  The 
                                                      
33 Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869-1939) was a Russian Bolshevik and a Revolutionary. She was married to 
Vladimir Lenin.  In the Soviet Union, she held the post of Deputy Commissar of Education and profoundly 
influenced the topic of ideology in education (Freund 318-319). 
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mention of famine was considered as anti-Soviet propaganda punishable with five or more years 
in labor camps.  Even the word ‘famine’ was forbidden from use (Conquest 258-259).  Death 
records and certificates were forged and altered to remove the cause of death initially stated as 
hunger, to unknown (Boriak 34). 
   
Figure 5.2  Death Record Issued in Ukraine in 1932 shows that the original cause of 
death stated as “starvation” was changed to “unknown cause.” 
 
 
Source:  Boriak, Hennadii  Sources and Resources on the Famine in Ukraine’s State Archival 
System.  In Hryn, Halyna (ed.) Hunger by Design: the Great Ukrainian Famine and Its 
Soviet Context. Harvard University. 2008. (34) Print. 
 
Any collective memory of the famine was effectively suppressed by the government (Wilson 
145).  On a personal level, the survival mechanism of denial was an additional force pushing 
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famine survivors to forget the physical, emotional, and psychological traumas they had endured.  
All disconnection from reality and an utter denial of truth made it easier for the Soviet 
government to promote utopian dreams about a happy communist future.  
The necessary elements required for constructing a communist society include the 
subordination of personal interests to common interests, the abandonment of any personal 
attachments in the name of communist ideals, volunteering or allowing the confiscation of 
valuables, and the ability to be resolute in the midst of cruelty or dangers associated with military 
actions (Krupskaya 40).  One’s connection with traditions, ancestry, and ethnic culture was to be 
eradicated as characteristics alien to the new Soviet identity.  The famine had been an 
opportunity for grain collectors to practice cruelty and resolution.  The task was unbearable and 
many tried to deal with their psychological trauma by persuading and reminding themselves that 
they must not give in to pity and must continue the historical revolutionary duty for the goal of a 
better communist future (Conquest 230, 233-234).  The famine extinguished many lives, leaving 
gaps in communities, families, and generations.  Many relationships that existed before the 
famine had vanished and this resulted in vast disconnects between community members, 
relatives, and age groups, which facilitated the abandonment of connections to the past on both 
personal and social levels.      
The promotion of Russian in the areas of government administration, ideology, science, 
and education secured its perception as being a high language.   Propaganda about love of the 
Russian language intensified through the institution of Soviet policies (Bilanuik 85).   The Soviet 
government believed that national languages would gradually die out and was frustrated that 
there was no evidence that it was actually happening (Bilanuik 85).  The famine contributed to 
the desired statistics of language disappearance:  the number of speakers of Ukrainian decreased 
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by millions (Magosci 562).   The famine also indirectly contributed to the spread of the Russian 
language because the execution of grain collection and other purges by representatives of the 
State were conducted primarily in Russian or with elements of Russian in the language.  It 
demonstrated to the Ukrainian people that Russian was the language of power that could easily 
crush millions of people without the faintest glimmer of concern.  A person who did not speak 
Russian was therefore rendered intimidated and insecure and was forced to see a more secure 
future in Russian.  Just as victims of rape try to convince themselves that it was an act of love in 
order to deal with their abuse, Ukrainian society became more susceptible to massive switches to 
the Russian language (Ryabchuk 177). 
The death record presented above indicates УСРР (Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic) 
as the entry in the field ‘Citizenship.’  There are a few more peculiarities in this entry, in addition 
to the alteration of cause of death.  First, the name of the republic was changed to УРСР 
(Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) in 1937 (Zaitsev 253, 270).  The Soviet government 
wanted to emphasize that Ukraine was first and foremost ‘Soviet,’ and only after that, ‘Socialist,’ 
and this order of words also matched the name of the whole Soviet state, the ‘Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics.’  Second, the record indicates that people in Ukraine identified with the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as the country of their citizenship, not the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).  Later, the engineering of the New Soviet Man ultimately resulted in 
people identifying with the USSR as the only country of their citizenship.  The Soviet Republics, 
including Ukraine, became mere references to geographical locations of residence and lost any 
affiliation with the concept of citizenship.  This document also contains spelling that disappeared 
from the language with the introduction of new orthography in 1933: спеціяльність, смерти 
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(Boriak 34).  These features vanished in “the battle against nationalism on the language front” 
(qtd. in Dingley 181).   
In order to secure the Codes of 1933 and the new alphabet that did not contain ‘ґ,’ the 
Orthographic Code of 1928 and the letter ‘ґ’ were labeled bourgeois and were said to represent 
bourgeois ideology.  The use of the letter ‘ґ’ became a crime and could lead to arrest and 
prosecution for counterrevolutionary activity (Magocsi A History… 567).  The government’s 
appeal to ideologies and their engagement in intimidations demonstrates that securing acceptance 
of the new alphabet is a form of quackish social engineering.  However, if one takes into account 
that purging users of the letter ‘ґ’ was an element of a policy aimed at establishing totalitarian 
Soviet control through a national genocide, securing a new alphabet becomes a deplorable 
technique of dark social engineering.  This practice was aligned with initiatives undertaken in 
other parts of the Soviet Union.  The authorities also proclaimed the Latin alphabet as bourgeois 
and replaced it with Cyrillic in the Asian Soviet republics, as well as in Siberia (Kappeler 379).  
Furthermore, the authorities were concerned with the writing of certain words in capital or lower 
case.  The word ‘God’ was to be written as ‘god’ to reflect the denunciation of religion by the 
Soviet state34 (Lewis Burgin 39).   The battle against nationalism in the area of language and the 
engineering of the New Soviet Man were carried out on the micro level of spelling, individual 
letters, and grammatical rules.  The famine removed any potential challenges for the acceptance 
of the 1933 Code since starving children in Ukrainian villages were not preoccupied with 
grammar and spelling.  As the situation worsened, schools stopped functioning and children 
often became too weak to attend. When the education system resumed work, the rules of 1928 
were practically forgotten and the new rules were accepted as the only standard.     
                                                      
34 The editorial to the nineth edition of Holoskevych dictionary published in Great Britain in 1961 denoted that while 
traditionally religious words were written with a capital first letter in Ukrainian, the dictionary prescribed writing 
them with small letters due to political reasons (Holoskevych  Editorial).    
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By replacing Ukrainian grammar endings with Russian ones in the 1933 Orthographic 
Code, the government set a precedent of language borrowing on a level that was not strictly 
lexical.  Shifting the paradigm of Ukrainian case endings towards Russian endings destroyed the 
integrity of Ukrainian words and intensified the practices of language mixing.  The mixture of 
Ukrainian and Russian called surzhyk is not strictly a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian words.  
Rather, Ukrainian words get russified by adding Russian morphemes and the same is true for 
Russian words in surzhyk: they often have Ukrainian affixes and endings.  Since the 1933 Code 
was the official sanction of mixing, surzhyk moved beyond the traditional oral vernaculars.  A 
high degree of penetration of Russian elements was recorded in industrial and professional areas.  
(Yizhakevych 298-299).  This is not surprising, since in 1933, the government eradicated 
specialized Ukrainian terminology and replaced it with Russian.   When a person did not 
remember a term, there was no motivation to check the dictionary because it was highly probable 
one would find a Russian-looking word.  The changes of 1933 and 1938 produced a situation 
where society accepted any prescription of language planning.  This attitude spread even to 
surzhyk, which was deemed an acceptable means of communication and people readily admitted 
that they used surzhyk and did not want to take any efforts to stop mixing languages. In a way, 
surzhyk was legitimized in 1933 and 1938 in accordance with the theory and policy of 
convergence of languages.  Convergence was designed by Soviet social engineers in order for 
Russian to soak up Ukrainian.   
By resembling Russian, the new standard variety of Ukrainian produced the impression 
that both languages were virtually the same.  This implied that a separate Ukrainian identity was 
non-existent.    The mandate of the new standard language and the elevation of Russian helped 
the government create the myth of the New Soviet Man who speaks Russian and does not 
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identify with any particular ethno-geographical area or group other than Russian.  Such an 
individual is easy to move from one site of the socialist construction project to another, ensuring 
the availability of labor and the indivisible wholeness of the Soviet state.   The introduction of 
Russian-looking features into standard Ukrainian in 1933 and 1938 and the increased role of 
Russian as the high variety facilitated the centralization of power by Soviet authorities.  Russian 
was the language of the political centre and Russian features in Ukrainian brought Ukrainians 
closer to the political center.  In essence, this was the centralization of power through standard 
orthography.   
Securing acceptance at the stage of language planning requires tremendous government 
efforts, as well as input from other interested social circles.   The language planning stage is 
more prone to failure than selection or codification.  Securing acceptance is interrelated with the 
elaboration stage and greatly depends on the progress of elaboration.  If the governments are 
willing to invest resources into the securing acceptance phase and endorse the new variety as 
prestigious, the probability of successful language planning increases.  The governments of 
independent Ukraine tried to achieve the acceptance of Ukrainian as its new standard.  Although 
they had little time, the Orthographic codes created during Ukraine’s brief independence became 
the foundation for the Codes of 1921 and 1928, which were adopted in Soviet Ukraine.  In most 
cases, efforts to secure acceptance of the Ukrainian language during ukrainianization were made 
by means of sociotechniques proper.  Elements of self-made and quakish social engineering were 
also present, since the language planners relied on legislative orders promoting Ukrainian.  
Despite other methods, acceptance of the Orthographic Codes of 1933 and 1938 was secured 
practically entirely by means of dark social engineering. People faced the choice of accepting the 
new codes or death.  Ukraine emerged from the famine and the purges as a different group of 
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people.  They survived as an ethnic group, but were severely undermined and battered into 
submission. They were more prone to accepting any policy the government would send their 
way, including the new Orthographic Codes.  The Ukrainian people started to drift towards 
Russian since it provided better hopes for the future, including security and dignity.      
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CONCLUSIONS 
A complete understanding of language planning projects requires the detailed 
examination of their historical and social context.  Therefore, the language planning undertaken 
in Soviet Ukraine between 1919 and 1938 cannot be analyzed without looking at the political 
forces driving the social change.  Furthermore, historical events, which took place in the years 
prior to the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine in 1919, had created a peculiar language 
situation, which, along with the Soviet government’s political goals, influenced language 
planning policy.  Annexing the Dnieper Ukraine in 1654 was an important achievement for 
Russian colonialism.  Therefore, substantial efforts were invested in retaining Ukraine, “the 
jewel in the Russian imperial crown,” within the borders of Russia (qtd. in Wilson 151).  In order 
to discourage aspirations of an independent Ukrainian national identity, Ukraine was subjected to 
political, social, and cultural oppression for centuries.  Although tsarist Russia and the Soviet 
Union were two very different totalitarian powers both in their political structure and 
administrative organization, they used similar mechanisms to suppress Ukrainian 
indigenousness.  One can observe the similarities of between tsarist and Soviet objectives and 
implementation of language policies, since these policies were guided predominantly by the 
colonial ambitions of both governments.   
Every stage of language planning reflects the mandates of those who have the power to 
intervene in the language.  Prior to 1917, the linguistic policy in Russia generally pursued the 
prohibition of Ukrainian in order to ensure the retention of Ukraine within Russia, with short 
periods of lifts of this ban.  However, even those small concessions were intended to undermine 
the Ukrainian language as they allowed very limited use of Ukrainian in non-strategic and non-
prestigious areas.   The Soviet government inherited Russian Tsarist colonial attitudes towards 
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Ukraine and adopted their methods of oppressing and assimilating the Ukrainian language.  
These sociolinguistic conditions were created to make Ukrainian a non-prestigious variety and 
therefore an unattractive means of communication.   The promotion of bilingualism in Ukraine 
was one sided: native speakers of Ukrainian learned Russian but the speakers of Russian did not 
need to know Ukrainian.  These policies undermined the existence of a Ukrainian national 
identity and contributed to implementing the concept of the New Soviet Man. 
Language change and language planning never occur in a vacuum and must be 
considered in the context of other languages (Hornberger 33). Ukraine’s servitude and 
partitioning between various conquerors meant it was influenced by Russian on one side and 
various European languages on the other.  Consequently, the Ukrainian language entered the 
twentieth century having two language traditions and no standard variety.  Ukraine’s 
independence and the Act of Union of 1919 created the first opportunity in history for the 
development of a unified code of Ukrainian.   Linguists who participated in codification projects 
during the years of independence (1917-1919) made enormous contributions to the development 
of standard Ukrainian and set the foundation and traditions for subsequent codification efforts.     
Driven by aspirations of a unified and independent Ukraine, the language planners chose 
to include features of both Dnieper and Western Ukrainian traditions, based on linguistic science, 
history, and etymology.  This concept and the Orthographic Codes of independent Ukraine were 
used as basis for codification projects undertaken in Soviet Ukraine in 1921 and 1926-1928. In 
this way, language planning traditions that developed in independent Ukraine penetrated Soviet 
linguistics and language planning.   Simultaneously, on the political front, the merging of 
Borot’bists with the Communist Party of Bolsheviks created favorable conditions for allowing 
19th century Ukrainian liberation ideas to influence the language policies of Soviet Ukraine.  The 
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adoption of the indigenization policy by the USSR served to lure ethnic groups into staying 
within the realm of Russia.  The Ukrainian version of this policy, ukrainianization, was needed 
by the Bolsheviks to secure acceptance of their ideology by the people of Ukraine, who, in 1926, 
were eighty percent Ukrainian, based on ethnicity and language (Magocsi A History… 573).  
These factors contributed to the strengthening and legitimizing of the Ukrainian national identity, 
an outcome always feared by oppressors of Ukraine. 
A strong Ukrainian nation would have been an impediment to Moscow’s concentration of 
control over the country.  The famine and purges in Ukraine quickly undid any nation-building 
progress made during ukranianization.  The famine reversed ukrainianization by destroying the 
peasantry, which was the ukrainianization policy’s base target and support group.  Purges against 
Ukrainian political and cultural elite groups removed the potential danger of educated and 
progressive individuals leading and inspiring the Ukrainian nation.  Since the standard language 
is considered an important element in nation building, the Soviet authorities made Ukrainian 
resemble Russian in order to undermine the separateness of the Ukrainian language.    The sense 
of distinct national identity that developed during ukrainianization was replaced through the 
myth of the New Soviet Man. 
Every person, including the New Soviet Man, needs to have a language.   Without 
actually saying it, Soviet authorities engineered conditions for Russian to become the one and 
only language of the new Soviet society. The Soviet government devised a new standard 
Ukrainian, which resembled Russian, specifically for groups that were unwilling, indifferent, or 
had no opportunity to master Russian.  Distinctly Ukrainian words were replaced with 
synonyms, often artificially created, to move Ukrainian vocabulary closer to Russian.  The 
standard language connects the nation to both its past and its future (Cooper 184).  This is true 
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for the Ukrainian Orthographic Codes of 1918-1919, 1921, and 1928, since the codifiers kept the 
history of the language in mind while developing the rules.  The Codes of 1933 and 1938, 
however, entirely disconnected standard Ukrainian from its historical and etymological 
background.  In this sense standard Ukrainian, just like the concept of the New Soviet Man, had 
no links to the past and was oriented entirely to the future.   
The process of assimilating Ukrainian into Russian continued past 1938: the spelling of 
any Ukrainian words that was still different from Russian subsequently changed to follow 
Russian models.  After 1933, borrowed foreign words in Ukrainian lost any connection to their 
original language.  They started to look as if they came from Russian, and their spelling came 
from Russian Orthography.  The process of mimicking Russian spelling, grammar rules, and 
word paradigms contributed to the development of a sense of superiority of the Russian 
language, because usually there is a drive to follow something more prestigious as it appears 
better and more attractive.   Labeling the standard language developed during ukrainianization as 
bourgeois and nationalistic was a social engineering tool designed to achieve the unanimous 
acceptance of the new rules and vocabulary, since commitment to previous orthography was 
viewed as disgraceful and dangerous.  Fear discouraged the survivors of purges and famine from 
demonstrating any signs of distinct Ukrainianness, even if they consciously recognized their 
identity as such.   
The crusade against Ukrainian letters did not come to an end with the cessation of the 
Stalin era or the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The battle with Ukrainian letters that are 
graphically different from the Russian alphabet continues even today.  The troublesome letters 
are no longer labeled “bourgeois,” since this categorization is now archaic, or even humorous. 
Instead, the letters are considered inconvenient, a characteristic that in our modern, fast-paced 
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society means these letters will likely be eliminated from the alphabet.  Current social engineers 
may be tempted to take advantage of the modern push to simplify and standardize technological 
processes. They can make anything disappear, from social habits to letters of the alphabet and 
they will not be required to explain their true reasons to the public in order to to secure support.  
All that is required is a label that suggests certain elements are hampering the path of 
technological progress and members of society will be more likely to reject these elements and 
support their destruction.  Moreover, the technological advances of telecommunication have 
made it possible to deliver an idea to millions without the need for thousand of propaganda 
agents canvassing the countryside.  Social networks can instantly deliver a message to millions 
of people, and millions will repeat it without any suspicion that it can be part of a hidden plot. 
When a country undertakes the project of codifying a vernacular to produce a standard 
variety, the individuals engaged in the process face numerous pressures.  Some of those 
pressures come from purely linguistic aspects: the forms that are selected to enter the standard 
have to be linguistically logical and interconnected within the paradigm of norms being 
established during codification.  Since the standard language can be both a uniting and separating 
force within society, the codifiers face pressures of an ideological nature.  As a rule, authorities 
that order the development of a standard language wish to use the process to their advantage.  If 
their goal is to build a strong national identity, they may order the codifiers to maintain the 
nation building function of the standard in mind while developing language norms in order to 
make those norms suitable for propagating national ideas.  The standard’s nation building 
function was used in Ukraine during the years of independence and ukrainianization as an 
attempt to build a united image of the country by shifting the orthographies of Western Ukraine 
and Dnieper Ukraine closer to one another.  Members of the Orthographic Commissions tried to 
 139 
 
diminish the effects of the standard’s separation potential as much as possible in order to avoid 
resentment of the standard by any group in Ukrainian society.   
The social engineering goal of the 1933 and 1938 codification projects was to dismantle 
the Ukrainian national identity, since the authorities viewed it as dangerous to Soviet power.    
The Ukrainian national identity was to be replaced with the myth of the New Soviet Man.  The 
Soviet agenda of engineering the New Soviet Man benefited from the unifying capacity of the 
standard language.  The authorities tried to create a Russian-Ukrainian linguistic commonality by 
including Russian elements in standard Ukrainian. Both sets of Orthographic codes (1918-1919 
& 1928 (1st set), and 1933 & 1938 (2nd set)) projected unity.  The first set projected the unity of 
Western and Dnieper Ukraine, while the second set projected the unity of Ukraine and Russia, 
and served as a building block for the myth of the New Soviet Man. The language planning 
processes of 1933 and 1938 did not involve any linguistic considerations and were guided by a 
purely political agenda.  The government did not anticipate any difficulty in spreading and 
securing the acceptance of the changes to the orthographic rules introduced in 1933 and 1938, 
even though these changes, were linguistically unsubstantiated.  The Soviet authorities resorted 
to dark engineering to eliminate any potential resistance to the new orthography.   
Politically and socially powerful groups undertake language planning in a society in order 
to fulfill their mandates.  Language planning is a purposeful intervention in the language of a 
nation and involves political, social, and cultural agendas.  Whether the government mandate is 
positive or negative is a question of moral principles and political debate (Thomas 38).   Social 
manipulations, mass arrests, executions, and the famine put the language planning efforts of 
1933-1938 in the category of dark social engineering.   Since a totalitarian regime operates under 
the constant fear of being overthrown by those who are oppressed, the Soviet government 
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showed it was threatened by the graphical representation of letters and spelling of words.  By 
eliminating distinct Ukrainian letters, spellings of foreign borrowings, and grammatical endings, 
the government devised a language that resembled Russian graphically, phonetically, and 
grammatically and secured the reign of the Soviet government in Moscow.  Whether a standard 
variety is socially beneficial in building a national identity or becomes a potential cause of 
ethnolinguistic death depends on the political mandate of the group undertaking the language 
planning process. 
The history of Russia’s political impact on standard Ukrainian may be of interest to 
scholars researching language planning and language change in the context of bilingual societies 
and political power.  It may be used to explain to students of Ukrainian how the differences 
between the orthographies used in the West and in Ukraine came into existence.  It may also 
provide some understanding of why the issue of the two codes of Ukrainian is the subject of 
many emotionally charged debates in Ukraine and within the Ukrainian community in the West.  
Awareness and understanding of the historical roots and political context of the development of 
the existing standards of Ukrainian may assist individuals involved in and effected by this 
polarizing issue to build a link between the opposing camps, find shared concepts, and begin 
appreciating the existing diversity of the language.  The study of the history of language planning 
will contribute to debates about the future of Ukrainian, which has become an important part of 
the nation building process of independent Ukraine in the 21st century. 
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